Capitalism, Democracy and the History of Political Ideologies

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Content

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Political Ideologies and their Relationship to Capitalism and Democracy

Special Issue: Introduction

The development of democratic ideas and practices as well as of industrial capitalism from the eighteenth century to the present day was closely associated with the emergence of range of political ideologies. In this special issue we deal with liberalism, social democracy, communism, and fascism. There have been other ideologies, of course, e. g. conservatism, anarchism, feminism, ecologism, Islamism, populism, nationalism and racism, just to mention a few obvious ones.[1] The very term "ideology" is often traced back to the time of the French Revolution, when Antoine Destutt de Tracy used it to outline a scientific way to examine ideas.[2] Ideology can indeed be described as a child of reason, as it is rooted in French Enlightenment belief in the human faculty to examine everything rationally and systematically. Those opposed to the Enlightenment and its ideals introduced a more pejorative understanding of ideology highlighting its relationship to political doctrines that were utopian, dogmatic and totalizing in nature.[3] The pejorative use of "ideology" was picked up by Karl Marx in his *The German Ideology*, in which he criticized philosophers, specifically the Young Hegelians, for only interpreting the world but not seeking to change it. Ideology was thus related to lack of efficiency, absence of reality and the espousal of illusory schemes. Later on, Marx and Friedrich Engels would not tire to contrast the allegedly scientific nature of their own thought with what they dubbed "bourgeois ideology."[4] Yet ironically the followers of Marx and Engels made Marxism into an ideology and referred positively to socialist ideology as underpinning socialist political movements. For the Marxist Antonio Gramsci, ideologies were important in making certain bodies

1   A rich discussion of the many facets of political ideologies can be found in Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent and Marc Stears, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
2   Emmet R. Kennedy, "'Ideology' from Destutt de Tracey to Marx," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 40, no. 3 (1979), 444–503.
3   Jay W. Stein, "The Beginnings of 'Ideology'," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 55 (1956), 163–170.
4   Martin Seliger, *The Marxist Conception of Ideology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

of ideas "hegemonic" vis-à-vis other bodies of ideas thus legitimating particular power structures or challenging them.

Karl Mannheim's 1936 study *Ideology and Utopia* amounted to a comprehensive attempt to provide a theory of ideology. Distinguishing between "particular" and "total" conceptions of ideology, he highlighted how some ideologies, including Marxism, amounted to a complete world view of everything.[5] During the Cold War, many liberal thinkers referred to ideology as only consisting of such totalizing bodies of theory, in particular communism and fascism, conveniently put together under the label of totalitarianism. The idea of an "end of ideology"[6] referring to the victory of liberalism over fascism (real) and communism (anticipated) was, however, itself ideology, liberal ideology, which Michael Freeden has described as the "dominant ideology" in the modern era.[7] Liberal political philosophy posited that pluralistic politics was the mirror opposite to totalizing ideologies, which were, according to Michael Oakshott, always based on forms of "abridgement" of social reality.[8] Such abridgments led to the construction of binary worlds of good and evil, where the former was exclusively associated with one's own ideology.[9] The political science and sociology literature on "ideology," usually differentiating between "science" and "ideology" was nearly endless during the Cold War, and after its end liberal triumphalism came back prominently, especially with Francis Fukuyama's 1992 publication of *The End of History and the Last Man*.[10]

However, under the impact of the new intellectual and conceptual history, more complex conceptualizations of ideology have appeared seeking to analyze ideologies as "complex structures of discourse which carry immense amounts of inherited, interwoven intellectual baggage, often increasing by the year. Every ideology is therefore a conjunction of intellectual hybrids."[11] Arguably few scholars have done more in re-orienting the study of ideologies away from understanding them as impoverished, simplified, and doctrinaire forms of political philosophy than Michael Freeden. His work instead emphasizes how it makes more sense to understand ideologies as "forms

5   Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (London: Routledge, 1997).
6   Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: on the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the 1950s* (New York: The Free Press, 1960) argued that classic nineteenth-century ideologies, in particular Marxism, had come to an end and would be replaced by common-sense technocratic and rational solutions to political problems.
7   Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 139–316.
8   Michael Oakshott, *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* (Rutherfordton, N.C.: Liberty Press, 1991).
9   Ken Minogue and Alien Powers, *The Pure Theory of Ideology* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985).
10   Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).
11   Andrew Vincent, *Modern Political Ideologies* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 18f.

of political thought that provide important direct access to comprehending the formation and nature of political theory, its richness, varieties and subtelty."[12] Studying ideologies, according to Freeden, is tantamount to exploring political philosophies. Ideologies are thus, like political philosophy, necessary to make sense of the political world around human beings. They tend to be based on values to which those adhering to them, subscribe to. Individuals cannot but receive, adapt, and espouse different ideologies. They have to relate their own beliefs to them and identify partially or wholly with them. They thus become ideologists themselves. In other words: ideologies are inscribed into the very fibre of the political.

What we pick up in this special issue is that many of the ideologies discussed here positioned themselves vis-à-vis the structures and justifications of industrial capitalism and of democracy as they emerged from the eighteenth century onwards. Liberalism is the oldest of those ideologies and it rested, above all, on critiques of absolutism and aristocratic privilege. Associated with ideas of constitutionalism, the rule of law, parliamentary and electoral reform, freedom of the press, reason, individualism, meritocracy and the development of a capitalist economy, its relationship to democracy remained deeply ambiguous in the nineteenth century, as many liberals tied demands for participation in the political sphere to education and property. They propagated a social exclusivism towards the lower classes that extended from the political to other lifeworlds, including the economic, social, and cultural.[13] Hence it was social democracy rather than liberalism that was most strongly associated with the rise of mass democracy from the last third of the nineteenth century onwards. Intent on solving the "social question" that accompanied the rise of industrial capitalism in the nineteenth century, social democracy had high hopes that democracy would be the key to social reform ameliorating the worst excesses of industrial capitalism and liberating the working classes from their "enslavement" under capitalism.[14] Communism was rooted as an ideology in the disappointment about what came to be conceptualized as "bourgeois" democracy and developed its own understandings of a "proletarian" democracy that under communism, however, looked like and felt like dictatorship. Opposed to capitalism, it associated "bourgeois" democracy with the defence of capitalism and the abolition of capitalism would, under communism, also necessitate the overcoming of

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12   Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 1.
13   Jörn Leonhard, *Liberalismus: zur historischen Semantik eines europäischen Deutungsmusters* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001).
14   Ole Merkel is currently working on a PhD at the Ruhr University Bochum under my supervision, examining the opposition of the British and German labour movements towards slavery in the nineteenth century, and how both used "slavery" as a metaphor to understanding the conditions of the working classes in Britain and Germany respectively.

"bourgeois" democracy.[15] Opposed to pitting social classes against each other, fascism instead emphasized the common interest of the nation and argued that nationalism and racism were the key motors of human societies. Democracy with its emphasis on a pluralism of interests expressed through diverse political parties, on parliamentarism and on the rule of law, was something that fascist ideology sought to overcome and replace with the interests of the people understood as all members of the national community. Everything, including capitalism, had to be subservient to the interests of that community.[16]

Much of our understanding of the trajectories of modern history rests on comprehending the relationship between political ideologies and their relationship to capitalism and democracy. Hence the four articles that make up this special issue explore key aspects of this relationship. Jörn Leonhard starts off with a warning not to equate too easily liberalism with capitalism. Instead, he argues that it was precisely a more flexible relationship between the two which made liberalism so resilient in overcoming a range of crises over almost three centuries to remain today an attractive political ideology in many parts of the world. Leonhard identifies four decisive transformative periods in the history of liberalism which, each time, made it adapt to different historical circumstances. At the end of the eighteenth century, liberalism developed a new understanding of the economy and of society more generally by introducing the idea of the market which was to transform estates-based societies. The key revolutionary idea expressed, above all, by Adam Smith was that pursuing individual interests could be brought into line with the common good.[17] Endorsing capitalism as the economic system best suited for this squaring of the circle went hand in hand with developing ideas of constitutionalism that was to perform the same trick in the political sphere. The second transformation of liberalism, occurred, according to Leonhard, in the 1840s and 1850s when some liberals at least began to develop more critical attitudes towards capitalism. John Stuart Mill, for example, was deeply concerned about marking class barriers more porous, even if he still shied away from endorsing a more interventionist and welfarist state.[18] The years around 1900 then saw a further intensification of liberal criticisms of capitalism. Lord Acton, the great historian of liberalism who never

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15   On the delineation of different types of democracy, see the classic Artur Rosenberg, *Democracy and Socialism: A Contribution to the Political History of the Past 150 Years* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965).

16   Richard James Boon Bosworth, *The Oxford Handbook of Fascism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); a brilliant brief introduction can be found in Kevin Passmore, *Fascism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

17   Knud Haakonssen, *The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

18   Christopher MacLeod and Dale E. Miller, *Companion to Mill* (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2017), especially the essays in part V: *Mill's Social Philosophy*, 407–532.

managed to finish his magnum opus on the subject, bemoaned the missing ethical orientation of capitalism.[19] In Britain the emerging New Liberalism[20] and the Progressive Movement in the United States.[21] saw a decisive turn to a stronger and more interventionist state seeking to correct the faults of capitalism. It marked a social opening of liberalism that made possible alliances with democrats and social democrats in pursuit of social reform. The final major transformation of liberalism, Leonhard argues, occurred from the 1970s onwards, when consensus liberalism championed consensus capitalism that was meant to bring the interests of the capitalist economy in line with the interests of democratic mass societies through state action and social engineering. At this stage, it would appear to be very close to the second major ideology discussed here by Stefan Berger: social democracy.

If Leonhard emphasizes in his article that liberalism was not a static ideology but one that could be accentuated very differently over time and space and one which was capable of reflecting the costs of industrial capitalism, the same can be said for social democracy. Berger emphasizes how social democracy emerged in the nineteenth century, above all, as a movement for more democracy, political and economic democracy, and inclusion in the social and cultural spheres of respectable middle-class society. It was, above all, disappointment with the ongoing exclusion of social democracy and the working classes that bred disillusionment and resentment and made social democracy turn to revolutionary Marxism. The overthrow of capitalism still needed democracy, but what kind of democracy would be established once capitalism was overcome, remained a matter of debate among Marxist social democrats.[22] The successful establishment of communism in the Soviet Union forced a division in social democracy, in which the social democrats renewed their commitment to democracy as dividing line to communism. The overthrow of capitalism by democratic means and the democratic shaping of the post-capitalist society of the future were basic tenets held by social democrats, even if the multiple crises of the interwar period, both economic and political, led to repeated self-doubts among social democrats whether the democratic path was the right one. Hence Berger underlines that it was only after the end of the Second World War and with the onset of the Cold War that social democracy shed the legacies of Marxism and committed themselves whole-heartedly to liberal democracy as the means to no longer overcome capitalism but to make it work for everyone, including the working classes. Whilst it appeared for a while as if social democracy,

19   Roland Hill, *Lord Acton* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
20   Michael Freeden, *New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).
21   Tim McNeese, *The Progressive Movement: Advocating Social Change* (New York: Infobase, 2008).
22   Soma Marik, *Reinterrogating the Classical Marxist Discourses of Revolutionary Democracy* (Delhi: Aakar, 2008).

in alliance with social liberalism would be capable of recasting capitalism in its image, the neoliberal challenge combined with attacks on social democracy's materialist progress orientation by sections of a postmaterialist left put social democracy on the defensive. Especially its ties to macro-economic steering, social engineering and an allegedly wasteful and counterproductive welfarism came under increasing critique. Social democracy had to reinvent itself and went through a phase of neoliberalization, which substantially weakened its brand, and further to a contemporary situation where it is very much searching for a new identity as a political ideology.

The fall of communism as an ideology that ruled half the globe during the period of the Cold War was widely celebrated as a triumphant moment both for liberalism and for capitalism. During the Cold War, the threat of communism had been an argument for social democrats and their allies in their quest to give capitalism a social outlook. The disappearance of communism seemed to confirm the neoliberal desire to free capitalism from all potential fetters. Those in the liberal-capitalist west who had retained, however limited, a certain loyalty or affection for communism, had always stressed that at least capitalism had been overcome in the societies of "real existing socialism."[23] If the relationship of communism to capitalism was straightforward, Kevin Morgan reminds us in his article that the relationship between communism and democracy was much more complex and ambiguous. Communist regimes in the twentieth century had a strong track record of using state violence to repress democracy. Democracy had indeed been key to the collapse of communism around 1990. As Morgan argues, communism's own pretence to democracy, captured in the term "people's democracy" had become the main reason for its nemesis. He pursues this refusal to let go of the language of democracy among communists from the Bolshevik definition of democracy as the class-based liberty of workers to the definitions often used by communists in the people's front policies during the era of fascism that harked back to the lowest common denominator of "bourgeois" democracy. Stalin's 1936 constitution was celebrated not just in the Soviet Union but also by many western fellow travellers as the most democratic in the world. Morgan is particularly interested in how communist movements that were in opposition used democratic freedoms in order to aid them in their struggles for greater social justice which were presented often as campaigns for democracy. Where communists were in opposition, they often had a very different attitude to democracy to communists in government. Lapsed communists, like E.P. Thompson in Britain, remained fierce critics of capitalism and sought to recover a socialist humanist civic activism based on morality and democracy.[24]

23   David Caute, *The Fellow Travellers: Intellectual Friends of Communism* (revised and updated edition) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).

24   Scott Hamilton, *The Crisis of Theory: E. P. Thompson, the New Left and Post-War British Politics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012).

If communism had an unambiguous hostility to capitalism and an ambiguous relationship to democracy, it was the other way around for fascism, which had an unambiguous hostility to democracy and an ambiguous relationship to capitalism. As Arnd Bauerkämper in his article makes clear, the old Marxist interpretation of fascism being in the pay of capitalism is far too simplistic.[25] Nowhere did fascism abolish capitalism, but in many places, it was transformed structurally. Where the aims of the fascist regimes did not harmonize with economic liberalism and market mechanisms, fascism was not hesitant to intervene. The regulation of labour mobility, prices, and interest rates as well as direct interventions in specific industries including the nationalization of industries were all means to ensure that ultimately the fascist regimes were capable of forcing their will onto reluctant capitalists. However, in most places most of the time this was not necessary, as capitalists made good profits under fascism. Thus, for example, the National Socialist political agenda of re-armament, autarky and expansion could be largely achieved in harmony with the leading industrialists in Germany. A mixture of stimulation and coercion led to the wide-spread collaboration of capitalists with fascists. Whilst there were only individual capitalists who supported National Socialism before 1933, in Italy many more key capitalists had lost their belief in democracy after the "red years" of 1919/20. They turned to fascism to protect capitalism, but the Italian fascists, just like the German National Socialists, were not shy to use state regulation of industry and to limit the freedom of industrialists where it suited their definition of the "national interest."

Overall, all four articles dealing with four of the major ideologies of the modern era highlight the ambiguous and shifting relationship to democracy and capitalism. Liberalism was wary of democracy for a long time, whilst it stood at the cradle of capitalism. Its espousal of individualism was inextricably bound up with a defence of private property.[26] Yet over time, it warmed to democracy and became critical of the social misery produced by capitalism, seeking ways in which democracy would be able to reign in capitalism. The struggle between left liberalism and neoliberalism over the amount of freedom capitalism was to be allowed continues to characterize liberal ideologies until today. Social democracy was the main political force in "forging democracy"[27] in the nineteenth century. Yet the exclusions and discriminations it suffered made parts of social democracy turn away from "bourgeois democracy" and towards revolution. The split with communism made social democracy return to the path of liberal democracy in the interwar period, even if it was only after the Second World War, under the impact of the Cold War, that social democracy, often in alliance with

25   David Beetham, *Marxists in Face of Fascism: Writings by Marxists on Fascism from the Interwar Period* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983).

26   John N. Gray, *Liberalism* (Milton Keynes: The Open University Press, 1986), 66.

27   Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe 1850–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

social liberalism, committed fully to democracy in order to give capitalism a more human face. Communism never abandoned its however flimsy claims to democracy, and especially where communism was not in government it remained a political force that used democracy in order to further campaigns against social injustices. Ironically, democracy movements ultimately brought an end to many ruling Communist parties across Eastern Europe and the wider world. Where it survives, as in China, it promotes a state-directed turbo-capitalism that threatens to beat the western capitalist states at their own game. Yet here it has ceased to be a force for greater social justice whilst being no more democratic than the Communist regimes of old. Like communism, fascism is a political ideology that has had its moment and is in need of proper historicization, a process that has been ongoing since the decades of the end of the Second World War. As an ideology it was ultimately defeated in a world war that saw a short-lived alliance between liberal democratic capitalism and communism. Fascism had proven the malleability of capitalism that has had an ability to accommodate itself to many different political ideologies. Fascism did not come to an end in 1945, and the recent alliances between neofascists and diverse right-wing populist movements, from Trumpism in the United States to Brexit in the United Kingdom and from the Rassemblement National in France to the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany show that as an ideology it may well be revived, albeit in different guises.[28] These political developments in our present make it all the more necessary to historicize the relationship between major modern ideologies and capitalism as well as democracy. The contributions in this special issue contribute to this exercise.

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28   Giovanna Campani and Birgit Sauer, "Neo-Fascist and neo-Nazi Constellations: The Cases of Italy and Austria," in *Understanding the Populist Shift: Othering in a Europe in Crisis*, edited by Gabriella Lazaridis and Giovanna Campani (London: Routledge, 2017), 31–49.

Jörn Leonhard

Liberalism and Capitalism since the Eighteenth Century: A Relationship of Conjunctions and Divergences

Abstract

This article explores the intersections, parallels and conflicts between liberalism and capitalism, from the eighteenth century to the present day. Although the convergence of liberalism and capitalism as two sides of a single phenomenon has been often claimed, the history of their interrelationship is much more contingent with the two ideologies often at odds intellectually and in social and political affairs. Tracing an intellectual history of these concepts from the Scottish Enlightenment to the varying national responses to the Industrial Revolution, the rise of planning and the World Wars and finally the rise of neoliberalism in the twentieth century, it highlights the adaptability and variability of liberalism as a political ideology over the past centuries.

Keywords: *liberalism, capitalism, Tony Judt, John Stuart Mill, Lord Acton, Friedrich Naumann, democracy, Enlightenment, neoliberalism, Cold War, industrialization, political economy*

Tony Judt and the Adaptability of Liberalism and Capitalism in the Twentieth Century's Age of Crisis

Shortly before his death in 2010, British historian Tony Judt reflected on the legacies of the twentieth century and its defining ideologies, namely communism, fascism, and liberalism. Judt's own biography exemplified the catastrophes and upheavals of the twentieth century. Family members had been murdered in Auschwitz; his father had been a supporter of communism, and his son had long supported the kibbutz movement in Israel. Tony Judt's own socialization encompassed not only May 1968 in Paris and the initially unstoppable triumph of the new generation of politicians around Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s—with their credo of the

necessary liberation of market forces—but also the collapse of the communist regimes between 1989 and 1991 and the end of the Cold War.[1]

In an interview series, Judt identified two leitmotifs in the history of the twentieth century, which only seem paradoxical at first glance. On the one hand, he emphasized the experience of violence in the name of ideological extremes, which had become a mass phenomenon during this period. On the other hand, he highlighted the ability of liberalism and capitalism to survive one crisis after another in this age of violence. In any case, the repeatedly proclaimed end of liberalism stood, and still stands, in stark contrast to the equally pronounced resilience and capacity for regeneration and adaptation to radically changed political, social, or economic circumstances and institutional conditions of the era. From this observation of a special "adaptability," Judt derived a surprisingly positive prognosis for the future.

With this in mind, the following thoughts examine some of the symptomatic rhythms in the relationship between liberalism, capitalism, and democracy. The relationship between the European variants of liberalism and capitalism has continued to develop both conceptually and in social and political practice since the nineteenth century. But it can be argued that at no time did this relationship dissolve into that total congruence which critics of liberalism in particular postulated when they spoke, for example, of the "Manchester model of capitalism." The critical examination of liberalism as a political programme and as social practice has often given rise to the equation of liberalism with capitalism. Despite its disconnect with reality, this equation has served as an ideological critique since the 1840s and continues to shape historiographical narratives to this day.

This article thus considers not only the points of contact and entanglements, but also the contradictions and conflicts within this complex relationship from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. In line with Tony Judt's analytical category of "adaptability," which interrogates the possible conditional factors of this relationship, this article examines the particular adaptability of liberalism, democracy, and capitalism. The focus is on four symptomatic moments of transition: the end of the eighteenth century, the 1840s and 1850s, the turn of the century to the First World War, and the 1970s. Simultaneously, these examples deliberately shift our perspective from the political and ethical conceptions of the eighteenth century to the macro-developments of the twentieth century in order to consider the different dimensions of the relationship between liberalism and capitalism.

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1   Tony Judt and Timothy Snyder, *Nachdenken über das 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2013).

The Emancipation of "Political Economy" from its Ethical Purpose at the End of the Eighteenth Century

As the early modern notion of the economy as the expanded household of the prince began to fade, a redefinition of the relationship between economy and morality began to materialize. For English and Scottish liberals in the eighteenth century and onwards, this moment was a decisive starting point for a new understanding of the economy, from which different models emerged.[2]

In his "Fable of the Bees" from the early eighteenth century, Bernard de Mandeville developed the view that economic success was not based on ethical assumptions, but on the intrinsically immoral self-interest of individual economic agents. Since all actors were equally driven by their intrinsically immoral self-interest, a functioning community developed as the sum of all individual actions. According to this idea, selfish desires complemented each other for the benefit of all.

For Adam Smith, this development culminated in a productive market society based on a division of labour as a model for an efficient economic system. Ideally, the dissolution of traditional, corporate ties would thus eventually lead to the transformation of corporative societies into market societies. The essential assumption of these models was based on the idea of a convergence of political ideas of order and economic concepts of action, linking the idealization of market societies with the motivations of a "Whig interpretation of history." This required the rejection of traditional ethical norms and the adoption of a novel criterion: efficiency. The model of the modern economy as a rational instrument for describing and explaining economic relations was first developed through the emancipation of economic theory from any ethical purpose. The pioneering theories of "political economy" in Britain since the eighteenth century and of the German national economy since the nineteenth century presumed the integration of a Machiavellian separation of politics and morality through the vantage point of a new criterion, namely that of success.[3]

Initially, economics appeared to Smith as part of the natural condition of man, and thus formed an anthropological constant. By placing the initially private dimension of economic action at the forefront, Smith emphasized the self-interest that he recog-

2   Jörn Leonhard, "Moral der Ökonomie und Ökonomie der Moral. Die Differenzierung der 'political economy' im Großbritannien des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts," in *Religion, Moral und liberaler Markt. Politische Ökonomie und Ethikdebatten vom 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart,* edited by Michael Hochgeschwender and Bernhard Löffler (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011), 69–88.

3   Klaus Lichtblau, "Politische Ökonomie," in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, edited by Joachim Ritter, Karlfried Gründer and Gottfried Gabriel (Basel: Schwabe, 1984), 1163–73.

nized behind every economic action as the decisive motivation.[4] Solidarity in a larger social system therefore did not arise from the normative quality of an existing moral tradition or an a priori system of values, but from the particular combination of individual self-interests: When market actors worked towards their own advantage within processes of exchange, they did not purposefully align themselves with the common good. But the sum of their individual interests and behaviours would, according to Smith, "naturally" and even "necessarily" lead to the benefit of all.[5] This was also where the actual meaning of Smith's metaphor of the "invisible hand" lay, exemplified by the connection between investment, profit maximization and public utility: While an individual financial investment aimed at individual profit maximization, it simultaneously made a contribution to the common good by increasing the national income, although that was not intended by the individual. Nevertheless, the experience of capitalism's industrial-economic dynamics in Great Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century provoked a second transformational shift that in turn forced a reformulation of the notion of the "political economy."

Synchronization Attempts: Liberal Responses to Economic Dynamics and Their Social Consequences since the 1840s and Around 1900

In the 1840s, John Stuart Mill, as the most important and influential intellectual representative and critic of Victorianism, began to analyze the concrete social costs of Great Britain's successful industrialization, which had become the exemplar of the capitalist order in contemporary socialist critique.[6]

His 1844 paper on "Some Unsettled Questions on Political Economy" formed the nucleus for a larger work that he regarded as a synthesis of the "political economy" of

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4   Wilhelm Hasbach, *Untersuchungen über Adam Smith und die Entwicklung der Politischen Ökonomie* (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot reprints, 1891); Jacob Oser, *The Evolution of Economic Thought* (New York: J. Wyatt Books Ottawa, 1970); Samuel Hollander, *The Economics of Adam Smith* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973); Arnold Meyer-Faje and Peter Ulrich, eds., *Der andere Adam Smith* (Bern: Paul, 1991).

5   Adam Smith, "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations," in *The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith*, edited by R. H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner, Vol. 2/1, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 454–6.

6   Donald L. Losman, "J. S. Mill on alternative economic Systems," *American Journal of Economics & Sociology* 30 (1971), 85–104; Pierre Vitoux, "John Stuart Mill: Économie et Société," *Cahiers Victoriens et Édouardiens* 48 (1999), 209–30; Jose Harris, "Mill, John Stuart," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Online Edition [accessed 28 May 2022], 1–35.

his time.[7] The starting point for his conception was the basic framework of the utilitarians around Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, his father, as well as the hypotheses of David Ricardo. John Stuart Mill himself had been intellectually socialized within these classical positions of "political economy," according to which, the "pursuit of wealth" was the driving force behind human behaviour. In line with Adam Smith, all economic activity within a society was understood as part of a self-regulating system. The distribution of surpluses and rewards to individual actors was thus based entirely on existing factors of production—namely land, labour, and capital.

With regard to the social realities of his era, especially the problems of the 1840s, which Friedrich Engels impressively analyzed in his *Condition of the Working Class in England*, Mill endeavoured to reformulate the classical conception of the "political economy."[8] Initially, Mill assumed a tension between the universalism of method and the relativity of conditions, which he used to highlight the economic and social problems of his time.[9] Thus, the English Poor Laws could not easily be applied to agrarian Ireland. Mill's reflections on these social questions were embedded within the larger transitional crisis of pauperism, a mass impoverishment that resulted from the intersection of demographic shifts and a still insufficient demand for labour in the industrial sector. Indeed, Mill was one of many voices that challenged the principles of the "political economy" in Britain since the 1840s. Conservative High Tories, Socialists, and Chartists were united in their increasingly aggressive criticism of the determinism inherent in Malthus' assumptions and the ideology of state non-intervention in the sense of Manchester Liberalism—a juxtaposition that already makes manifest that liberalism and capitalism could not be equated during this period. Instead, very different approaches developed within the liberal spectrum, ranging from leading Whig reformers to philosophical radicals centred around Edinburgh University and the Westminster Review. While Whig-aristocratic liberalism in the early nineteenth century was still deeply influenced by older notions of trusteeship over the economically emerging middle classes, John Stuart Mill pursued a different approach.

In his writings, Mill argued polemically against contemporary philanthropy, a decisive feature of both Victorianism and Anglicanism. Philanthropic aid, according to Mill, made any economic improvement in a society dependent on the fulfilment of the moral obligations of the rich towards the poor. Victorian philanthropy appeared to Mill as a subtle continuation of a social ancien régime, behind which he saw little more than moral hypocrisy at play, that—hidden under the cloak of an ostensibly Christian willingness to help—reinforced a traditional paternalism that maintained

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7   John Stuart Mill, "Essays on Some Unsettled Questions on Political Economy (1844)," in *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. 4: Essays on Economics and Society Part I*, edited by John M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 229–340.

8   Friedrich Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England* (Leipzig: O. Wigand, 1845).

9   Harris, *Mill*, 20.

the political and social immaturity of the industrial worker. Accordingly, it was vital that contemporary English society overcome this basic trait, which perpetuated itself as a particular "culture of deference" far into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, once and for all. The future would then not be shaped by "the whole fabric of patriarchal or seigneurial influence," but by the historical significance of the "principles of Reformation" understood as a synonym for individual freedom and self-determination. Mill identified not only the contemporary explosion of mass media, but also Chartism as a sign of the successful self-organization of workers' interests and the concept of a "civil society" as promising signs in this direction. The connection between liberation and freedom was particularly salient here: "the poor have come out of leading-strings and cannot longer be treated like children."[10] Mill thus criticized the coexistence of capitalist structures and anachronistic social paternalism, which found its political-constitutional counterpart in the pre-1830 unreformed parliament.

Beginning in the late 1840s, Mill emphasized the necessity of a social order in which the social boundaries between employers and workers—and class boundaries more generally—were more permeable. The revolutionary upheavals after 1848, as well as the experiments with cooperatives and new forms of labour organization, especially the republican Parisian national workshops, seemed to prove him right. At the same time, developments at the beginning of the 1850s forced a reformulation of contemporary capitalist models. In his *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Marx explained Napoleon III's eventual success as the consequence of a balance of class forces, a lack of class consciousness, the ability of the executive to make itself independent and the plebiscitarian expropriation of freedom through a particular personality whose popularity was based not least on a successful harnessing of historical narratives.[11]

In the third edition of Mill's 1852 *Principles of Political Economy*, he incorporated these contemporary experiences into his understanding of "cooperative partnership," a conception of collective ownership of land, and in his pointed critique of the "division of the human race into two hereditary classes, employers and employed." In addition, Mill also noted the parallels between the experiences of British industrial workers in a capitalistically organized economy and the "patriarchal despotism" under which women and home workers were forced to live.[12] Despite this, Mill still believed in the ideal of a limited, self-restraining government that would focus on traditional liberal economic functions such as currency stability and the dismantling of tax privileges

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10   John Stuart Mill, *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, Vol. III: *The Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy*, ed. by John M. Robson (New York: Routledge, 1965), 760–3.

11   Karl Marx: *Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Napoleon*, second edition (Hamburg: Otto-Meissner, 1869).

12   Mill, *Collected Works*, 790–6.

and monopolies. The notion of a socially conscious interventionist and welfare state remained foreign to Mill.[13]

At the other end of the liberal spectrum, Lord Acton criticized capitalism's lack of ethical orientation at the end of the nineteenth century. With his particular orientation towards Catholicism that nonetheless rejected the power of the Catholic Curia—"too Catholic for liberals, too liberal for Catholics," he belonged to the personal network around Ignaz Döllinger, William Gladstone, and John Morley.[14] Although Acton had long espoused the principle of laissez-faire, which demanded that the state restrain itself from meddling in the economy and society at large, by the end of the century, he began to recognize that modern societies could be in danger of atomizing themselves in response to the manifold conflicts of interest. In contrast to Mill's ideal of free individuals, Acton focused on the Middle Ages and the ideal of an organic community in response to the social tensions and deficits of integration of his own era. He thus became a follower of neo-corporative ideas, in which he recognized a possible solution to the social erosion evident in contemporary societies.[15] It was attractive to Acton not only because it encompassed a social dimension, but also made manifest his pronounced aversion to the modern central state. Like Alexis de Tocqueville, Acton saw in the French Second Empire under Napoleon III as a threat to individual freedom hidden under the guise of social equality. He contrasted his pronounced scepticism about the practices of political and social decision-making processes—"power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely"—with a normative framework of Christian values. His aristocratic liberalism was thus undoubtedly anachronistic.[16] It thus only had a limited influence on the conceptualization of the modern welfare state and, above all, on the development of New Liberalism at the end of the century.

Ultimately, what do these examples show? In contrast to many classical representations within the political history of ideas, there were no simple universals in "liberal" positions on and discourses about the relationship between "homo oeconomicus" and "homo socialis." Rather, the examples outlined here underline how the upheavals experienced since the eighteenth century also led to a wide-ranging pluralism within theoretical conceptualizations. Crisis dynamics and changes in response to new expe-

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13   Harris, *Mill*, 21.
14   Gertrude Himmelfarb, *Lord Acton: A Study in Conscience and Politics* (London: Hollis and Carter, 1952); Owen Chadwick, *Acton and Gladstone* (London: Athlone Press, 1976); Joseph L. Altholz, *The Liberal Catholic Movement in England: The "Rambler" and its Contributors, 1848–1864* (London: Burns and Oates, 1962).
15   E. D. Watt, "Ethics and Politics: The Example of Lord Acton," *University of Toronto Quarterly* 33, no. 3 (1964), 279–90.
16   John Acton, *Essays on Freedom and Power*, edited by Gertrude Himmelfarb (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948), 364. Alan S. Kahan, *Aristocratic Liberalism: The Social and Political Thought of Jacob Burckhardt, John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

riences did not lead to a static "liberalism," but to very differently accentuated "liberalisms."[17] The novel "system of needs" identified early on by Hegel corresponded to an expanding market of interpretations and explanatory patterns since the eighteenth century.[18] The emergence of the "political economy" as a novel scholarly movement and the continued interrogation of the relationship between economy, society, and ethical norms must be understood within this context.

Smith's response to this question amounted to understanding self-interest and the common good in emerging market societies not as opposites, but as complementary. For Smith, this synthesis was the result of man's anthropological disposition—stemming from his inherent neediness and ability to empathize (a notion he developed it his "theory of moral sentiments")—and the result of a particular feedback loop. The allegory of the "invisible hand" translated this effect into a suggestive image. The common good was thus not created by economic actors guided by traditional ethical norms, but rather by a complex web of interactions and communications between individual actors who followed their own self-interest, that, in the aggregate, benefited the common good. This concept however ignored the problem of justice in competitive societies, while also setting very high expectations for the socialization of individual actors. With his attempt to reformulate the premises of the "political economy" as an ethical framework for the social order, John Stuart Mill was no longer reacting to the experiences of emerging market societies, but to the social costs and issues engendered by a rapidly developing industrial society. He formulated his new conception as a pronounced ideological critique of the paternalistic character of Victorian philanthropy, of the socio-cultural segregation of English society which it helped to deepen, and of a pronounced "culture of deference" that, in his view, continued the disenfranchisement of the lower classes.[19] In contrast to this misunderstood moralization of social aid, the Whiggish principle of "trust," and the trusteeship of aristocratic elites for the segments of society not represented in parliament, Mill envisioned an egalitarian representation of interests and a principle of meritocratic cooperation.[20]

17   Jörn Leonhard, *Liberalismus. Zur historischen Semantik eines europäischen Deutungsmusters* (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2001).

18   Georg W. F. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (Berlin: Nicolai, 1821), § 189.

19   David C. Moore, *The Politics of Deference: A Study of the mid-nineteenth Century English Political System* (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1976); Jörn Leonhard, "Historik der Ungleichzeitigkeit: Zur Temporalisierung politischer Erfahrung im Europa des 19. Jahrhunderts," *Journal of Modern European History* 7, no. 2 (2009), 145–68.

20   Andreas Wirsching, "Popularität als Raison d'être: Identitätskrise und Parteiideologie der Whigs in England im frühen 19. Jahrhundert," *Francia* 17/3 (1990), 1–14; Jörn Leonhard, "'True English Guelphs and Gibelines': Zum historischen Bedeutungs- und Funktionswandel von whig und tory im englischen Politikdiskurs seit dem 17. Jahrhundert," *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 84, no.1 (2002), 175–213.

Notable in the positions outlined here is the relative absence of the state. For Smith, Mill and also Acton, the state remained confined to a small number of functions: securing a stable framework for infrastructure, for currencies, and for the political system. But the state was not understood as an ethically legitimized interventionist institution. Instead, Mill and Acton, working from an anti-étatist perspective, harshly criticized the expansion of state functions, which put them in line with the thinking of their contemporary, Alexis de Tocqueville. All three authors combined the leitmotif of the threat to freedom. What connected the thinking of all three authors was their concern about freedom and any threats to it. An ethical dimension of state action, as formulated, for example, by Hegel in view of the Prussian reform state at the beginning of the nineteenth century, was sought here in vain. In nineteenth-century Britain, confidence in the self-regulation of market relations and the evolutionary development of parliamentary representation continued to dominate. Here, significant differences with continental Europe become apparent, which explain both the German perspective on the so-called Adam Smith problem—the contrast between morality and economics—and the relatively late turn in Great Britain and the United States to an interventionist welfare state under the guise of "New Liberalism" and the "Progressive Movement."[21]

In Germany, the relationship between liberalism and capitalism was markedly different. Here, the equation of both isms emerged in the early nineteenth century precisely within the critique of liberalism—significantly earlier among conservative authors than among left-wing Hegelians around Ruge and Bauer. As early as 1819, Adam Müller associated liberals not only with a revolutionary disregard for organically developing institutions, but also with a reduction to purely economic goals in the sense of the political economy adopted from England. The influx of "liberal ideas" and money would simply be adding "new and worse chains" to the old. For Müller, the "supposedly liberal factory system that threatens to devour the natural order of things in Europe" was the real "universal ruin" of the present.[22] Having transformed himself from a German Jacobin to a Catholic publicist at the beginning of the 1820s, Joseph Görres saw "screaming liberalism" as a scourge rooted in "money arrogance," "capitalists" and the "intellectual arrogance of scholars."[23]

But this accusation hardly affected the practice of early German liberalism, which was something completely different from the class shaping ideology of "bourgeois

21   Jörn Leonhard, "Progressive Politics and the Dilemma of Reform: German and American Liberalism in Comparison, 1880–1920," Maurizio Vaudagna, ed., *The Place of Europe in American History: Twentieth Century Perspectives* (Turin: Otto, 2007), 115–32.

22   Adam Müller, "Von der Notwendigkeit einer theologischen Grundlage der gesamten Staatswissenschaften und der Staatswirtschaft insbesondere (1819)," in Rudolf Kohler, ed., *Schriften zur Staatsphilosophie* (Munich: Theatiner-Verlag, 1923), 205, 234.

23   Joseph Görres, "Aphorismen (1822/23)," in Joseph Görres, *Gesammelte Schriften*. 1.

capitalism" (bürgerlicher Kapitalismus), both in terms of the role of the state and the desired structure of economy and society. The liberal credo in Germany was characterized by reforms within a progressive-enlightened state, a constitutional monarchy and parliament, as well as by the defence against uncontrolled street violence.

In contrast to these pre-1848 political positions, from which the democratic movement increasingly departed, the social model of German liberals remained largely traditional in the first half of the nineteenth century: Based on the ideal of a moral economy centred on a traditional householder, it remained —at least outside of the early industrialized regions of the Rhineland and Upper Silesia—alien to the considerations of an English "political economy." In contrast to a modern market society marked by a differentiation between production and trade, by the formation of supra-regional and transnational markets under the label of supply and demand, the perspectives of most German liberals before the 1840s and 1850s remained primarily focused on the local and pre-industrial. This corresponded to a society in which, despite initial transformations—including exponential population growth and the receding of the institutions of corporate society —much still pointed to a retrenchment, especially in the German Southwest with its still powerful aristocrats and numerous feudal relics.

The dynamism engendered by a high birth rate, especially in the Southwest, was not yet matched by widespread industrial development, which only began to absorb the surplus population in the 1850s. The result was mass impoverishment and emigration. "Pauperism" was the social question of the Vormärz period—symptom of a transitional society in crisis, for which constitutional liberalism, with its focus on constitutional order, parliament, and the borders of a future German nation-state, could initially not provide any answers. The social agenda of liberals only gradually began to change in response to the conflict-ridden 1840s, whose upheavals found their exemplary expression in the Silesian weavers' uprising. Up to that point, the liberal model of society had been determined by an emphasis on social harmony and a reconciliation of interests through reason and education. Nonetheless, the traditional model of a "classless civil society of middle incomes"—not a class society with sharp and unreconcilable differences—remained, in the long run, an important reference point. As part of this vision, property, and education as well as a certain maturity and independence—understood as particular bourgeois virtues—were the decisive prerequisites for political participation. [24]

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24   Lothar Gall, "Liberalismus und "bürgerliche Gesellschaft," *Historische Zeitschrift* 220 (1975), 324–56; Rainer Koch, "Industriesystem" or "bürgerliche Gesellschaft," in *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 39 (1978), 605–28; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "Der deutsche Liberalismus zwischen 'klassenloser Bürgergesellschaft' und 'organisiertem Kapitalismus'," in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 4 (1978), 77–90; Thomas Zunhammer, "Begriff und Ideal des Mittelstandes im Staatslexikon von Karl v. Rotteck und Karl Theodor Welcker," in *Aufklärung, Vormärz, Revolution* 16/17 (1999), 79–98.

At the end of the nineteenth century, a characteristic programmatic convergence took place in Great Britain and Germany. Both English New Liberalism and the ideological reorientation of a segment of German liberals toward social liberalism must be understood as responses to the particular deficits emerging within modern industrial capitalism. Contemporary discussions in both England and Germany dealt with quite similar questions, ranging from an eventual rapprochement to the labour movement, political and social democratization and the function of the state, to the connection between reform policies and imperial integration. This ideological reorientation also had a transnational dimension. Thus, in the United States, "progressivism"—reacting to the "Gilded Age" and the consequences of largely unregulated market developments—also engaged with approaches developed in Germany.

Confronted at the turn of the century with the consequences of industrialization and a workers' movement that had emerged very early in Germany, Friedrich Naumann—as the most prominent representative of the social liberalism propagated by the National-Social League—began to search for a new version of liberalism that encompassed the critique of liberalism's far-reaching exclusion of the emerging forces of social democracy. National economists and social reformers like Lujo Brentano und Gerhart von Schulze-Gaevernitz, who sought to build bridges to the union movement and cooperative models, also belonged to these streams of thought.

Naumann criticized the fact that the liberals had not taken note of the consequences associated with the development of industrial society and had thereby fallen into crisis. According to Naumann, recourse to the merely political-constitutional goals of "bourgeois liberalism" was no longer sufficient for a contemporary definition of progressiveness. Liberalism "lacks a unified understanding of the direction of economic movement." In contemporary society, "bourgeois liberalism" no longer marched in line "with the idea of technical progress," but still stuck to the notion of "an old petty-bourgeois democracy and continues to chew the bread crust, as it has always done in the past." As such, "liberalism as a whole has lost on all sides: the big industrialists, the workers, the farmer."[25] Naumann turned above all against the outdated feudal thinking which he saw as the foundation of a version of liberalism primarily shaped by the educated classes, which consequently had no innovative potential as it ignored the significance of the rising labour movement: Liberals were "liberal in their own circles"—but for many of them, liberalism was only "a coat of paint and a phrase [eine Tünche und eine Phrase]." They had "no sense of the labour movement and had no chance of winning it over, since it had no larger economic programme."[26] Under

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25   Friedrich Naumann, "Der Niedergang des Liberalismus. Vortrag auf der 6. Vertretertagung des Nationalsozialen Vereins zu Frankfurt am Main 1901," in Friedrich Naumann, *Politische Schriften*, 258–260.

26   Ibid., 260.

these circumstances, the "new development of liberalism." was only possible, especially within a context of universal suffrage, "if its leading party politics align solidly with contemporary social democracy." The opening of liberalism to the left—the "core question of the formation of a new German liberalism"—was linked to the question of how "social democracy can become a national, practical-political party."[27] In Germany, these attempts did not find much political resonance before the First World War, but began to form an important programmatic foundation for left-liberals from 1917/18 onwards, in contrast to Great Britain, where New Liberalism was able to set new priorities in public life. At the same time, this search for a compromise between bourgeois liberalism and moderate socialism under the auspices of social liberalism linked a desire for internal policy reforms and social integration with an aggressive claim to world power—as can be seen with Naumann in Germany or the New Imperialists in Great Britain.[28]

Organized Capitalism and Nationalization, Experts, and Inherent Logics: The First World War

Even before 1914, liberals were confronted with shifting conditions as new forms of public deliberation and political communication took hold. This led to the emergence of mass political markets with professionally organized parties and interest groups. The traditional ideal of many liberals, especially in Germany, of an individual living for politics, which did not need a party with functionaries, came under increasing pressure. Because the liberal parties never achieved the relative coherence of milieu-based parties such as the Social-Democratic Party or the Catholic Centre Party, they reacted with particular sensitivity to electoral discussions prior to 1914. After 1918, a fundamental problem of liberalism, namely the tension between equality and individual freedom—which the French historian Alexis de Tocqueville had already recognized in the 1850s as the defining feature of a democratic age of the masses—returned to the forefront. According to Tocqueville, the freedom of the individual was threatened by the modern instruments of democracy, as the Bonapartist coupling of plebiscite and populism seemed to prove. The fact that these ideas were used from the 1920s onwards to explain the rise of ideological extremes through a specific adaptation of Bonapartism pointed to a fundamental issue within liberalism.

27   Ibid., 262.
28   Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, "'Soziale Demokratie' als transnationales Ordnungsmodell im 20. Jahrhundert," in *Dimensionen internationaler Geschichte*, edited by Jost Dülffer and Wilfred Loth (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2012), 313–33; Leonhard, "Progressive Politics," 115–32.

Many of these developments were accelerated and exacerbated by the First World War, while others were called into question or became subject to re-evaluation. At least three vectors were important for the relationship between liberalism, capitalism, and democracy, shaping liberal thought patterns and opportunities for action far beyond 1918. First, the war was accompanied by a new kind of state expansion—into hitherto still relatively autonomous areas of life and action—which created new forms of cooperation between the state, the economy and society. After the summer of 1914, as parliamentary processes were suspended under the banner of Burgfrieden, Union sacrée or truce, the executive branches were strengthened, increasing the importance of charismatic war politicians such as Georges Clemenceau and David Lloyd George or military politicians such as Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff. These processes of state expansion had at least two important long-term consequences: One, they promoted particular processes of homogenization and levelling in these societies at war, empowered by new concepts circulating at the time, such as that of a "national community" (Volksgemeinschaft). This homogenization was different from the liberal paradigm of evolutionary reforms based on reasoned progress. It did not result from the persuasiveness of particular ideas or the implementation of natural rights, but from the millions of victims, the democratic equality of the dead, the widows and orphans, and the imaginary plebiscite of the trenches and armament factories. Two, this new complex of state and community at war gave birth to a new ideal of planning, expertise, and inherent logic. The "expert," endowed with subject-specific knowledge, supplanted the classical war hero. Trust in predictable optimizations, in the controllability of political life, the economy, demography and the international order would become a decisive legacy of the war.

Second, the permanent pressure to mobilize put these societies at war under enormous stress. The defence of one's nation and one's country became an imperative cited by all actors involved and justified the almost immediate suppression of individual rights. Thus, a variety of coercive regimes emerged, initially reflected in military recruitment practices, the occupation regimes and the treatment of ostensible "enemy aliens," and—as time went on—in the regimes of suspicion that emerged against alleged speculators and profiteers, deserters and traitors. In view of the ethnicization of politics, liberals in particular experienced the consequences of inclusion and exclusion in the name of belonging and loyalty, war-state control, surveillance, and coercion. The war revealed how quickly plural conceptions of society could come under threat in the face of a permanent mobilization of people, production and capital, and how fragile the privacy of the individual could become. Especially after 1916/1917, these new frontlines forced liberal thinkers into a defensive position. This was evident in the opposing ideas put forth by a growing socio-cultural anti-liberalism, made visible in the focus on integrative ideas of community, organized capitalism or the notion of war socialism in Germany. Against the backdrop of an expansive state at war never seen before in British history, the practices of "compulsion" and "conscription" document-

ed a hard borderline toward liberalism, and helped explain the alienation of many liberals from Prime Minister David Lloyd George, who himself had been a representative of pacifist left-wing liberalism before 1914.

Third, the war brought about major shifts in social mobility, both up and down. While many of these new-found experts were recruited from the liberal bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie as such declined in relative importance to the working class. This perceived loss of meaning and status promoted a critical examination by many liberals of the phenomena of mass society and mass culture, which went far beyond a consideration of the consequences of universal suffrage introduced in most European countries by the end of the war. Instead, fears about the rising of the masses became the topos of liberal critique—for example in Friedrich Naumann's preoccupation with "mass life" (Massenleben) or in the famous unease sketched out by José Ortega y Gasset in 1930: "Towns are full of people, houses full of tenants, hotels full of guests, trains full of travellers, cafés full of customers, parks full of promenaders, consulting rooms of famous doctors full of patients; theatres full of spectators and beaches full of bathers. What previously was, in general, no problem, now begins to be an everyday one, namely, to find a room."[29]

Social Liberalism, Consensus Capitalism, Neoliberalism: Reformulations of the Liberal Paradigm in the Twentieth Century

In the face of the social realities extant after 1920, turn-of-the century liberalism—especially the social liberalism exemplified by progressivism—lost in importance, although the relationship between liberal thinking and the middle class and academic elites remained intact. In the 1920s and 1930s, it is therefore possible to witness not only the "resuscitation attempts" of bourgeois democracy, but also the rise of social engineering experts socialized in academically bourgeois circles. They worked to reorganize society, reform capitalism, and manage social and technical progress. The inheritance of these social engineers included the experiences of war, from the reliance on planning and the cult of expert knowledge to the breakthrough of mass democracy in the shadow of the victims of war, as well as anti-Bolshevism and a frequently critical examination of parliamentarism. Their worldview could be inflected with liberalism, but for the most part it was socially liberal and integrated into the order of the existing

29   Jose Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (NY: W. W. Norton, 1932), 11.

democracy. After 1930 however, this stream of thought became increasingly anti-liberal in many Central European countries, whether in a communist or a fascist form.[30]

In short, with a specific focus on the 1930s, it can be said that the struggle during these crisis years—marked by the world economic crisis and mass unemployment—was aimed at redefining the relationship between the individual and society in a new and permanent way. Where should the individual find their place within society: in the public sphere, in economic life, in the sphere of political participation? The American New Deal, Italian fascism, and German National Socialism—and after the end of Second World War, the British welfare state—each provided distantly related and yet different, humane or inhumane, solutions. But the initial questions that drove their actions and programmes were clearly similar, arising as they did from similar basic material conditions at a time of deep crisis within the capitalist economy.[31]

In the two decades after the First World War, the link between liberalism and the middle class and between liberalism and the bourgeoisie, which had originated in the nineteenth century, disappeared. In addition, the hitherto axiomatic connection between liberalism and individualism was overshadowed by a social reality dominated by mass society. How would it be possible to bring liberalism to bear within this social formation? The victory of the ideologically unequal alliance made up of Anglo-Atlantic democracies and Stalinism in the Second World War paved the way in the West for removing, after 1945, the foundation for not only the communal ideologies inherent to Italian fascism and German National Socialism, which had been directed against all individualism, but also the anti-liberal utopias of the interwar period.

Between 1950 and 1970, liberalism unfolded as a project for society as a whole—both economically and politically as well as socio-culturally. This was true for the United States, and Western and Northern Europe as well as for Central Europe; against this backdrop, reinforced by the constellations of the Cold War, a normative idea of the liberal West became entrenched. In Germany, liberalism was revived after 1945 from the core foundations of the national tradition suppressed during the Third Reich. The development of both political liberalism and the return to the free economy in the form of the social market economy had their roots in the historical developments of the 1920s and early 1930s. Ordoliberalism emerged in West Germany as a socio-ethical programme underpinning the social market economy after

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30   Thomas Etzemüller, ed., *Die Ordnung der Moderne. Social Engineering im 20. Jahrhundert* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2009).

31   Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *Entfernte Verwandtschaft. Faschismus, Nationalsozialismus, New Deal 1933–1939* (Munich: Carl Hanser, 2005); Howard Brick, *Transcending Capitalism. Visions of a New Society in Modern American Thought* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); José Harris, "Einige Aspekte der britischen Sozialpolitik während des Zweiten Weltkriegs," in *Die Entstehung des Wohlfahrtsstaates in Großbritannien 1850–1950*, edited by Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Wolfgang Mock (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982), 255–70.

the 1948 currency reform. In view of the aura that surrounds the social market economy as the driving force of the "economic miracle," it is also often overlooked in the historiography that the ordoliberalism that sprang forth from the Freiburg school of national economics[32] was not a purely specific German phenomenon. It must rather be understood as the German variant of a transnationally effective Atlantic "consensus liberalism," which emerged in the 1930s in the era of the New Deal in the USA, before eventually coming to Europe with the Marshall Plan.[33]

Based on the characteristics of this "consensus capitalism," as it was known in transatlantic intellectual circles,[34] its origin in the New Deal becomes obvious: Since 1939/1942, this consensus was heavily influenced by the expertise of German emigrants to the United States, who designed a model of social order oriented that coupled the capitalist economy with the interests of democratic mass society with as little friction as possible, recognizing therein the role of progressive state action. By engaging in this liberal and capitalist consensus, it became possible for community thinking and mass democracy to interconnect, thus continuing to relegate individualism, the category of the liberal individual, to a secondary position. In conjunction with Keynesianism as an economic theory, which, as developed by the British economist John Maynard Keynes, assigned the task of economic control first to the state and not the entrepreneurial individual, and only granted individual free will to economic enterprises within this nation-state framework, consensus liberalism represented a project on the ideological "left."

Liberal and conservative critics considered such regulations within government bureaucracy and in the framework governing economic life to be "socialist." Confronted by the challenges sparked by totalitarian dictatorships across the world, everything remotely reminiscent of "socialism" was immediately seen as a threat to freedom in these circles. One of the pioneers of this line of thought, and an early opponent of Keynes, was Friedrich August von Hayek, an Austrian who refused to return to the country after the National Socialist "Anschluss," who subsequently became an influential economic theorist in Great Britain and the United States. In 1948, Hayek was

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32   Nils Goldschmidt, ed., *Wirtschaft, Politik und Freiheit. Freiburger Wirtschaftswissenschaftler und der Widerstand* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005); Reinhard Blum, *Soziale Marktwirtschaft. Wirtschaftspolitik zwischen Neoliberalismus und Ordoliberalismus* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1969); Andreas Heinemann, *Die Freiburger Schule und ihre geistigen Wurzeln* (Munich: VVF, 1989); Stefan Kolev, *Neoliberale Staatsverständnisse im Vergleich* (Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius, 2013).

33   Charles S. Maier and Günter Bischof, eds., *The Marshall Plan and Germany. West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program* (Oxford: University Press, 1991); Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century* (London: Abacus, 1995), 268–286.

34   Julia Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie. Die Westernisierung von SPD und DGB* (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2003).

one of the founders of the Mont Pèlerin Society, which later became one of the most influential think tanks in the struggle against the ideology behind consensus liberalism and its associated economic theory, Keynesianism. Here, a radical criticism of the "consensus" was developed, through an analysis of the state's influence on economic life and the strictures of "socialist" regulations, which curtailed the freedom of market-ready individuals.[35] The turnaround began in the early 1980s and accelerated after 1990/1991, as the postwar boom began to run out of energy, and the central ideas surrounding consensus liberalism and Keynesianism ceased to determine the path of future development, sparking to new kind of liberalism

The rhythms and conjunctures outlined here, from the eighteenth century to the 1990s stand in contradiction to the notion of a direct correspondence or even equation of capitalism and liberalism. Rather, this long-durée perspective reveals the many tensions and variable confrontations between the two at key moments. This history can neither be understood as a confirmation of the historiographical formula of the "rise" and "fall" of capitalism or liberalism, nor as the end of history wherein liberalism and market capitalism stand victorious after the end of the Cold War. Instead, this history reveals a pronounced flexibility, as well as a perpetual state of reinvention, through criticism and crisis of both—precisely what Tony Judt underlined with his concept of "adaptability."

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Translated from the German by Julia Sittmann

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35   Bruce Caldwell, *Hayek's Challenge. An Intellectual Biography of F. A. Hayek* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004); Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, eds., *The Road from Mont Pèlerin. The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

Stefan Berger

Social Democracy, Democracy and Capitalism

Abstract

This article argues that the belief in democratic accountability was a core belief of early social democracy in the nineteenth century. After exploring how early social democracy understood itself largely as a democracy movement, the article will explain the turn away from democracy that was associated above all with the adoption of Marxism. The article will proceed to trace the torturous path of social democracy back to endorsing democracy as a key aim through the interwar economic and political crisis to the post-Second World War years, when the Cold War made it paramount for social democracy to shed its Marxist legacies and make democracy a key plank of its own identity again. However, as this article will argue, other planks were those of macro-economic planning, social engineering, and state welfare, and it was those that were at the centre of critiques formulated by neoliberalism and by a postmaterial left from the 1970s onwards. The cultural hegemony of neoliberalism in particular led to a deep crisis of social democracy which is ongoing, but, as we shall see, it is interesting to observe that in various attempt to reinvent social democracy, ideas of democracy all take centre stage.

Keywords: *Marxism, democracy, economic democracy, social democracy, planning, welfare, postmaterialism, neoliberalism.*

David Marquand, the long-term British social democrat, Labour MP, and left-wing intellectual wrote the following about the relationship between democracy, capitalism, and social democracy: "Either democracy has to be tamed for the sake of capitalism, or capitalism has to be tamed for the sake of democracy. The capitalist market economy is a marvellous servant, but for democrats it is an oppressive, even vicious master. The task is to return it to the servitude which the builders of the postwar mixed economy imposed on it, and from which it has now escaped."[1] According to Marquand, this was the task of social democracy. He made this statement a few years after he had re-joined the Labour Party in 1995 which he had left together with his long-term

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1   David Marquand, "Premature Obsequies: Social Democracy Comes in from the Cold," in *The New Social Democracy*, edited by Andrew Gamble and Tony Wright (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1999), 14–5.

political mentor, Roy Jenkins, in 1981 to protest the left-wing drift of the party in the late 1970s. The statement puts in a nutshell the belief of many social democrats that the economy should be subject to democratic checks and balances. As we shall argue below, the belief in democratic accountability was a core belief of early social democracy in the nineteenth century. After exploring how early social democracy understood itself largely as a democracy movement, the article will explain the turn away from democracy that was associated above all with the adoption of Marxism. Marxism was not hostile to democracy, quite the contrary, but democracy stopped being an aim in itself. Hence it had a functional value for Marxists on the road to the establishment of the communist society. The article will proceed to trace the torturous path of social democracy back to endorsing democracy as a key aim through the interwar economic and political crisis to the post-Second World War years, when the Cold War made it paramount for social democracy to shed its Marxist legacies and make democracy a key plank of its own identity again. However, as this article will argue, other planks were those of macro-economic planning, social engineering, and state welfare, and it was those that were at the centre of critiques formulated by neoliberalism and by a postmaterial left from the 1970s onwards. The cultural hegemony of neoliberalism in particular led to a deep crisis of social democracy which is ongoing, but, as we shall see, it is interesting to observe that in various attempt to reinvent social democracy, ideas of democracy all take centre stage. Hence the article will highlight the importance of understanding the social democratic project as a project for democratizing not only the political sphere but also wide areas of society and the economy.

Democracy as a Way of Fighting Economic, Social and Political Exclusion: The Beginnings of Social Democracy in the Nineteenth Century

The emergence of industrial capitalism from the late eighteenth century onwards, first in Great Britain, subsequently in Europe, the Americas and elsewhere in the world, brought with it new ways of labouring and living that were associated with dangerous factory work, long working hours and poor living conditions. Friedrich Engels described these new ways of living and working in his classic *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, first published in 1845, that was based on his experiences in the shock city of the industrial revolution, Manchester.[2] The workers who were living

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2   On the process of working-class formation, see Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg, eds., *Working-Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

this new life began to form associations to defend themselves against the power of the factory owners, and to ask for a fairer share in their economic profits. The formation of trade unions was the most direct expression of the desire of workers to fight for their economic inclusion by way of higher wages, better and safer working conditions, and shorter working hours.[3] Producer and consumer cooperatives were other types of organization meant to ensure more economic and social inclusion for ordinary working people by cutting out the profits made by middlemen, merchants and industrialists.[4] As most working people did not have the right to vote in the nineteenth century, political parties were founded to fight for workers' enfranchisement and their representation in parliament, where their MPs worked for the adoption of laws that benefited working people, from accident insurance to pensions to insurance against sickness and health and safety laws.[5] Social democratic trade unions, cooperatives and parties were all aimed at increasing the democratic participation of working people in the economic, social and political life of the state. Many early socialists saw their aims as inextricably intertwined. Thus, Louis Blanc argued that only a democratically elected parliament would bring about, through legislation, the setting up of independent producers' cooperatives.[6] Working-class associations often did not organize the poorest of the poor, but rather artisans, small trades people and journeymen. Many of them were directly threatened by the new industrial capitalism and they also possessed the necessary educational and cultural resources to set up these organizations. Most of the early social democratic organizations were small by comparison with liberal, conservative, or church organizations, and they tended to be characterized by attempts to build up their own democratic associational life within their organizations.[7]

Connecting their belief in democracy with their desire for greater social justice, they called their type of political commitment social democracy. They were opposed to monarchical, aristocratic and clerical rule, but they were also opposed to those liberals who wanted to link political empowerment to education and property. Early

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3   E. P. Thompson in his classic *The Making of the English Working Class*, first published in 1963, described that process of early trade union formation in the industrializing regions of Britain, where John Gast of the London skilled trades, Gravener Henson for outworkers in northern England and John Doherty for the cotton spinners led British trade unionism to its first highpoint in the late 1820s and early 1830s.

4   Mary Hilson and Silke Neunsinger, eds., *A Global History of Consumer Cooperation since 1850: Movements and Businesses* (Leiden: Brill, 2017).

5   On the early political formation of working people see Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 62–84.

6   Joachim Höppner and Waltraud Seidel-Höppner, *Von Babeuf bis Blanqui. Französischer Sozialismus und Kommunismus vor Marx* (Leipzig: Reclam, 1975), vol. 1, 301.

7   For early German social democracy this has been analysed in exemplary fashion by Thomas Welskopp, *Das Banner der Brüderlichkeit. Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie vom Vormärz bis zum Sozialistengesetz* (Bonn: J. W. H. Dietz Nachf., 2000).

social democracy was to all intents and purposes a citizens' movement, intent on making workers into citizens who could participate in the affairs of the economy, society, and the state. They fought for political, social, cultural, and economic inclusion of workers, and yet they often experienced exclusion. Politically, they were disenfranchised. Early political parties, such as the German Social Democratic Workers' Party, the SDAP, hence put franchise reform at the heart of their political programmes: "political freedom is the most indispensable precondition for the economic emancipation of the working classes. Hence the social question is indivisible from the political question. The solution of the former is conditional on the solution of the latter, and possible only in the democratic state."[8] Socially, they were not accepted by their social superiors. The bourgeoisie developed sophisticated mechanisms of distinction to keep workers before the gates of middle-class associationalism. Workers were, strictly speaking, not clubbable in the social spheres of the middle classes. Workers aspired to education, but often found that they could not pay for the expensive higher schools that were the gateways to universities. Culturally, workers were keen to develop their own cultural forms: choir singing, concerts, literature, and theatre. Social democracy also shared an interest in middle-class cultural icons, even if they were prone to interpreting those icons differently. A telling example is the commitment of early German social democracy to Friedrich Schiller, the national poet of Germany, who social democrats interpreted in significantly different ways to many of his more middle-class admirers. For social democrats he was the poet of liberty and democracy and of a nation characterized by those values.[9] Economically, workers and their organizations, the trade unions, were often fought bitterly by the employers who wanted to retain their absolutist rights inside the factory gates and refused any demands to negotiate with those seeking to represent their workers independently. Overall then, the culture of early nineteenth-century social democracy was made up of frustrated aspirations of working men. It should indeed be stressed that it was an altogether male associational culture that we are talking about. The political language of manliness created its own exclusions, against women from their own social milieu. Even if some of the early socialists, like François-Charles Fourier, were champions of women's emancipation, even if some of the classic texts of social democracy, such as August Bebel's *Women and Socialism*, first published in German in 1879 and translated into dozens of languages, call for the extension of women's rights, social democratic associational culture often

8   Dieter Dowe, *Programmatische Dokumente der deutschen Sozialdemokratie*, (Berlin: J. W. H. Dietz Nachf., 1984), 2nd edn., 174.
9   Martin Rector, "Sozialdemokratische Literatur von 1890–1918," in *Geschichte der deutschen Literatur vom 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*, edited by Victor Žmegač (Weinheim: Beltz, 1996), vol. II:1, 4th edn., 234–55.

remained male-centred.[10] However, it was the comprehensive exclusion of the male social democratic milieu at all levels of industrial society that ultimately would turn many social democrats into hostile critics of the entire social system that they came to identify with and name as "capitalism."

Marxism and Anti-Capitalism

Nothing exemplified this turn of social democracy from a commitment to democratic inclusion to anti-capitalism more than its adoption of Marxism during the last third of the nineteenth century. The more social democracy was politically oppressed and excluded the more it adopted the language of anti-capitalist revolution that it took from the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Marx and Engels valued democracy, for it was on the basis of democracy that the bourgeoisie would ultimately be defeated, but they also differentiated clearly between bourgeois and proletarian democracy.[11] The former was a formal mechanism of middle-class interest representation, whereas the latter started from the social content of democracy and was far more participatory. Indeed, the Paris Commune of 1871 was to become a model for Marx and Engels in terms of the outlook of a genuine proletarian democracy. Rather misleadingly, Marx called this proletarian democracy a "dictatorship of the proletariat," as it was based on the interests of the working class. Hence the context and content of democracy was different, but the mechanism of democratic rule would stay in place. However, Marx never thought through what a proletarian democracy would look like in practice which added to the confusion over the term "dictatorship of the proletariat."[12]

It is characteristic that the largest social democratic movement of the world before 1914, German social democracy, adopted Marxism formally and made it a cornerstone of its political programme after 12 years of political persecution under the so-called Anti-Socialist Laws between 1878 and 1890. In its Erfurt Programme of 1891, the party committed itself to Marxism and the overthrow of capitalism and its ruling classes. The class struggle, the social democrats now argued, was the motor of social change and would eventually result in a revolution that was to sweep away the old

10   On Fourier see Pamela Pilbeam, *French Socialists Before Marx: Workers, Women and the Social Question in France* (Montreal: McGill Queen's University Press, 2000). For the interwar period see also Helmut Gruber and Pamela Graves, eds., *Women and Socialism. Socialism and Women. Europe Between the Two World Wars* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1998).

11   Alex Demirovic, "Marx und die Aporien der Demokratietheorie," *Das Argument* 30 (1988): 847–60.

12   Uwe-Jens Heuer, "Demokratie/ Diktatur des Proletariats," in *Historisch-Kritisches Wörter-buch des Marxismus*, edited by Wolfgang Fritz Haug (Berlin: Argument Verlag, 1995), vol. 2, 534–51.

order and bring about socialism as the dawn of a new era in which the working classes would be liberated and in which they would rule.[13] The esteem in which German social democracy was held in Europe and the Americas ensured that this message of revolutionary anti-capitalism associated with Marxism circulated widely and wherever social democracy experienced economic, social, cultural and political exclusion it also resonated widely.[14] It never was the only show in town, as anarchism, more particularly anarcho-syndicalism, was a rival but equally anti-capitalist and revolutionary force that was in parts of southern and south-eastern Europe and in Latin America a more powerful political movement than social democracy.[15] Christian, mainly Catholic workers' movements had their own critique of capitalism which they saw as incompatible with the teachings of Christ, even if they were often hoping for a moral reform of capitalism rather than its violent overthrow.[16]

The close connection between the exclusionary practices directed against social democracy and the latter's turn to revolutionary anti-capitalist Marxism is indirectly confirmed by the different path travelled by social democracy in Britain, where a powerful trade union movement had emerged in the nineteenth century capable of enforcing their recognition by employers. Allied to the Liberal Party after mid-century, it achieved political recognition and representation in parliament, where many trade unionists turned MPs influenced legislation. "Respectable" trade unionism was socially accepted by middle-class society, even if the class lines in British society remained incredibly distinct.[17] Transferring its allegiances to the nascent Labour Party after the 1900s the trade union movement also ensured that the Labour Party never became an avowedly Marxist party. Committed to "parliamentary socialism"[18] it sought the democratic inclusion of the working class into the British nation state.[19] Whilst it contained Marxist and anti-capitalist sentiments at certain times and places,

13   Stefan Berger, *Social Democracy and the Working Class in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Germany* (London: Longman, 2000), 72–6.

14   J. P. Nettl, "The German Social Democratic Party 1890–1914 as a Political Model," *Past and Present* 30 (1965), 65–95.

15   Carl Levy and Matthew S. Adams, eds., *The Palgrave Handbook of Anarchism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019).

16   Lex Heerma van Voss, Patrick Pasture, and Jan de Maeyer, eds., *Between Cross and Class: Comparative Histories of Christian Labour in Europe, 1840–2000* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2005).

17   Ross McKibbin, *Classes and Cultures: England 1918–1951* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Selina Todd, *The People. The Rise and Fall of the Working Class* (London: John Murray, 2014).

18   Ralph Miliband, *Parliamentary Socialism: A Study in the Politics of Labour* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1961).

19   Erich Wangermann, "Vom vernünftigen System zur Logik der ökonomischen Entwicklung. Zur Demokratiediskussion in der englischen und deutschen Arbeiterbewegung," *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 3 (1991), 53–71.

it always remained committed a predominantly reformist version of social democracy.[20]

It would, however, be entirely mistaken to ignore the emergence of reformism also within the social democratic movements officially dedicated to revolutionary anti-capitalism. After all, the first part of the Erfurt programme of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), making official the party's conversion to Marxism, was already balanced with a second part, which described in detail the reformist aspirations of the party in a variety of different policy fields. Before the First World War Eduard Bernstein became the most outspoken representative of reformism within German social democracy, calling for a democratic and parliamentary road to socialism that would seek alliances with other politically progressive forces in Germany.[21] Whilst his brand of "revisionism" was condemned by the party leadership and the keeper of its ideological grail, Karl Kautsky, incidentally a personal friend of Bernstein, many leading social democrats increasingly practiced reformism in their political life in Imperial Germany. And even Kautsky shared with Bernstein a firm commitment to representative forms of democracy.[22] Well before 1914 reformism became a strong movement in virtually all social democratic parties in Europe and elsewhere, even where they were officially committed to Marxism. Hence pre-First World War social democracy was characterized by a deep split between those who felt that the only road to socialism would be the one through a violent overthrow of capitalism and those who favoured a parliamentary and evolutionary road to socialism.[23] Whilst many of the former became disciples of communism after the successful Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917, the latter formed to backbone of social democratic movements in the interwar period.

However, the Marxist legacy in social democracy had left a deeply ambiguous attitude of many social democrats vis-à-vis democracy. Many associated liberal democracy in particular with capitalism and condemned it as a political system in which the full emancipation of the workers would not be possible. Marx and Engels themselves had been deeply ambiguous about liberal democracy. On the one hand they recognized that its freedoms and rights-based discourse was an advantage for working-class activism when compared to autocratic and absolutist forms of government. On the other hand, they depicted liberal democracy as class rule of the bourgeoisie that could only be ended by a violent overthrow of the economic system, capitalism, that liberal democracy was associated with. Hence, within the social democratic movement of the

20   Andrew Thorpe, *A History of the British Labour Party* (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1997).
21   Manfred B. Steger, *The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
22   Karl Kautsky, *Der Parlamentarismus, die Volksgesetzgebung und die Sozialdemokratie* (Stuttgart: J. H. W. Dietz, 1893).
23   Carl E. Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905–1917: The Development of the Great Schism* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1955).

pre-First World War era, an intense discussion took place about varieties of democracy, including socialist or proletarian democracy and how they could be distinguished from one another.[24]

Searching for a Democratic Path towards Socialism

It was the Bolsheviks and Lenin in particular who forced this debate after 1917, and in the ideological rifts between Lenin and Kautsky, two lines of socialism were established which both had a profound impact on the course of the twentieth century. Lenin's "proletarian democracy" that legitimated an end of parliamentary rule and a form of dictatorship of the most advanced parts of the working class, i. e. the Communist Party, stood diametrically opposed to Kautsky's "social democracy" that accepted the frame of liberal parliamentary democracy in order to advance the causes of social justice.[25] In the interwar period social democracy was to embark on alliance-building with other socially progressive forces in order to win parliamentary majorities, form national governments and implement social reforms often seen as the first steps to a comprehensive social democratization of societies. The most important social democratic party of the pre-1914 period, the German SPD, was hampered in its efforts by the emergence of the biggest communist party outside of the Soviet Union in Germany and a distinct lack of powerful and willing political allies that shared its democratic and social inclinations. It was nevertheless able to give the Weimar Republic nationally and many of the states of Weimar, notably Prussia, a distinctly social democratic outlook—with significant advances in trade union rights, social welfare and workers' social, cultural and educational inclusion into the state.[26] Yet arguably the more significant advances were made in Sweden, where the social democrats forged a lasting alliance with the farmers' party that laid the foundation for half a century of social democratic rule that was to shape Swedish society deeply and made Sweden a byword for social democracy in many parts of the world.[27] By merging a socially progressive agenda of workers' inclusion with the language of nation and community—Per Al-

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24   An attempt to systematize this discussion in a scholarly way can already be found in Artur Rosenberg, *Democracy and Socialism: A Contribution to the Political History of the Past 150 Years* (New York: Beacon Press, 1965). [first published in German in 1938]

25   Moira Donald, *Marxism and Revolution: Karl Kautsky and the Russian Marxists, 1900–1924* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).

26   Heinrich August Winkler, *Geschichte der Arbeiter und der Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik*, 3 vols. (Bonn: J. W. H. Dietz, 1984–1987).

27   Jenny Jansson, *Manufacturing Consensus: The Making of the Reformist Swedish Working Class* (Philadelphia: Coronet, 2012); see also: James Fulcher, "Sweden," in *The Force of Labour. The Western European Labour Movement and the Working Class in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Stefan Berger and David Broughton (Oxford: Berg, 1995), 7–38.

bin Hanson's "folkhemmet," the Swedish SAP achieved an unprecedented cultural hegemony in Swedish society that still is hugely influential if by no means undisputed anymore in Sweden today. In Italy the Socialist Party under Antonio Labriola also followed a policy of a step-by-step extension of democracy and social reform.[28] Already well before 1914 the French socialist leader Jean Jaurès had declared his firm belief in gradual reform under parliamentary democratic auspices.[29] In the interwar period it appeared for a while as if social democratic parties would best be able to combine concerns for liberal democracy with concerns for social justice.[30]

In the interwar period many social democrats attempted to put forward ideas that would extend democracy from the political to the economic sphere. Fritz Naphtali, the head of the German social democratic trade unions' Research Institute for Economic Affairs developed an elaborate theory of economic democracy between 1925 and 1929. Extending the powers of works councils and establishing management boards in which unions would be directly represented as well as state involvement in economic decision-making were all important elements in this theory.[31] Much less dependent on state intervention and statism was guild socialism, but at the heart of this idea was also the notion of economic democracy.[32] Whitney councils in Britain after 1918 signalled a renewed interest in questions of economic democracy as did the Dutch socialists' demands for significant workers' participation in management.[33]

Returning social democracy in the interwar period to the democratic path of the search for inclusion from where it had started in the early nineteenth century and from which it had deviated under the impression of multiple exclusions in the latter part of the nineteenth century, was not without its difficulties. The most important were the ongoing economic crises of the interwar years, associated with hyperinflation and especially with the Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Not only for the communists but also for many social democrats the economic failure of capitalism seemed to confirm again how deeply problematical this economic system was and how it impacted negatively on the values and interests of social democracy. Hence it also prompted the return of greater anti-capitalist sentiments in the ranks of social democracy. Even in the relatively reformist Britain, Labour Party politicians

28   Luigi dal Pane, *Antonio Labriola nella politica e nella cultura italiana* (Turin: Enaudi, 1975).

29   Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism: its Rise, Growth and Dissolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), vol. 2, 178ff.

30   Sheri Berman, *The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).

31   John Moses, "The Concept of Economic Democracy within the German Socialist Trade Unions During the Weimar Republic," *Labor History* 34 (1978), 45–57.

32   Kevin Morgan, *Bolshevism, Syndicalism and the General Strike: The Lost Internationalist World of A. A. Purcell* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2013).

33   Lex Heerma van Voss, "The Netherlands," in *The Force of Labour*, edited by Stefan Berger and David Broughton (Washington, DC: Berg, 1995), 50.

such as Harold Laski feared for parliamentary socialism in the 1930s and despaired of the prospect of bringing about socialism through constitutional means.[34] When the shadow of fascism darkened the prospect of a social democratic future in the 1930s and when more and more democracies fell for authoritarian forms of government, the few remaining liberal democracies had to face the question whether they were a dying creed. The Bataille Socialiste in France and the Action Socialiste in Belgium both sought to commit social democracy to a course of revolutionary anti-capitalism in alliance with communism. When Austro-fascism came to power in Vienna in 1934, Otto Bauer abandoned his earlier endorsement of the democratic road to socialism and instead called for revolutionary action leading to a dictatorship of the proletariat.[35]

Whilst some social democrats thus turned to anti-capitalism, this situation tied other social democrats even further to liberal democracy and led them to a deeper engagement with theories of pluralism. Thus, for example, Gustav Radbruch and Hermann Heller in Germany began to argue that interest fragmentation was the basis of pluralist policies that would not go away in socialist societies. Hence, they argued as legal experts that the maintenance of the rule of law would be the prime concern for social democrats even after a socialist society had been created, as individual rights would protect different interests and their expression.[36] The experience of exile, especially in Western democracies, such as Britain and the United States, enhanced and promoted a deeper understanding of democratic pluralism and led to an endorsement of liberal democracy as the frame in which social democratic politics had to seek to advance its agenda.[37] No one represented that change more than the later West-German social democratic chancellor, Willy Brandt. As a young social democrat Brandt had joined the breakaway Socialist Workers' Party (SAP) in 1932 that aimed to transcend

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34   Harold Laski, *The Crisis and the Constitution: 1931 and After* (London: Hogarth Press, 1932); Laski, *Can Socialism Come by Constitutional Methods* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1932).

35   On the revival of revolutionary Marxism in social democratic parties in Europe during the first half of the 1930s see Gerd Rainer Horn, *European Socialists Respond to Fascism: Ideology, Activism and Contingency in the 1930s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

36   Hermann Heller, "Staat, Nation und Sozialdemokratie," (1925), in *Gesammelte Schriften*, edited by Hermann Heller (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1971), 527–42; Gustav Radbruch, *Der innere Weg. Aufriss meines Lebens* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961), 131.

37   Isabel Tombs, "Socialists Debate Their History from the First World War to the Third Reich: German Exiles and the British Labour Party," in *Historikerdialoge: Geschichte, Mythos und Gedächtnis im deutsch-britischen kulturellen Austausch 1750–2000*, edited by Stefan Berger, Peter Lamber and Peter Schumann (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), 361–82; Julia Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie. Die Westernisierung von SPD und DGB* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003); Ursula Bitzegeio, *Über Partei- und Landesgrenzen hinaus: Hans Gottfurcht (1896–1982) und die gewerkschaftliche Organisation der Angestellten* (Bonn: J.W.H. Dietz Nachf., 2009).

the SPD's purely legalistic defence of political democracy in Weimar Germany. Socialized in the Social Democratic Youth Movement (SAJ) in the 1920s Brandt would have been familiar with one of the most famous slogans of the SAJ: "Democracy that is not much, Socialism is the aim." (It rhymes in German: Demokratie, das ist nicht viel, Sozialismus ist das Ziel.) The word "democracy" was sometimes exchanged for the word "republic." Both variants, however, show to what extent the democratic commitment of younger social democrats could not be taken for granted. In exile in Norway, Brandt came under the spell of Scandinavian, in particular Swedish social democracy. Here he learnt to understand political democracy as the only foundation on which socialism could be built after the end of the Second World War, and, inversely, he came to comprehend socialism as "perfect democracy."[38]

Welfare Capitalism and Social Democracy

The end of the Second World War, which had brought so much devastation to Europe, provided one of the rare moments of temporary instability, where horizons of expectations were suddenly wide open and demands for change were widespread. Antifascist councils or liberation councils stepped into a power vacuum and sought to implement social, economic, and political reforms. The future of capitalism, widely associated with fascism, especially in fascist countries, such as Italy and Germany, or countries where capitalist elites had collaborated with the fascist occupiers, such as France, seemed in doubt. Social and economic elites were challenged and threatened, and the political vacuum at the heart of many immediate postwar societies produced all sorts of schemes, some of them pregnant with ideas of anti-capitalism. [39]

Under the impact of the global Cold War the dichotomy between social democracy and communism, established after 1917, became more marked. Social Democracy equalled high treason in Stalinist communism and was punishable by death sentences. Social democratic anti-communism in liberal capitalist societies contributed to multiple discriminations, persecutions and to the depiction of communists in rather two-dimensional ways. An ongoing commitment to Marxism that would form a shared platform with communists now became untenable. It was once again the German social democratic party that embarked on the most symbolic purging of Marxism, in its emblematic 1959 Bad Godesberg programme.[40] Wholly committed

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38   Willy Brandt, *Links und frei. Mein Weg, 1930–1950* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1981).

39   Stefan Berger and Marcel Boldorf, eds., *Social Movements and the Change of Economic Elites in Europe after 1945* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018).

40   On the significance of the Bad Godesberg programme see Peter Lösche and Franz Walter, *Die SPD: Klassenpartei, Volkspartei, Quotenpartei – zur Entwicklung der Sozialdemokratie*

to liberal democracy, social democracy now made its peace with capitalism, no longer seeking to overcome and replace it but instead attempting to bring about a capitalism with a human face, in other words a capitalism that would provide benefits also for workers, in particular welfare and the mass consumption of consumer goods as well as greater equality of opportunities in education.[41] In his comparison of the postwar trajectories of the Dutch, French and German social democratic parties, Dietrich Orlow concluded that "virtually all Socialists insisted political democracy was an end in itself. The concept included both respect for individual civil rights and adherence to a system of political decision-making founded on free, universal suffrage. Most social democrats favoured parliamentary democracy as a constitutional system."[42] The Socialist International in 1951 underlined the symbiotic relationship between democracy and social justice: "Socialism can only be realized through democracy; democracy can only be perfected through socialism."[43] And just before the end of the Cold War, in 1989, it reiterated its belief that democratic socialism consisted of the "worldwide democratization of economic, social and political power structures."[44]

Where social democracy was strong it often built on and institutionalized liberal corporatist arrangements, which allowed macro-economic steering of processes in which employers and trade unions were closely integrated. In its Scandinavian version it might have resembled a "politics against markets,"[45] but it also often would be more correctly described as a politics with markets, as those in political power had to accept the rule of the game that was still capitalism. Attempts at steering the economy were accompanied by efforts to increase forms of workplace democracy. Different types of workplace democracy can be distinguished.[46] One of the oldest, already promoted by Beatrice and Sidney Webb in the 1890s,[47] is that of industrial democracy, i.e. trade union representation of workers and collective bargaining procedures.[48] Next to

von Weimar bis zur deutschen Vereinigung (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992).

41   Gary Dorrien, *Social Democracy in the Making: Political and Religious Roots of European Socialism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), chapter 6, 409–74.

42   Dietrich Orlow, *Common Destiny: A Comparative History of the Dutch, French and German Social Democratic Parties 1945–1969* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

43   "Ziele und Aufgaben des demokratischen Sozialismus" [1951], in *Geschichte der Internationale*, edited by Julius Braunthal (Hannover: J. H. W. Dietz Nachf., 1971), vol. 3, 613–4.

44   Prinzipienerklärung der sozialistischen Internationale, 17th Congress, Stockholm, 1989, 3.

45   Gøsta Esping Anderson, *Politics against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

46   Stefan Berger, Ludger Pries and Manfred Wannöffel, eds., *The Palgrave Handbook of Workers' Participation at Plant Level, Basingstoke* (Palgrave MacMillan, 2019).

47   Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Industrial Democracy* (London: George Allen & Co., 1892).

48   John W. Budd, *Employment with a Human Face: Balancing Efficiency, Equity and Voice* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

this there was also the idea of self-management and workers' control, which included power-sharing mechanisms between workers and management at plant level.[49] Thirdly, various forms of representation of workers in management boards were implemented. The best-known of those representative models of workplace democracy is that of German codetermination (Mitbestimmung).[50] A fourth type of workplace democracy focused on the lived experiences at work highlighting diverse mechanisms through which work could become an emancipatory and participatory experience. An emphasis on workplace organization is here related to opportunities for self-determination and democratic decision-making.[51] A fifth type of workplace democracy focusses on questions of ownership and promotes diverse forms of mutualism. Cooperatives are the best-known form of this bottom-up associations for economic purposes, where the producers also own the means of production and share the profits as well as the losses.[52] A variant of this type is private ownership of firms which allow representation of consumers, stakeholders, and users of products on management boards.[53] Finally, we have industrial citizenship models, where workers are financially rewarded if the company does well. In other words, they share to different degrees in the company's profits.[54] A comparative history of these types of workplace democracy and their relationship to the social democratic project after the Second World War is yet to be undertaken.[55]

Furthermore, the social democratic arrangement with capitalism led to comprehensive plans of social engineering, where the state apparatus was to be used to achieve greater equality of opportunities and more social justice. Thus, for example, school reforms were implemented that were meant to make higher forms of schooling more porous for working-class children allowing them more access to education, including

49   James Muldoon, *Council Democracy: Towards a Democratic Socialist Politics* (London: Routledge, 2018).

50   Walther Müller-Jentsch, *Mitbestimmung: Arbeitnehmerrechte im Betrieb und Unternehmen* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2019).

51   Andrea Veltmann*, Meaningful Work* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

52   Vera Zamagni, "A Worldwide Historical Perspective on Cooperatives and their Evolution," in *The Oxford Handbook of Mutual, Cooperative and Co-Owned Business*, edited by Jonathan Michie, Joseph Blasi and Carlo Borzaga (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 97–113.

53   Christopher D. Merrett and Norman Walzer, eds., *Cooperatives and Local Development: Theory and Applications for the 21st Century* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2004).

54   Erik Poutsma, John Hendrickx, and Fred Huijgen, "Employee Participation in Europe: in Search of the Participative Workplace," *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 24:1 (2003), 45–76.

55   In 2021, the author, together with Roberto Frega, Frank Georgii and Manfred Wannöffel, initiated a DFG/ANR-funded project with the aim to provide such comparisons for Western Europe. Many thanks to Roberto, Frank, and Manfred for intense discussions on workplace democracy that will surely intensify further in the years to come.

higher education. Other schemes of social engineering included the public financing and the paying of subsidies for cultural, educational and leisure facilities that would allow everyone, including workers, to participate in cultural, sports and other recreational activities. The traditional belief of the left in science and progress furthered an outlook according to which a rational planning of the social by scientific elites would best ensure the realization of a progressive agenda towards more social equality.[56]

During the long economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s it appeared, at least in Western Europe, as if the social democratic model of welfare capitalism would drive everything before it. Liberal, Christian democratic and even conservative parties social democratized themselves and joined in the chorus of those seeking to use democracy in order to harness capitalism to work for the benefit of everyone in society, including workers.[57] Welfare capitalism became a West European model in these decades, carefully studied and observed and sometimes even copied or adapted in other parts of the world. The global system conflict between capitalism and communism made that model attractive, as it was capable of underpinning the claim that communism was not the best way of achieving social justice and a fair deal for workers. Social democracy was able to ride the tiger of capitalism in a way that would ultimately achieve better living and working conditions, higher standards of living, more mass consumption and greater equality of opportunities also for those sectors of the population for whom communism allegedly spoke.[58] German workers, for example, voted with their feet until the sealing of the German-German border in 1961 and, by leaving the Communist East Germany in droves, gave expression to their belief that they trusted welfare capitalism more than communism in building a worthwhile future for themselves.[59]

56   In model countries of social democracy, like Sweden and Norway, social engineering constitutes a core platform of social democratic governmental policies. See Francis Sejersted, *The Age of Social Democracy: Norway and Sweden in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

57   On the social democratisation of western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s see Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1945* (London: Penguin, 1994), chap. 9: 'The Golden Years'.

58   Alexander Hicks, *Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism: A Century of Income Security Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

59   On workers in the GDR, see Christoph Klessmann, *Arbeiter im 'Arbeiterstaat' DDR: deutsche Traditionen, sowjetisches Modell, westdeutsches Magnetfeld (1945–1971)* (Bonn: J.W.H. Dietz Nachf., 2007).

The Neoliberalization of Social Democracy

Yet this social democratic vision of democratizing capitalism and making it work for all came under severe pressure in the economic crisis of the 1970s ending the long postwar boom and ushering in forms of economic crisis management among which the rise of neoliberalism promised the most radical break with the social democratic postwar project. Neoliberal policies, associated above all with the governments of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US during the 1980s, attacked many of the core assumptions of social democratic welfare capitalism.[60] Macro-economic steering, its apostles argued, crippled the dynamism and energy of free markets, prevented economic growth and was thus indirectly a job killer. Hence everything had to be removed that prevented markets from operating without outside interference. Employers had to be as free as possible to take decisions that were in line with market mechanisms. The "dead hand"[61] of the state had to be removed and the power of trade unions to interfere with managerial decisions had to be reduced. The civil war from above that was waged by Thatcher on the British trade unions with the full force of the state behind her was the most telling example of the neoliberal aspiration to crush everything that stood in the way of market deregulation.[62]

Yet the attack of neoliberalism on social democratic welfare capitalism was not only directed against the macro-economic steering of markets, but also on all forms of social engineering that was associated by neoliberals with waste of taxpayers' money and endless state bureaucracy stifling freedom and individual initiative. It allegedly produced forms of welfare dependency that made whole generations of workers into passive recipients of state monies rather than active shapers of their own destinies. Neoliberals pointed out not only how wasteful the state handouts had been but also how comparatively minor the results were, in terms of (for example) making working-class children access higher education and in changing the class structure of society.[63]

Finally, neoliberals replaced the social democratic buzzword "democracy" with the neoliberal buzzword "freedom." Both capitalism and individuals had to be freed from the incompetent, paternalistic and wasteful interferences of the state who had not so

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60 Wendy Brown, *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution* (New York: Zone Books, 2015). See also Paul Pierson, *Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

61 Brink Lindsey, *Against the Dead Hand: The Uncertain Struggle for Global Capitalism* (New York: John Wiley, 2002).

62 Peter Dorey, "Margaret Thatcher's Taming of the Trade Unions," in *The Legacy of Margaret Thatcher: Liberty Regained?*, edited by Stanislao Pugliese (London: Politico, 2003), 129–151.

63 William Roth, *The Assault on Social Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

much democratized as bureaucratized markets and everyday lives of ordinary people. The attempts of social democracy to expand notions of democracy from the political sphere of representation via elections and parliaments to other spheres of life, including the economic and social spheres, were rolled back and notions of a more restrictive liberal democracy, restricted to the political process, were revived by neoliberal politicians and theoreticians. One of the canonical texts for neoliberals, Milton Friedman's *Capitalism and Freedom*, first published in 1962, stressed the aspects of freedom rather than democracy in underpinning capitalism.[64]

The economic and social record of neoliberalism is at best mixed and at worst catastrophic. Deindustrialization in the UK and the US devastated whole industrial regions and coined phrases such as "rust-belt" and "chavs," associated with dislocation and the disintegration of social ties that once underpinned whole working-class communities. Neoliberalism widened the gulf between the "haves" and the "have nots." It made the rich richer and the poor poorer. And yet it thrived on the fears of the middle classes who did not want to pay higher taxes and who could not see benefits for themselves in social democratic welfare capitalism. And it also thrived on the promises to the working classes that they, through thrift and hard work, could achieve more individually than collectively through bodies such as trade unions, cooperatives, and social democratic parties. In other words, despite a doubtful social and economic record it managed to achieve forms of cultural hegemony that had a deep impact on the social democratic project of democratizing capitalism.[65]

It should be noted here that the neoliberal attacks on the social democratic project were accompanied by attacks from an anti-authoritarian left that had its origins in the 1968 movement.[66] Building on some of its theoretical inspirations, in particular the writings of Max Horkheimer, it had come to mistrust the traditional statism of social democracy and the accompanying attempts at social engineering.[67] Under the impact of the new environmental thinking, associated with the writings of the Club of Rome but also with the green movements of the 1970s, a fundamental critique of Western ideas of progress as being at the heart of an unsustainable and destructive process that destroyed the foundations of human life on earth came to fore from the 1970s onwards. Ideas of sustainability, communitarianism, "small is beautiful" and the power of civil society all had a critical edge towards traditional social democratic beliefs in

64   David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

65   Wendy Brown, *In the Ruins of Neoliberalism: The Rise of Antidemocratic Politics in the West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019).

66   Robert Gildea, James Mark, and Anette Warring, eds., *Europe's 1968: Voices of Revolt* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

67   Max Horkheimer, *Gesellschaft im Übergang* (Frankfurt am Main: suhrkamp, 1981).

social engineering, statism, and progress.[68] Hence it was not only the neoliberal right but also a post-1968 new left that came to doubt the social democratic project of the immediate postwar decades.

Under this double impact social democrats came to doubt their own project and began rethinking their basic beliefs in ways that moved them in some ways closer to neoliberalism. They bought into the neoliberal belief in the freedom of markets and shied away from regulating the economy. They became less interested in redistributing wealth and were no longer worried by the rich getting richer. They also mistrusted their earlier attempts at social engineering and instead now bought into the language of neoliberalism, propagating more active forms of citizenship and self-help rather than welfare. An active stakeholder society and the mobilization of citizens was to provide ways out of the paternalist social engineering projects of the past.[69] Some scholars, such as Gerassimos Moschonas, went as far as arguing that social democratic parties, under the influence of neoliberalism, had undergone a "great transformation" that made them act "in the name of social democracy" but without the values and ideals that once underpinned the social democratic project.[70]

The neoliberalization of social democracy always had its limits. Thus, budgets of social democratic governments in the 1990s and 2000s remained mildly redistributive throughout. There was an ongoing concern with poverty and preventing people from being trapped in poverty. Equally, social democrats looked for ways of managing deindustrialization rather than leaving everything to markets, even if these forms of deindustrialization were now even more than before hardly ever directed against markets but sought to bolster capitalism through state measures. The state was still used in positive ways by social democrats to underpin notions of solidarity with working-class communities suffering under the impact of deindustrialization.[71] It would also be wrong to equate ideas about stakeholder societies and the mobilization of citizenship initiatives automatically with neoliberalism. Anthony Giddens' ideas about a "third" social democratic way, published in the 1990s, were about giving some of the neo-

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68 Jeffrey C. Alexander and Piotr Sztompka, eds., *Rethinking Progress: Movements, Forces and Ideas at the End of the Twentieth Century* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990); Amitai Etzioni, *The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1997).

69 Magnus Ryner, "Neoliberalisation of European Social Democracy: Transmissions and Dispositions," in *The Sage Handbook of Neoliberalism*, edited by Damien Cahill, Melinda Cooper, Martijn Konings, and David Primrose (London: Sage, 2018), 248–59.

70 Gerassimos Moschonas, *In the Name of Social Democracy: The Great Transformation 1945 to the Present* (London: Verso, 2002).

71 Matthieu Fulla and Mark Lazar, "European Socialists and the State: A Comparative and Transnational Approach," in *European Socialists and the State in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries* edited by Fulla and Lazar (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2020), 1–26.

liberal ideas around individual initiative and freedom a distinctly social democratic outlook.[72]

Nevertheless, the neoliberalization of social democracy went far enough to ensure that social democracy lost its distinctive political brand with which it had been associated before the 1980s. Political parties began to appear to the left of social democracy often championing programmes that looked suspiciously like old social democratic ones advocating more steering of the economy, more social engineering and more democratization of capitalism.[73] Right-wing populist parties appeared who often attempted to cloth themselves in social garb, i.e. they also promised a return to welfarism, albeit often under ethnocentric, nationalist and racist preconditions.[74] And the Christian democratic traditions at the centre of politics that had been social democratized in the 1950s and 1960s often remained a serious political rival for social democratic parties.[75] Hence the social democrats were squeezed from all sides and in many countries lost their status as catch-all parties becoming at present a mere shadow of their former political selves. This has gone furthest in those countries where the neoliberalization of social democracy has gone furthest, in particular in the Netherlands, Britain and Germany, but social democratic parties have also been losing ground in their Scandinavian heartlands and elsewhere. During the last years many of the parties have attempted to revert their association with neoliberalism and return to more traditional social democratic agendas and concerns but finding a new brand on the diversified political spectrum that characterizes many democracies in the 2020s will be a difficult task. However, the rethinking of social democracy is an ongoing process.[76]

Democracy — a Means of Overcoming Capitalism or Embedding Capitalism?

The relationship between social democracy, democracy and capitalism has been a difficult and tension-ridden one from the nineteenth century to the present day. As I have argued here, the emergence of social democracy in the nineteenth century was closely

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72   Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity, 1988).

73   Luke March, *Radical Left Parties in Europe* (London: Routledge, 2012).

74   Tijtske Akkerman, Sarah L. De Lange, and Matthijs Rooduijn, eds., *Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: into the Mainstream?* (London: Routledge, 2016).

75   Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser, eds., *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945* (London: Routledge, 2004).

76   Richard Gillespie and William E. Paterson, eds., *Rethinking Social Democracy in Western Europe* (London: Routledge, 1993), which is about rethinking processes in light of the neoliberal challenge. See also: Henning Meyer and Jonathan Rutherford, eds., *The Future of Social Democracy: Building the Good Society* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012).

associated with the struggle for democracy—political, economic, and social. Frustrated and disappointed by the failure of bourgeois society to integrate social democracy and enraged by multiple forms of discrimination and persecution, many social democrats turned to revolutionary Marxism during the last third of the nineteenth century. This was accompanied by a denigration of democracy within the ranks of social democracy. From being the crucial aim, it became a mere means to achieve a more socially just society. The tensions between socialism and democracy were written into Marxism and could not be overcome within Marxism. When the social democratic movement split into a social democratic and a communist wing following the successful Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917, social democracy re-affirmed its belief in democracy and made this the major dividing line between itself and communism. However, under the impact of the Great Depression and the rise of fascism in interwar Europe, many social democrats remained ambiguous about democracy. Hence it was only after the end of the Second World War and under the impact of the Cold War that social democrats in the west abandoned Marxism and whole-heartedly endorsed liberal democracy and the rule of law as the framework in which to aim for and achieve greater social justice. Democracy was no longer a means to overcome capitalism. Instead, it became a tool with which to give capitalism a more human face, or in Karl Polanyi's memorable phrase, with which to "embed" capitalism.[77] During the golden age of social democracy from the 1950s to the 1970s, it combined a firm commitment to democracy with macro-economic steering, social engineering and a range of social and welfare policies all aimed at the more just redistribution of societal wealth. However, the attacks of neoliberalism on the one hand and of a postmaterial left on the other left the social democratic project looking increasingly outdated. It seemed no longer to provide appropriate answers to the economic and environmental challenges of contemporary societies. Torn between sticking to old recipes, a neo-liberalization of its outlook and a "greening" of its traditions, it has been seeking to reinvent itself with varying success from the 1990s onwards.[78]

If, arguably, many of its central presuppositions have been looking old-fashioned, including statism, macro-economic steering, and social engineering, the one plank of its long history, democracy, is arguably still its strongest arrow, albeit one that a variety of other political groupings also lay claim to. Nevertheless, if we survey some of the more recent ideas by left-wing intellectuals on how to rejuvenate the social democratic project in the twenty-first century, ideas of democracy tend to take centre stage. Jürgen Habermas has called on social democracy to rethink its project by re-affirming

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77   Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001) [first published in 1944].

78   Hans Keman, *Social Democracy: A Comparative Account of the Left-Wing Party Family* (London: Routledge, 2017).

its commitment to liberal democracy. This would involve stressing the importance of liberal freedoms, democratic institutions, and the rule of law. Institutions, according to Habermas, become central elements in upholding a precarious balance of interests in democratically constituted societies.[79] Among the sharpest critics of Habermas on the left have been Chantal Mouffe and Ernestau Laclau but their notions of "radical democracy" also advise the left to use, above all, the mobilization of a democratically constituted civil society to counter neoliberalism's attacks on democracy.[80] Oskar Negt has argued explicitly that in response to neoliberalism social democracy should engage in a public debate on the relationship between socialism and democracy to overcome the identity crisis on the left of the political spectrum.[81] Norberto Bobbio has called on the left to revive ideas of economic democracy and the democratization of the economic sphere in order to counter the power of corporate capitalism. The major dividing line in society, for him, is still that of social inequality, social injustice and poverty, and democracy remains the only way for the left to search for more social justice.[82] The extension of democracy to more social spheres than the political is also at the heart of Anthony Giddens' programme of a revitalization of the left. Arguing that "socialism is closely tied up with ideals of democracy," he finds: "Democracy offers a framework within which socialist parties can peacefully rise to power and implement their programme of change."[83] The ultimate aim of achieving more social cohesion in societies can only be achieved through democratic means. A democratized democracy, according to Giddens, needs decentralization of political decision-making, more local direct democracy and a more active citizens' involvement in governance structures.[84] The worrying analyses of Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, who have diagnosed the emergence of a self-referential post-democracy of elites and the increasing move of important political, economic and social decisions outside of spheres of democrat-

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79   Jürgen Habermas, *Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992).

80   Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 1985). More recently, Mouffe has chastised social democracy for having become neoliberalized and has called for a left-wing populism re-invigorating the democratic political process through agonistic principles. See Chantal Mouffe, *Agonistics. Thinking the World Politically* (London: Verso, 2013); Mouffe, *For a Left Populism* (London: Verso, 2018).

81   Oskar Negt, *Achtundsechzig: politische Intellektuelle und die Macht* (Frankfurt am Main: suhrkamp, 1998), 166.

82   Norberto Bobbio, *Which Socialism? Marxism, Socialism and Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity, 1987); Bobbio, *Left and Right* (Cambridge: Polity, 1996).

83   Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right. The Future of Radical Politics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 62.

84   Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way and its Critics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).

ic control,[85] seem to make it all the more necessary to emphasize the importance of democracy for the social democratic project. Capitalism has to be democratically controlled and social democracy, with its long commitment to democracy, would be well advised to put itself at the helm of a movement demanding more democratic control of capitalism.

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85   Colin Crouch, *Post-Democracy* (Blackwell: Wiley, 2004); Wolfgang Streeck, *How Will Capitalism End?* (London: Verso, 2016). See also Wolfgang Streeck, *Gekaufte Zeit: die vertagte Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus* (Frankfurt am Main: suhrkamp, 2013).

Kevin Morgan

Capitalism, Communism, and Democracy: Theory and Practice in European Communism, 1917–1956

Abstract

Communism claimed to stand for a higher form of democracy unleashed from capitalism's intrinsic inequalities and sources of oppression. This continuing validation of a democratic ideal informed communist campaigning practices in the capitalist world. It was simultaneously belied by regimes of "real socialism" seen as embodying the new social system destined to supersede capitalism. Democracy as critique and aspiration consequently proved a faultline that persisted through the history of European communism and contributing to its disintegration and collapse at the end of 1980s. In reviewing these basic disunities of theory and practice, this paper draws in particular on research on communism and its supporters in Britain including the Fabian socialists Sidney and Beatrice Webb.

Keywords: *Communism, democracy, Fabian socialism, Communist Party of Great Britain, Sidney and Beatrice Webb.*

Democracy and Dictatorship

In the relations of communism to democracy, there were two decisive moments in the history of the Bolshevik revolution. The first was the seizure of power, which some call a coup, which the Bolsheviks carried out in the name of "bread, land and peace" on 7 November 1917. The second, less than two months later, was the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly elected by popular vote in the weeks immediately following the revolution. The Bolsheviks had obtained around a quarter of the vote; opponents of the new regime, enjoying overwhelming support among the peasantry, were in a clear majority. When the assembly convened on 5 January, it was immediately suppressed by the new regime, and a demonstration in its support fired on by troops. Maxim Gorky had been a supporter of the Bolsheviks and would be so again. He was nevertheless an outspoken critic at this stage who noted the parallel with the "Bloody Sunday" shootings of unarmed demonstrators by Tsarist troops in January 1905.

For almost a hundred years the finest Russians have lived by the idea of a Constitu-
ent Assembly, a political institution which would give the entire Russian democra-
cy the opportunity freely to express its will. […] Rivers of blood have been spilled
on the sacrificial altar of this sacred idea, and now the "People's Commissars" have
given orders to shoot the democracy which demonstrated in honour of this idea.[1]

Seventy-two years later, in the spring of 1989, rolling student demonstrations became
a familiar presence in Tiananmen Square, Beijing. It was here that forty years earlier
Mao Zedong had proclaimed the People's Republic of China and the subsequently
much enlarged square had ever since served as the symbolic centre of communist rule.
Amongst the giant images of communist leaders and the official Monument to the
People's Heroes, on 30 May the students erected their own impromptu figure of the
Goddess of Democracy. Five days later, on 4 June 1989, it was crushed by tanks as
troops dispersed the demonstrators, leaving several hundred dead.

No wonder that Stephen Smith describes the century's communist regimes as mu-
tations of a single genus.[2] From start to finish of the short twentieth century, and in
both major countries of the communist revolution, what united these episodes was
the ready use of state violence to suppress rights of free assembly and collective action.
Despite the variations of social structure, culture and economic development, Smith
identifies the genus with monopoly control of the state and subordination to it of all
independent agency and intellectual life. "And so we will fight with the means estab-
lished by William Tell," an earlier generation of Russian revolutionaries had pledged,
"until we achieve those free institutions which will make it possible to discuss without
hindrance, in the press and in public meetings, all social and political problems, and
solve them through free representatives of the people."[3] Whatever desires for human
betterment were satisfied by communism, they evidently did not include this one.

Except as a form of negation, the coupling of communism and democracy has
therefore been seen by many as either tenuous or fraudulent. There were many anti-
communists whose democratic credentials were slighter still. There were also liberal
and social-democratic critics, beginning with those disenfranchised by the Bolsheviks
in 1918, for whom the antithesis of dictatorship and democracy would henceforth be-

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1   Maxim Gorky, "January 9 – January 5," (published 22 Jan. 1918) in *Untimely Thoughts. Es-
     says on revolution, culture and the Bolsheviks 1917–1918*, edited by Maxim Gorky (London:
     Yale University Press, 1968), 123–126.
2   Stephen A Smith, "Introduction: towards a global history of communism," in *The Oxford
     Handbook of the History of Communism*, edited by Stephen A. Smith (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
     versity Press, 2014), 3–4.
3   The first draft of Narodnaia Volia programme cited Franco Venturi, *Roots of Revolution. A
     history of populist and socialist movements in nineteenth century Russia* (London: Weidenfeld
     and Nicolson 1960), 649.

come a basic guiding principle. In the discussions of democracy that from the 1940s featured in the burgeoning discipline of western political science, communism served as a defining other excluded by definition from the field of enquiry. "Problems" of communism were studied either as a genus in its own right or else subsumed under the inimical rubric of totalitarianism—in a way that again was largely antithetical to democracy.[4] Communists by this time made their own forthright claims to the title, as in China's "new democracy" or the "people's democracies" of post-1945 eastern Europe. For the comparative political scientist, this was mere appropriation (or misappropriation) that one should not dignify by taking seriously. "No sensible person," wrote A. H. Birch in his *Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy*, "has ever been deceived by this into thinking that these states were democratically governed in the accepted sense of the term."[5]

Though this was the common sense that helped define the Cold War, its basic tenets were only reinforced by the revolutions of 1989 by which it seemed so obviously vindicated. Ernest Gellner pronounced that civil society had been "the central slogan in the dismantling of Marxist society."[6] From the new left perspective of Perry Anderson, capitalism's turning from nationalism to liberal democracy as its primary legitimation had since 1945 brutally exposed the contradictions of a communist world in which free association was denied.[7] "Experts of Communism have largely lost their 'subject,'" was the common-sense verdict of comparativist Hans Daalder. "Scholars who were mainly concerned with the study of the development and the working of democracies, on the other hand, stand before an entirely new universe."[8]

With the throwing open of communist archives, communism as a historical subject was in reality to flourish as never before. Nevertheless, the elusiveness of democracy as a theme seemingly corroborated the sensible person's view. In the *Oxford Handbook* that he edited, Smith notes that only in India may one trace a handful of democratically elected communist administrations. Among the volume's thematic essays none is devoted to communism and democracy. In the *Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Communism*, subjects covered include bureaucracy, despotism, purges, totalitarianism, red terror, great terror, terrorism, martial law, killing fields, Holodomor and Gulag. There is no entry on democracy as such. Norman N. Naimark does contribute a discussion of people's democracy that is notably balanced and informative in its treatment. Nev-

4   A point developed further below.
5   Anthony H. Birch, *The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy* (London: Routledge, 2001), 72–73; Jack Lively, *Democracy* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975), 33–34.
6   Ernst Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty. Civil Society and its Rivals* (London: Penguin, 1996), 53.
7   Perry Anderson, "Internationalism: a breviary," *New Left Review* 14 (2002): 22.
8   Hans Daalder, "The Development of the Study of Comparative Politics" in *Comparative Democratic Politics. A guide to contemporary theory and research*, edited by Hans Keman (London: Sage Publications, 2002), 29–30.

ertheless, Naimark again notes the dominant western view of the phenomenon as a mere sham and camouflage to "hornswoggle" unwary outsiders. "People's Democracy was not democracy at all, because the idea and reality of parliamentary government were completely unacceptable to the Soviets."[9]

Varieties of Democracy

The contention of this paper is that democracy as challenge, critique and aspiration was central to the collapse of European communism, not just as the unravelling of a Marxist teleology but as a basic faultline and ambivalence at the heart of communism itself. Belying the loose analogies so often drawn with fascism, an openness and vulnerability to democratic argument was the result of deep internal contradictions that are abundantly documented in contemporary sources. Against the "accepted sense" of the terms both communism and democracy, there have always been dissenting views and caveats. Fundamentally, these have usually boiled down to one or other of two critical insights. The first is that normative concepts of this type have no single self-evident meaning but are always historically constructed and "essentially contested." The second is that neither democracy nor communism were simply normative concepts, but on the contrary involved issues of agency and collective action which have been central to their historical meaning. It may be tempting to pose the relationship as one between communism as political practice and democracy as normative value. In seeking to take a more historicized approach, this paper will show how partial and narrowly ideological such an approach has often been.

Beginning with democracy, one might cite the Canadian C.B. Macpherson as one of the most influential exponents of the view that liberal democracy was only one possible variant of democratic government, and one inseparable from the capitalist economic order whose inequalities and restrictions of the freedoms of the majority it legitimized.[10] Developing these reflections from the 1960s, Macpherson, was acutely aware of the Cold War polarities which his synthesis of liberal and Marxist approaches sought to confront.[11] We shall nevertheless see that the idea of competing claims to democracy goes back long before 1917, in diverse articulations including those of the communists themselves. It was with a sense of these longer trajectories that David Held, while acknowledging his debt to Macpherson, would later delineate

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9   Norman N. Naimark, "People's Democracy," in *A Dictionary of 20th-Century Communism*, edited by Silvio Pons and Robert Service (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 607–611.

10   C.B. Macpherson, *The Real World of Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).

11   Macpherson, *Real World*, 65. For an overview, see Jules Townshend, *C.B. Macpherson and the Problem of Liberal Democracy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), chapter 1.

competing "models of democracy." Among their established variants, Held primarily distinguished between a liberal or representative model and a "Marxist conception of direct democracy."[12] In reality, Marxism was just one component in a wider socialist challenge to established power relations ranging from technocratic elitism to the grass-roots democracy of syndicalists and guild socialists.[13]

That Marx and Engels loomed so large for Held was partly because his was avowedly of that literature that centred on ideas rather than movements and practices. Adopting a broader historical approach, Macpherson had recognized in democracy a ferment of social agency and expectation arising from below that was only afterwards accommodated by the liberal state in the form of liberal democracy.[14] When Thomas Carlyle in *The French Revolution* (1837) invoked the "new omnipotent Unknown of Democracy" whose crowning expression the revolution was, he did not so much mean a political programme as a social actor and standard of value that any nineteenth-century socialist might have recognized and identified with.[15] Even Tocqueville in *Democracy in America* (1840) was concerned with democracy as a social state and "that equality of conditions of which the sovereignty of the people was merely the political corollary."[16] Drawing on these traditions, communism in one aspect may be seen as a critique and often a denial of that conception of liberal democracy, also an appropriation, propounded instead as corollary to the market economy. Macpherson's contention was that it held the promise of a non-liberal but democratic order that addressed or avoided the denials of equal rights that were inherent in liberal capitalism.

Of course, it did not deliver on that promise. Panglossian even in the 1960s was Macpherson's view of "actually existing" socialism as a sacrifice of present freedoms to secure their fuller flowering in the future.[17] Gellner's colourful "Caesaro-Papism-Mammonism" at least captured the finally unresolvable tension between these regimes and any notion of a civil society. Entering the discussion in the 1980s Held was sceptical as to Marxism's promise of the "end of politics" and post-1989 he further stressed its underestimation of the "liberal preoccupation with how to secure freedom of criticism and action." Critical voices, like those of "western Marxism," were to be found only at the periphery of "Marxism-Leninism," if not beyond it; revived to such effect after the crisis of Stalinism in 1956, they were symptoms of the breakdown and

12   David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Oxford: Polity Press, 2006), 3–6.
13   For the richness of socialist thinking in a specific national context, see Logie Barrow and Ian Bullock, *Democratic Ideas and the British Labour Movement 1880–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
14   Macpherson, *Real World*, chapter 1.
15   Thomas Carlyle, *The French Revolution: A History* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1871), 103.
16   André Jardin, *Tocqueville: A Biography*, trans. Lydia Davis (London: Peter Halban, 1988), 203.
17   Macpherson, *The Real World*, 59.

internal fissuring that would culminate in 1989.[18] But there can be no appreciation of the longer history of these tensions unless communism is also understood as a political movement involving commitments and beliefs that were both intensely felt and fraught with contradictions.

Mao once characterized communism as a complete proletarian ideology and a new social system.[19] Crucially it was also one of the political movements that shaped the twentieth century and the only one of such international scope and cohesion. It is in this wider context that the notion of Caesaropapism is clearly inadequate. The Bolsheviks seized power, and two years later established the new Communist International (Comintern), in the expectation of a rapidly spreading world revolution. In the event, they had to fall back on a Leninist notion of uneven development to account for the indefinite thwarting of this prospect. One result was that Mao's new social system was never co-extensive with the communist movement itself. Another was that communist states and parties alike were drawn into various fronts and alliances through which to cultivate a broader democratic public through some notion of common interests and ideals. A third was that these common interests included the ability to function politically under conditions of "bourgeois" or non-socialist democracy. Marxism for western communists did not mean the end of politics with which Held identified it. It meant relentless civic activism, extending to the workplace, according to that other precept drawn from Engels's *Anti-Dühring*, "To struggle is to live."[20] Notwithstanding communism's culture of centralization and the inculcation of a common political identity, it is in its different existential relations with democracy and civil society that its conceptualization as a single genus is most severely stretched.

A striking exemplification of this was the "two branches" of Finnish communism: one in Soviet exile and sharing in the dominant political culture of Bolshevism, and the other, "Finnish" branch being under constant threat of proscription and centrally concerned with protecting workers" rights and liberties against the coercive apparatus of the state.[21] Communism, in other words, was a movement which embraced both societies in which the exercise of democratic rights was seen as threatening communist rule; and those in which, as in Finland itself, such rights were a basic condition of the communists' own effectiveness and even survival. It was also a movement, to complicate things further, that sought to reconcile conflicting pressures according to the same leading bodies, pronouncements and theoretical texts. Within a purely Soviet

18   Held, *Models*, 96–124, 172–179, 225–230.
19   "On new democracy" (Jan. 1940) in Mao Zedong, *Selected Works of Mao-Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 360.
20   Which, for example, the British communist Ernie Benson took as the title of his autobiography.
21   Tauno Saarela, *Finnish Communism Visited* (Helsinki: Työväen historian ja perinteen tutkimuksen seura, 2015), 112.

context, David Priestland has noted how the persistent resort to democratic argument was a destabilizing internal factor contributing to the system's collapse.[22] When Stalin described the eponymous "Stalin" constitution of 1936 as the world's only thoroughly democratic one, it is easy to see it as an exercise in doublethink. Nevertheless, Orwell himself, the architect of doublethink, once wrote of the communists that it was "not altogether an advantage to a political party to sail under false colours"; for there was always the danger that on these grounds its own supporters might desert it—or at least, as in 1989, lose any self-belief or resolution in its defence.[23]

Internationally the contradictions were sharper still, and because of communism's transnational character risked percolating into those countries in which communists exercised their political monopoly. As liberal democracy between the wars ceded so much ground to the authoritarian right, communists did not just draw on those socialistic ideas of economic democracy which liberal polities had failed to satisfy. They were also at the forefront of campaigns around those traditional democratic rights to whose curtailment they were typically more exposed than almost any other political formation.

It is on this international aspect that the presentation here will focus. It draws in particular on examples from Britain, where communism was at once remote from ever exercising power and continuously able to function legally. This doubtless encouraged a susceptibility to wider democratic norms and practices, without quite the deep-seated antagonism that was at first so evident in Germany, for example, or even in France.[24] Nevertheless, the underlying tensions and ambiguities were not specific to any single national case. Birch maintained that communists at first dismissed democracy only to exploit it for their own purposes when experience showed that it was universally popular. In reality, communists at no point simply relinquished the language of democracy; and when in the 1930s they sought to mobilize around even its non-socialist variants, this was not because they were universally popular but because they were almost everywhere under threat. To have sought to reconcile such positions with Stalinist forms of rule was an anomaly that would in time generate a host of conflicts within the communist movement. Communism was deeply marked by its ambivalence as to whether it signified the exposure, transcendence, or fulfilment of wider

22   David Priestland, "Soviet Democracy, 1919–91," *European History Quarterly* 32 (2002): 111–30.

23   "Burnham's View of the Contemporary World Struggle" in Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell. Volume 4: In Front of Your Nose, 1945–50* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970), 367. For the Stalin constitution, see below.

24   For which see for example Marc Lazar, "Fort et fragile, immuable et changeante … La culture politique communiste," in *Les cultures politiques en France*, edited by Serge Berstein (Paris: Seuil, 1999), 233.

democratic ideals. The later disputes that resulted from this are familiar. Focusing on the period prior to 1956, the object of the present paper is to show how deeply rooted they were in the years of Lenin and Stalin.

Who, whom?

Nikolai Bukharin is remembered as the relatively moderate and humane Bolshevik whose gradualist notions of socialist construction offered the one coherent alternative to Stalin's unleashing of unrestrained state violence. Despite this later reputation as a "rightist," in the revolution's earlier phases Bukharin had nevertheless been among the most zealous and outspoken of its leaders and one who scorned to dissimulate its single-minded commitment to its goals.[25]

Published in 1918, his *Communist Programme* is said to have been the first popular exposition of Bolshevism in power. To the question of why the Bolsheviks had so swiftly abandoned their commitment to democratic freedoms it gave a straightforward answer. Before the revolution the workers' party had called for a constituent assembly because it was not yet strong enough to storm the positions of the bourgeoisie. "It needed time to prepare, to gather strength, to enlighten the masses, to organize." It needed, in other words, rights of a free press, assembly and association, and in practice could formulate these demands only as broader democratic principles that would be enjoyed by all. Now, however, times had changed, and the achievement of Soviet power allowed the class-based freedoms of the workers alone. "When there is a question of the press, we first ask *which* press—the bourgeois or the workers' press; when there is a question of gatherings, we ask *what* gatherings—workers' or counter-revolutionary."[26] Although still awaiting its classic two-word formulation, the Bolshevik logic of "Who, whom?" was already inescapable.

The communist view of democracy, as of almost any general principle, was therefore historically contingent or positional. On the Comintern's launching in March 1919 Lenin drafted a set of theses on democracy and dictatorship designed to secure a definitive break with social democracy. For Lenin, the key division was that of the qualifying adjectives *bourgeois* democracy and *proletarian* dictatorship. Against social-democratic critics like Karl Kautsky, whom he had once revered as socialism's leading theoretician, Lenin insisted that there nowhere did or could exist "democracy in the abstract," and that to dream of a third way between the dictatorships of bour-

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25   The standard account remains Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution. A Political Biography, 1888–1938* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).

26   N. Bukharin, *Programme of the World Revolution* (1918) (Glasgow: Socialist Labour Press, 1920), 36–7. Widely translated, the pamphlet's title has been rendered in a variety of English versions.

geoisie and proletariat was a petty-bourgeois fantasy.[27] In *The ABC of Communism*, coauthored by Bukharin with Evgeny Preobrazhensky, the dismissal of bourgeois democracy as a fraud came with the further assurance that, even were it conveiable, "in comparison with the Soviet Power it would not be worth a cracked farthing."[28] In the "twenty-one conditions" of admission which the Comintern adopted at its second congress, there was an explicit assumption of "conditions of acute civil war" in which communists could have no confidence in "bourgeois legality." Certainly, they were not to be constrained by it.[29]

But even at this stage the Bolsheviks did not just abandon the language of democracy to their opponents. Democracy and dictatorship were not alternatives, but forms of class rule viewed from either side of the who-whom equation. What mattered was which class ruled; and because the who of the workers' dictatorship represented the toiling masses against their exploiters, that is the "overwhelming majority" against a minority, Lenin equated it with an ideal of "true democracy" realizable only through a revolutionary break with capitalism. Lenin was therefore not oblivious to the power of the idea of democracy as if of some universally recognized test of political value and the legitimacy of different class regimes. Communism's antagonist and antithesis was not democracy but capitalism, which undermined democracy through the restriction of meaningful rights of press and assembly to the propertied classes supported by the "bourgeois apparatus of power." Communism, conversely, heralded wider and deeper forms of democracy, through "continuous, unhampered, and decisive participation in the democratic administration of the State."

This was the "true" proletarian democracy which in due course would lead to Held's "end of politics" and the distantly dangling prospect of the withering away of the state. The most widely circulated rendering of these themes was Lenin's *State and Revolution*, written just prior to the revolution, with its promised sequel of a "*more* democratic state machine" which the great majority would direct and themselves administer. Though seemingly the most libertarian of Lenin's writings, it is easily dismissed as a utopian passing fancy having little bearing on the shaping of the future party state.[30]

27   "Theses on bourgeois democracy and proletarian dictatorship adopted by the first Comintern congress," in: Jane Degras, *The Communist International 1919–1943: Documents. Volume 1: 1919–1922* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), 7–16.

28   Nikolai Bukharin and Evgenii Preobrazhensky, *The ABC of Communism* (1920) (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969), 222–6.

29   Reproduced in Degras, *Communist International*, 166–72.

30   For sympathetic views see Richard Stites, *Revolutionary Dreams. Utopian Visions and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 41–6; Neil Harding, *Lenin's Political Thought. Volume 2: Theory and Practice in the Socialist Revolution* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1981), chapter 6; for the sharpest critical assessment, see A.J. Polan, *Lenin and the End of Politics* (London: Methuen, 1984).

Nevertheless, thanks to its status as one of the Marxist-Leninist "classics" it did also provide a critical yardstick which circulated freely among communists themselves.

Lenin's object of a clean break with social democracy was, by and large, achieved. After all, speaking louder than any pamphlet was the suppression of the Constituent Assembly, and of the rival socialist parties represented within it. Dispensing with the distinctions of bourgeois and proletarian, Bolshevism's leading critics put democracy at the centre of their case against the new regime. Kautsky was one of the easier to target as a vacillating "centrist" who had already drawn Lenin's withering scorn. In his *Proletarian Revolution* (1918), described as the "first serious study in the West" to be dedicated to communism, he now affirmed his belief in democracy at the expense of any but the most platonic attachment to revolution. While formally Kautsky upheld the Marxian notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat, he emptied it of any meaning or rationale that could have required so abrasive a term. As "servility to opportunism" and "unexampled theoretical vulgarization" this was simply grist to Lenin's mill. It was also in the course of his ferocious rebuttal that Lenin made the case for Soviet power as a "higher" form of democracy that he later distilled into the theses of the Comintern.[31]

Rosa Luxemburg, in contrast to Kautsky, could never have been traduced as a renegade. Murdered by the reactionary *Freikorps* in January 1919, she was, with her comrade Karl Liebknecht, one of the foremost martyrs of the European revolution. Because of the alleged complicity of social-democratic politicians in their murder, she also became a symbol of the new divisions on the left that cut so deeply in Germany.[32] Published only posthumously in 1922, her critique of Bolshevism was not in theory aimed at the principle of dictatorship itself. Rather than counterposing democracy and dictatorship, Luxemburg urged the exercising of dictatorial powers on the widest possible basis and through harnessing rather than extinguishing democracy. Practically speaking, the end result was nevertheless the same: defence of the Constituent Assembly and no long-term restrictions on rights of suffrage.

As the most important guarantees of the workers' own political activity Luxemburg identified the same rights of press, association and assembly as had the Russian revolutionaries of the *Narodnia volia* generation. She also saw quite lucidly and prophetically that the asphyxiating of political life could not but undermine the soviets themselves and the forms of class-based democracy they claimed to embody. Her arguments may to some extent be grouped with dissenting strands emerging within Bolshevism such

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31   V. I. Lenin, *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1935), 12 and passim; see also Bruno Naarden, *Socialist Europe and Revolutionary Russia: Perception and Prejudice, 1848–1923* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992), 302–21.

32   See Eric D. Weitz, "'Rosa Luxemburg belongs to us!' German communism and the Luxemburg legacy," *Central European History* 27 (1994): 27–64.

as the Workers' Opposition and the Democratic Centralists. Katerina Clark has even suggested that Luxemburg's differences with Lenin amounted to a "matter of degree of repression"; and it is certainly true that even the fiercest left-wing critics, like the anarchist Emma Goldman, tended to focus on those victims of the Bolsheviks who were above any suspicion of sympathy for the old ruling order.[33] Nevertheless, in questioning the very notion of single-party rule, Luxemburg gave vent to sentiments that any liberal might have cited, and many liberals later did. "Freedom only for the supporters of the government, only for the members of one party […] is no freedom at all. Freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently."[34]

Morris Hillquit had no such international standing as Kautsky or Luxemburg. A lawyer by profession prominent in the American Socialist Party, he had served as its prewar representative to the International but could speak with no such authority as the leaders of the mighty German social democracy. It was Hillquit, nevertheless, who in taking issue with Bukharin's rationalization of Bolshevik rule put his finger on the central contradiction this posed for communism internationally. Whatever the necessities of the successful workers' dictatorship, as he pointed out with considerable cogency, the rest of the world's socialists were still in Bukharin's pre-revolutionary, oppositional phase. It was obvious, according to Hillquit, that the two situations presented radically different practical tasks and that these presupposed the fullest liberty of propaganda, organization and political action wherever socialists did not exercise power.[35]

Hillquit saw how potentially damaging the suppression of these freedoms under Soviet power could prove to the case being made for socialism in the West. He also noted the "extraordinarily delicate" position of having "one or more parties in power amidst an organization of minority opposition-parties," and the difficulties of extricating international issues from those of state interest should these parties occupy the dominant position to which the Bolsheviks unabashedly laid claim.[36] Trotsky in his autobiography would scorn Hillquit as a "Babbitt of Babbitts," that is, as the epitome of American small-town philistinism and the ideal socialist leader for the well-to-do

33   Katerina Clark, "Rosa Luxemburg, 'The Russian Revolution'," *Studies in East European Thought* 70 (2018): 161; for Goldman, see Kevin Morgan, *Bolshevism, Syndicalism and the General Strike: The Lost Internationalist World of A. A. Purcell* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2013), chapter 4.

34   Rosa Luxemburg, "The Russian Revolution (1922)" in *The Russian Revolution* and *Leninism or Marxism?* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961), chapters 5–6 and 8. For early Bolshevik oppositionists, see Barbara C. Allen, *Alexander Shlyapnikov 1885–1937. Life of an Old Bolshevik* (Chicago, Ill: Haymarket Books, 2015), chapter 7.

35   Morris Hillquit, *From Marx to Lenin* (New York: Hanford Press, 1921), chapters 11–12.

36   Hillquit, *From Marx*, 143–6.

petty-bourgeois.[37] Nevertheless, it was Trotsky who in the 1930s was impelled by this same basic contradiction into the formation of an ill-fated Fourth International. The Comintern, meanwhile, was by this time heading towards dissolution on the stated grounds of the "increasing complications in the internal and international relations" of different countries including "differences in their character and even contradictions in their social orders."[38] Hillquit had identified a fundamental anomaly which the Bolsheviks had believed it possible to overcome by mere force of will and organization.

Disunities of Theory and Practice

The watershed moment for both Trotsky and the Comintern was Hitler's accession to power in Germany in 1933. In his theses for the first Comintern congress Lenin had described the institutions of bourgeois parliamentarianism as progressive vis-à-vis the Middle Ages and ceasing to be so only in an epoch of proletarian revolution. This relativist understanding of the advantages of bourgeois democracy acquired renewed topical relevance as it became clear by the 1930s that the proletarian revolution was nowhere on the political agenda, while a return to the pre-democratic Middle Ages very much was. The illusory third way of social democracy was at first held responsible, and Trotsky would continue to adhere to a variant of this position. The parties of the Third International, on the other hand, effected a basic strategic shift towards the accommodation of such democratic parties, states and values as could contribute to the common struggle against fascism. In its various transmutations, democracy henceforth was to be one of the communist movement's central mobilizing slogans.

Two key texts symbolized this turn for an international public. The first was Georgi Dimitrov's address as secretary to the Comintern's seventh and final congress in mid-1935. Formalizing the turn to the popular front, Dimitrov acknowledged that the alternative to bourgeois democracy was no longer a workers' dictatorship but fascism. He therefore called for the defence and extension of the democratic rights which were both the fruits of working-class struggle and the best terms on which to continue to wage that struggle. Under socialism, meanwhile, the so-called Stalin constitution adopted the following year validated what might once have been dismissed as the fetishes of pure democracy. These provisions included the abolition of class-based political rights, the introduction of secret and universal suffrage and guaranteed freedoms of

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37   Leon Trotsky, *My Life. An Attempt at Autobiography* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975), 283–5.

38   See the English text of the resolution dissolving the Comintern, *World News and Views*, 29 May 1943, 169–70. For the prewar origins of the decision, see Serge Wolikow, *L'Internationale Communiste (1919–1943). Le Komintern ou le rêve déchu du parti mondial de la révolution* (Paris: Les Éditions de l'Atelier/Éditions Ouvrières, 2010), chapter 5.

speech, press and assembly. Conspicuously absent was any concept of an opposition or of competing political programmes. Nevertheless, the constitution was meant to win over democratic opinion in the West, and though inauspiciously synchronized with the launching of the show trials it did in some cases do so. In the words of the British novelist and playwright J. B. Priestley, it gave such scope to "human personality" as far exceeded countries like Britain and turned the dream of an ideal state into reality.[39]

In Birch's less impressionable reading, this signalled the communists' verbal adaptation to democratic norms in their more widely accepted sense. It was on this terrain, for example, that they would initially advance their claims in the reshaping of post-war politics in countries like Germany or Italy. In the former case, there was talk of completing the unfinished bourgeois revolution, while in Italy the shift was symbolized by the communists' strong and largely constructive commitment to the post-war Constituent Assembly.[40] Even the Italian communists, however, invoked a notion of "progressive" or "advanced" democracy whose social and participatory aspects marked a step in the direction of socialism. If this then proved compatible with support for the Stalinized regimes of eastern Europe, it was because of the persistence of themes of a form of democracy that in some sense corrected the deficiencies of the liberal model. Historians of the International Brigades have noted the big wink given by one of the British commissars when he said that they were to fight for bourgeois democracy. Nevertheless, the wink—like the Italian communists' later *dopiezza*—did not mean indifference to democracy itself so much as a commitment to what they now referred to as its "profound social content."[41]

These elements of continuity may be illustrated by two characteristic British productions displaying the "direct," "advanced" or "progressive" democratic ideas with which communism was so strongly identified in this period. The first and better known is *Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?*—the monument to fellow-travelling published by the Fabian socialists Sidney and Beatrice Webb in 1935. In most accounts, this is seen as confirming how little democracy mattered to either Stalin or the Webbs. When the latter travelled to the USSR in 1932, they had behind them forty years of joint activity as ultra-reformist socialists espousing the "inevitability of

39   J. B. Priestley, "Foreword," in *The Draft Soviet Constitution* (London: 1936), 5; David Priestland, *Stalinism and the Politics of Mass Mobilization. Ideas, Power and Terror in Inter-War Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 280.

40   For the importance of democratic arguments, with a more generous view than most of their sincerity, see for example Wilfried Loth, *Stalin's Unwanted Child. The Soviet Union, the German Question and the Founding of the GDR* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), chapter 1.

41   Rémi Skoutelsky, *L'espoir guidait leurs pas. Les volontaires français dans les Brigades internationales 1936–1939* (Paris: Grasset, 1998), 184–9.

gradualness."[42] That they only now embraced communism in its Stalinized phase has usually been attributed to their deep-seated elitism and top-down conception of social change. At best, theirs was a "weak" version of democracy; at worst, as in Hal Draper's *Socialism from Below*, it was "managerial, technocratic, elitist, authoritarian" and the consummate expression anywhere of socialism-from-above.[43] This does at least serve as reminder that the communists were not alone in their ambivalence regarding democracy. As Stalin tightened his grip on power, the Webbs maybe pictured embarking for Russia with eager expectations and on the principle of like attracts like.

In reality, the sustained wishful thinking of *Soviet Communism* needs to be located within a longer tradition of socialist thinking about democracy that resists such easy dichotomies. In 1921, the Webbs had issued the long socialist blueprint they called *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*. They were not at this stage among the socialists fascinated by the "hand of revolutionary authority" which the Bolsheviks exercised so firmly.[44] Instead, they depicted what at this stage was the alternative of a "manifold democracy" of citizens, producers, and consumers. The greater part of their writings had been devoted to pioneering studies of the co-operatives, trade unions and local government. It was on these "manifestations of Democracy," rather than the exercise of state power, that their socialist constitution principally depended. "This new conception of Democracy sprang […] from observation of the living tissue of society," they explained. While others debated the character of the state "in the sense of the political government," they believed that its sovereignty and moral authority were being silently undermined by the "growth of new forms of Democracy."[45] Though Lenin sought to "smash to atoms" what the Webbs would have silently undermined, one cannot miss a certain affinity with *The State and Revolution*—as indeed with certain anarchist writings like those of Kropotkin.[46] Birch referred slightingly to the Webbs' account of industrial democracy—which, incidentally, Lenin and Krupskaya translated—as if of a secondary matter not bearing on the central issue of government authority. But Eric Hobsbawm had a far better sense of its meaning

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42   The discussion that follows draws in part on Kevin Morgan, *The Webbs and Soviet Communism: Bolshevism and the British Left, Part 2* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2006).

43   Hal Draper, *The Two Souls of Socialism* (New York: 1966), 14–17 and 21–30.

44   Eden and Cedar Paul cited Morgan, *Webbs*, 156–7; for similar such views see Morgan, *Webbs*, 152–3.

45   Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1921), xiv–xviii; and *The Consumers' Co-operative Movement* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1921), v.

46   Lenin, "The State and Revolution," in *Collected Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1960–70), XXV, 477–8; On Kropotkin, see for example Jim Mac Laughlin, *Kropotkin and the Anarchist Intellectual Tradition* (London: Pluto Press, 2016), chapter 4.

in describing it as an "an entire theory of democracy, the state and the transition to socialism."[47]

By the time they wrote *Soviet Communism* the Webbs saw it as a realization of these longstanding ideals. In default as yet of any Stalin constitution, they devoted their first 450 pages to conjuring up what they also described as a constitution, but one whose chief characteristic was that of the "multiform" democracy which they detailed through long chapters on the citizen, producer, and consumer. There was also a new element not envisaged in their original constitution: the "creedocracy" or "vocation of leadership" which they identified with the communist party. As by this time was becoming almost mandatory, they concluded the discussion by posing the question "Dictatorship or democracy?" Though strongly veering towards the latter view, the Webbs' conception of a new civilisation was one they also described as rendering such dichotomies obsolete. The USSR did not comprise "a government and a people confronting each other, as all other great societies have hitherto been." Instead, it was a government "instrumented by the people" in a varied array of collectives extending from the narrow sphere of politics to the crucial democratic matter of wealth production. Here too was the end of politics, but one achieved through the unleashing of democracy rather than its temporary suspension.[48]

The Webbs were wilfully deceived, and this too was a paper constitution. Selling in tens of thousands, their Fabianised view of Soviet communism nevertheless exercised an important influence on their contemporaries. Even the communist Pat Sloan, whose *Soviet Democracy* was issued by the popular-frontist Left Book Club, leant heavily on the Webbs in explaining why democracy and dictatorship should not be seen as mutually exclusive. "The essential question […] is 'For whom is there democracy?' and 'Over whom is there a dictatorship?'"[49] The Stalin constitution figured only marginally, for the Webbs' imagined Soviet constitution not only predated it but had a greater resonance with readers. G.D.H. Cole was a younger Fabian socialist and formerly Britain's leading proponent of the group-based theories of guild socialism. As the Fabian Society's chairman during the Second World War, Cole repeatedly evoked an image of Soviet democracy that, despite its flaws, he held to be more active, real and "free" than Britain's and a participatory model it could learn from.[50] At the height of the USSR's wartime popularity, the images projected upon Stalinism by its British

47   Birch, *Concepts*, 72; Eric Hobsbawm, "The Fabians reconsidered," in *Labouring Men. Studies in the history of Labour* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968), 255.

48   Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1935), 419–51.

49   Pat Sloan, *Soviet Democracy* (London: V. Gollancz, 1937), 12.

50   George D.H. Cole, *Fabian Socialism* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1943), chapter 6; Cole cited Jose Harris, "The Labour Party's Political Thought," in *Labour's First Century*, edited by Duncan Tanner et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 43.

admirers were driven by participatory ideals that both idealized the USSR and drew on the home-grown innovations of the so-called people's war. "It has not been a matter of voting in a Town Hall or a House of Commons what ought to be done by some other person," wrote the communist leader Harry Pollitt; "the people themselves have been doing the job." Indeed, none gave stronger voice than Pollitt to the "new conception of democracy" that carried the Marxian overtones of the "full participation of the people in the administration of things."[51]

It is Pollitt who provides our second text in the form of the essay he contributed to the quintessential popular-front collection *Why I am a Democrat* published in 1939. This therefore postdated the Stalin constitution and specifically cited Dimitrov's report to the seventh world congress. Nevertheless, Pollitt's class-based view of democracy was as little unaffected as the Webbs' by the niceties of formal constitutions. Squeezed between the Liberal Party leader and the Bishop of Liverpool, his essay drew on his command of the idioms and experiences of the organized worker to speak as if directly for those forms of collective agency that the Webbs described as democratic tissue. Pollitt did fleetingly allude to elections. Nevertheless, he neither held nor even much aspired to elected public office, and the emphasis throughout was on rights to strike, to organize, to free speech and opinion, to "have the right to protest and to back up our protests by action."[52] Democracy mattered because it was the condition for the free expression of class politics.

While focusing on the British context, Pollitt's essay did briefly invoke the Soviet democratic ideal in which protests were unknown "because the masses do not want them" and because they saw that the country's business must be carried on "without hindrance."[53] The only way to reconcile these contrarieties was through a flattening discourse of class. As Pollitt put it on another occasion: "All I was concerned about was that power was in the hands of lads like me, and whatever conception of politics had made that possible was the correct one for me." Disunity of theory and practice meant flagrant double standards according to a who-whom calculus premised on the inalienable primacy of Soviet power; for "whatever the policy of the Soviet Union it is always in the interests of its people and the working people of every other country of the world."[54]

51 James Hinton, *Shop Floor Citizens. Engineering Democracy in 1940s Britain* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1994), 10–11; Kevin Morgan, *Harry Pollitt* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 142–3.

52 Harry Pollitt in *Why I am a Democrat*, edited by Richard Acland (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1939), 135–50.

53 Harry Pollitt in *Why I am a Democrat*, 139, 148–9; Pollitt, *Looking Ahead* (London: Communist Party of Great Britain, 1947), 41–2.

54 Pollitt, *Looking Ahead*, 41–2.

Pollitt was one of those communists trapped forever in a world that was shattered by the Khrushchev speech in 1956. It is from this point that one can trace the new left in Britain that, as in E.P. Thompson's socialist humanism, denounced both the anti-democratic ideology of Stalinism and the "vile alchemy" of the who-whom denial of morality.[55] While this takes us beyond the scope of the present paper, what is relevant here is how the break with Stalinism was also seen as a way of recovering those positive ideals and traditions that Thompson at least maintained were the truest part of the communist experience. "In those countries where the purge could not reach," he wrote, "there has been constant conflict within the communist movements between forces of health and corruption."[56] If democracy as a programme was deeply corrupted, what remained healthy was a political practice of militant civic activism that was galvanized and dignified by the revolutionary end to which it theoretically led. We need not follow Thompson into the starker top-down, bottom-up dichotomy to which new leftists were understandably drawn. As any detailed study will show, considerations of brute party interest were not confined to "inner party bureaucracies" but continually intruded on the wider conception of the vanguard party. Nevertheless, it was just this sense of their leading role that means that communists not only advocated Pollitt's rights of speech, strike and assembly but continuously sought to make them real and effective.

An outstanding example in Britain was the communist-led National Unemployed Workers' Movement, which from local casework to the demonstrative advocacy of national hunger marches gave the unemployed a voice that was otherwise all too easily discounted in inter-war Britain. Austria was another country with a small communist party overshadowed by a dominant social-democratic one; and in reading Helmut Gruber's study of the socialist showpiece of Red Vienna it is striking how reactions to welfare provision from below are principally documented through communist newsletters making a good deal of the "lack of democracy."[57] There is no space here for a potted social history of communism. One may nevertheless note how limited the reach of liberal democracy really was, and how much stronger still was the democratic example of communists contesting colonial rule, the many examples of true capitalist dictatorship or such deeply fissured societies as the American South.[58]

Communists thus campaigned for democratic freedoms and frequently came to symbolize them for a wider democratic public. In 1948, for example, this was the theme of one of Salvador Allende's best known speeches when he denounced Chile's

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55 E.P. Thompson, "Socialist Humanism," *New Reasoner* 1 (1957): 105–43, 116, 131.
56 Thompson, "Socialist Humanism," 137.
57 Helmut Gruber, *Red Vienna. Experiment in Working-Class Culture, 1919–1934* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 64, 71.
58 See for example Robin G.D. Kelley, *Hammer and Hoe. Alabama Communists During the Great Depression* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2015).

Cold War "Law for the Permanent Defence of Democracy" on grounds that the "possibility of rebellion against injustice" was itself the essence of democracy.[59] In Britain, Pollitt maintained that in the 1930s there were "more arrests, fines, sentences of imprisonment of workers defending freedom of speech and of the Press and the right of demonstration than in the last 100 years put together."[60] It was a matter of pride for the communists that they were the main target of this activity; subjected to levels of surveillance and constraint unprecedented in British history, they became the focus of countless campaigns in which they did not blush to call upon a liberal public and the principles it claimed to uphold. A communist activist would wryly note the irony of having lost his copy of J.S. Mill's *On Liberty* in a police raid in 1940. Only a long time after might he have registered the further paradox of his own deep identification with a society in which supposedly the masses did not even want these liberties themselves.[61]

Totalitarian Democrats?

François Furet was another of the historians who broke with communism in 1956. His subsequent trajectory was nevertheless as different from Thompson's as it very well could be. Through his magnum opus *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963) Thompson sought to recover the longer traditions of democratic contestation which even Stalinism had only partially stifled. Furet, by contrast, broke with communism far more comprehensively and without any lingering attachment to its healthier aspects. More than that, he did not seek out these healthier elements in the longer history of the left, but on the contrary rejected its notions of a people's history as firmly as he did those of people's democracy. Following the collapse of European communism, Furet offered his own valedictory on the experience in the shape of his book *Le Passé d'une illusion*. Again, in stark contrast to Thompson, one of its central arguments was that that the negative ideal of anti-fascism had come to count for so much by the 1940s because there existed no positive value that could unite the liberal democracies and Stalinist communism.[62]

59   Victor Figueroa Clark, *Salvador Allende. Revolutionary Democrat* (London: Pluto Press, 2013), 48–50.
60   Harry Pollitt in: *Why I am a Democrat*, 143. For activities specifically directed at the NUWM, see K.D. Ewing and C.A. Gearty, *The Struggle for Civil Liberties. Political Freedom and the Rule of Law in Britain, 1914–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 214–74.
61   Author's interview with the late George Matthews.
62   François Furet, *Le Passé d'une illusion. Essai sur l'idée communiste au XXe siècle* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1995), 193.

This can hardly explain how democracy proved to be arguably the chief ideological battleground of the Cold War. Instead, it makes more sense to return to the idea of competing democratic ideals and how these now came to be articulated with a greater clarity than possibly they ever had between the wars. A common language of democracy had been crucial in cementing the alliance of *soi-disant* democratic states and political forces. Between its socialist and liberal-capitalist variants, there was moreover a distinct shift in favour of the former. In his book *Forging Democracy*, Geoff Eley describes the mid-1940s as a rare moment of radical openness and opportunity. Along with the remaking of democracy, its unifying themes were comprehensive social security, full employment through economic planning, and a moral renewal involving the purging of ruling elites.[63] Purge, plan and plenty, animated by democracy: the ingredients of the new civilisation were all there, and it was as communism made its strongest advances that Europe took its greatest steps to temper the market economy with notions of social justice and democratic entitlement. The wartime alliance nevertheless disintegrated, and the sense of radical openness passed. In the fortress politics of the Cold War, neither side could leave to the other what all concurred was the moral high ground of democracy.

It was in these circumstances that the first was heard of the seemingly oxymoronic concept of "totalitarian democracy." Abbott Gleason observes that totalitarianism in this period usually signified the polar opposite of "democratic," at least in its western sense.[64] This was certainly not E. H. Carr's intention when in 1946 he published *The Soviet Impact on the Western World*. Based on lectures delivered the previous autumn, this dealt first with the political impact which for Carr meant above all else the "new and more progressive form of democracy" which the USSR claimed to pioneer. In evaluating this claim, Carr traced two widely differing conceptions of democracy deriving respectively from the English and French revolutions. It was the second of these, running from Rousseau to Stalin, that he described as totalitarian democracy. It is nevertheless clear that this was intended in a descriptive and non-pejorative sense. If, according to Carr, the Soviets believed that "direct participation in the running of affairs is at least as essential an attribute of democracy as voting in occasional elections", it was hardly self-evident that they were wrong. He also echoed Cole and Pollitt in discerning a revival of this "primitive democracy" in the shelter committees and Home Guard so important in Britain's own ethos of a democratic people's war.[65] Already in his fifties, Carr himself had no personal history of left-wing associations and

63   Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy. The History of the Left in Europe 1850–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 288–91.

64   Gleason, "Totalitarianism," 807; Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

65   Edward Hallett Carr, *The Soviet Impact on the Western World* (London: Macmillan, 1946), 1–19, 112–14.

was more a conservative by temperament than either a radical or a democrat. Fittingly or otherwise, it was at this point that he embarked on the monumental history of the USSR which, like the Webbs', achieved some notoriety for the credibility accorded forms of government which critics held bore scant relation to their substance.[66]

The concept's wider familiarity was due not so much to Carr as to J.L. Talmon's *Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*. Published in 1952, this was a book as symptomatic of its moment as Carr's was of the political porousness of the preceding period. Writing it while in London-based exile, Talmon accredited Carr with having followed its progression "at every stage" and helped with clarifying its guiding theme—which again was a dichotomous coupling of liberal and totalitarian democracy and the tracing of the latter from the age of Rousseau.[67]

The burden of his argument was nevertheless very different from Carr's. In assimilating Soviet democracy to the western political tradition, Carr had implicitly vindicated the "peaceful penetration" of the latter by ideas of Soviet derivation that helped address what he saw as an epoch-defining crisis of individualism. Talmon, by contrast, used teleology as a device by which radical movements far from power already prefigured those forms of rule which did not represent their betrayal but rather their logical sequel and fulfilment. In this sense at least, one may note a sort of parallel with the continuum between totalitarian movement and totalitarian state in Hannah Arendt's nearly contemporaneous *Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951). Also published the same year was Maurice Duverger's notion of the totalitarian party that already exhibited its key defining features at the heart of the modern democratic state. In the USA, meanwhile, political scientists seeking to fathom the "appeals of communism" slipped easily into the language of neurosis and maladjustment. Here too there were parallels with Talmon's emphasis on the same neurotic "human element" that over the centuries accounted for revolutionary ideas and commitments and the "thrill of fulfilment experienced by the believers in a modern Messianic movement, which makes them experience submission as deliverance."[68]

We are thus back squarely in the Cold War ideological contest within which Macpherson located his own reflections on the character of democracy.[69] Like Thompson, however, and unlike Macpherson and Carr, we might nevertheless think that the

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66   Jonathan Haslam, *The Vices of Integrity: E.H. Carr, 1892–1982* (London: Verso, 1999), 108, 134.

67   J.L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1986), vii, 6, 258.

68   Talmon, *Origins*, 39–40; Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: World Pub., 2004), 450–506; Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties. Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* (London: Methuen, 1959), 116–24; Gabriel A. Almond, *The Appeals of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1954), chapters 9–10.

69   Macpherson, *Real World*, 65.

practices of non-ruling communists offered the more convincing demonstration of the communist claim to a less "cramped and limited kind of democracy" than that prevailing under capitalism.[70] To this extent, we might turn Hillquit's astute observation on its head: it was the ethos and practice of minority-opposition communism that were always potentially in a state of tension with the spuriously democratic practices of the eastern bloc.

That is why the political crisis of 1956 looms so large in any discussion of this question; for there were thousands who, like one of Thompson's fellow historians in Britain, broke at last with communism "for the sake of the ideas which brought them into it."[71] As another of the defectors later put it:

> How the hell can you carry on saying what a lot of bloody imperialist bastards people are, in Africa or somewhere they're putting people in jail for nothing, when you've just had your people admitting they've put thousands of people in jail? What's the basis of your argument?[72]

Even the unlamented Stalin constitution has been seen as planting the "first germ" of the civil society themes that were later taken up under Gorbachev. Even in the 1930s, rather as Orwell suggested, campaigns around the constitution are said to have stirred a consciousness of "political and civil rights" among those who might otherwise have been unaware of such concepts.[73] Communists in just the same way might turn to *The State and Revolution* to find the "direct opposite" to the "monstrous bureaucratic state" they had upheld in the name of democracy.[74] Had communism in its Stalinist phase signified the denial, subjection or annihilation of democracy and civil society? Or had it represented an especially combative and resolute variant of just those civil society activities that communists themselves suppressed once attaining the genus of state power? It is because the answer includes some element of both, that communism's history continues to prove a fruitful source of debate around principles which are actually of much wider significance.

70   See the discussion in John Strachey, *The Theory and Practice of Socialism* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1936), chapter 13.

71   National Archives, London, KV 2 4299 /189, intercepted letter, Rodney Hilton to Edwin Payne 20 Nov. 1956.

72   Author's interview with the late James Friell.

73   Sarah Davies, *Popular Opinion in Stalin's Russia. Terror, Propaganda and Dissent, 1934–1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chapter 6.

74   See Kevin Morgan, "Stephen Edmund Frow (1906–97), communist, trade unionist and working-class historian and Ruth Frow (1922–2008), communist, peace activist and working-class historian" in Keith Gildart and David Howell, *Dictionary of Labour Biography*, XIV (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 110–31.

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Arnd Bauerkämper

Fascism and Capitalism

Abstract

Fascism and National Socialism did not abolish capitalism but changed its operation by defining new parameters of rational economic decisions. The rulers of Italy and Germany, respectively, harnessed industrial and agricultural producers, traders and bankers to their overriding political aims. Even though they curtailed the market mechanism, private property and entrepreneurial freedom was maintained. Despite the important commonalities, differences between the economies of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany are indisputable. In Italy more than in Germany, a large portion of the economy was under the direction of public authorities by the late 1930s. Altogether, path-dependency prevailed in the two states. The same applies to Spain and Portugal where authoritarian dictatorships reinforced state intervention, which had shaped economic development since the late nineteenth century. The two countries on the Iberian Peninsula remained halfway between a market economy and a centrally administered (planned) economy.

Ever since the Fascist movement founded by Benito Mussolini unexpectedly seized power in Italy on 28 October 1922, "fascism" has been a minefield of contested interpretations.[1] Closely intertwined with divergent biographical experiences as well as political convictions, scholarly controversies on fascism have never been exclusively academic debates. On the contrary, "fascism" has often served as a rallying cry demarcating different political camps and schools of thought. In retrospect, three major periods of research on fascism are discernible. Following Mussolini's seizure of power, debates initially centred on the causes and specific features of Italian Fascism. As early as the 1920s, however, contemporary observers (especially communists) expected the rise of similar movements in some other capitalist states. In the following decade, the upsurge of fascism in major European states and the Nazi "seizure of power" lent the concept a more general meaning. From the mid-1930s onwards, the consolidation of the Stalinist regime also fuelled a new debate about "totalitarianism." Emphasizing

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1   When capitalized, "Fascism" refers to the Italian variant, whereas "fascism" denotes the generic concept.

similarities with regard to the claims of political rule and the execution of power, the concept had been coined by Italian liberals such as Giovanni Amendola in 1923 in order to denounce Mussolini's dictatorship. In the Cold War of the 1950s, "totalitarianism" took on a new lease of life in numerous member states of the North Atlantic alliance.[2]

The relationship between fascism and capitalism has been particularly contested. Communists and socialists alike suspected Mussolini's Fascists to be paid by the bourgeois elite. In fact, the *Fasci di Combattimento* that he had founded in 1919 were supported by large landowners and businessmen in northern Italy. From a Marxist perspective, Hitler's "seizure of power" seemed to confirm a popular interpretation that largely equated fascism with capitalism. John Heartfield's famous 1932 cartoon ("Motto: Millions Stand Behind Me! The Meaning Behind the Hitler Salute: Little Man Asks for Big Donations") epitomizes the belief that the Nazi Party (NSDAP) was essentially the puppet of industry and financiers. In the 1960s and 1970s, Marxist historians still claimed that capitalism had given rise to fascism since the First World War. By contrast, their liberal and conservative opponents argued that businessmen had shown themselves reluctant to support the Nazis before 1933. Moreover, they insisted on the "primacy of politics" in the dictatorships of the Fascists and the National Socialists.[3]

As this controversy became sterile and scholarly interest in fascism declined, the relationship between fascism and capitalism received less attention in the 1980s. Detailed investigations, however, demonstrated that fees paid by members of the Nazi Party were more important financial resources that the donations by big industry.[4]

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2   For overviews, see Arnd Bauerkämper, "A New Consensus? Recent Research on Fascism in Europe, 1918–1945," *History Compass* 4 (2006), 1–31; Ernst Nolte, "Faschismus," in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, edited by Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1975), 329–36.

3   Tim Mason, "Primacy of Politics: Politics and Economics in National Socialist Germany," in *The Nature of Fascism*, edited by Stuart E. Woolf (London: Random House, 1968), 165–95. For contributions to the controversy, see, among others, Henry Ashby Turner, "Big Business and the Rise of Hitler," *American Historical Review* 75 (1969), 56–70; Henry Ashby Turner, "Großunternehmertum und Nationalsozialismus 1930–1933. Kritisches und Ergänzendes zu zwei neuen Forschungsbeiträgen," *Historische Zeitschrift* 221 (1975), 18–68; Dirk Stegmann, "Antiquierte Personalisierung oder sozialökomische Faschismus-Analyse? Eine Antwort auf H.A. Turners Kritik an meinen Thesen zum Verhältnis von Nationalsozialismus und Großindustrie vor 1933," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 17 (1977), 275–96; Thomas Trumpp, "Zur Finanzierung der NSDAP durch die deutsche Großindustrie. Versuch einer Bilanz," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 32 (1981), 223–41.

4   Henry Ashby Turner, *German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 343–5. For a comprehensive review, see Reinhard Neebe, "Die Verantwortung der Großindustrie für das Dritte Reich. Anmerkungen zu H. A. Turners Buch 'Die Großunternehmer und der Aufstieg Hitlers'," *Historische Zeitschrift* 244 (1987), 353–63.

The end of the Cold War in 1989–91 ultimately discredited simplistic equations of capitalism and fascism. Correspondingly, new investigations have highlighted the options of industrialists and businessmen as well as their room for manoeuvre and leverage under fascist rule.[5] Research on Mussolini's dictatorship has demonstrated the strong role of the state, particularly from 1931 to 1936, even though private property was preserved. Historiography has also accentuated the "distance between corporative principles and the practice of government action" in Fascist Italy.[6]

As the strongest and most spectacular regime, the Nazi dictatorship has received particularly attention. During the 1960s and 1970s, two opposing interpretations of the relationship between the rulers and industrialists shaped scholarship. Marxist historians claimed that the interests between the Nazism and German industry were largely identical. Emphasizing the aims to suppress the Left and to secure resources beyond the Third Reich, they held big industry accountable for the Nazi dictatorship, the Second World War, the exploitation of occupied territories, forced labour, and the extermination of the Jews. By contrast, the opposing camp of scholars argued that industrialists had essentially been victims of the Nazis for whose crimes they were not responsible. These historians have observed that the NSDAP had not received major funds from big industry before 1932. Yet there is broad consensus on the significant contribution of industrialists to the collapse of the Weimar Republic. They had increasingly criticized the economic and social policies of Germany's first democratic state that many of them had sought to replace by an authoritarian regime.[7]

Since the end of the Cold War, a "depolarization of scholarship"[8] and access to new sources has given rise to new research questions and more nuanced interpretations. In particular, the complexity of relations between the Nazis and German industrialists has been uncovered and accentuated. As early as 1980, Gerd Hardach had argued that

5   Werner Abelshauser, Jan-Otmar Hesse and Werner Plumpe, "Wirtschaftsordnung und Nationalsozialismus, Neuere Forschungen zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus," in *Wirtschaftsordnung, Staat und Unternehmen. Neue Forschungen zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus*, edited by Werner Abelshauser, Jan-Otmar Hesse and Werner Plumpe (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2003), 10–1.

6   Lino Cinquini, "Fascist Corporative Economy and Accounting in Italy during the Thirties: Exploring the Relations between a Totalitarian Ideology and Business Studies," in: *Accounting, Business and Financial History* 17, no. 2 (2007), 214.

7   For overviews of the debate, see Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation* (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 48–56; Peter Hayes, "Industry under the Swastika," in *Enterprise in the Period of Fascism in Europe*, edited by Harold James and Jakob Tanner (London: Routledge, 2017), 26; Alan S. Milward, "Politische Ökonomie, Unilateralismus und Sicherheit im 'Dritten Reich'," in *Wirtschaftsordnung, Staat und Unternehmen*, 221; Werner Plumpe, "Unternehmen im Nationalsozialismus. Eine Zwischenbilanz," in *Wirtschaftsordnung, Staat und Unternehmen*, 243, 249–50, 255.

8   Hayes, "Industry," 27.

the economic system of the Third Reich combined "so-called responsible economic self-administration with comprehensive guidance by the state."[9] This interpretation has been taken up and differentiated by Christoph Buchheim and Jonas Scherner who have claimed that the Nazis established a state-directed market economy that was based on private property.[10] Moreover, Avraham Barkai and Albrecht Ritschl, in particular, have identified important ideological roots of Nazi economic policies, especially racism and Social Darwinism.[11] Altogether, recent scholarship has highlighted the hybrid nature and changeability of the German economy in the Third Reich. Rape by "Aryanisation" and the rampant exploitation policies in the occupied territories too, have increasingly received attention.[12]

As a result of this new scholarship, the debate about the primacy of politics or economics has become a question of emphasis rather than zealous engagement and clear commitment.[13] Peter Hayes and Richard Overy, for example, have stressed the role of

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9   Karl Hardach, *The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 7.

10   Christoph Buchheim and Jonas Scherner, "Anmerkungen zum Wirtschaftssystem des "Dritten Reichs'," in *Wirtschaftsordnung, Staat und Unternehmen: neue Forschungen zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus*, edited by Dietmar Petzina, Werner Abelshauser, Jan-Otmar Hesse, Werner Plumpe (Essen: Klartext, 2003), 97. Also see Christoph Buchheim, „Unternehmen in Deutschland und NS-Regime 1933–1945. Versuch einer Synthese," in *Historische Zeitschrift* 282 (2006), 356, 358, 367, 374, 386 f., 389 f.; Christoph Buchheim, "Das Verhältnis von Staat und Wirtschaft in der NS-Zeit," in *Jahrbuch* für *Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 45 (2004) 2, 237–40.

11   Richard J. Overy, "Business in the *Grossraumwirtschaft*: Eastern Europe, 1938–1945," in *Enterprise in the Period of Fascism in Europe*, edited by Harold James and Jakob Tanner (London: Routledge, 2017), 152; Hayes, "Industry," 30–3, 36; Albrecht Ritschl, "Zum Verhältnis von Markt und Staat in Hitlers Weltbild. Überlegungen zu einer Forschungskontroverse," in *Die Schatten der Vergangenheit. Impulse zur Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus*, edited by Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse and Rainer Zitelmann (Berlin: Propyläen, 1990), 243–64; Albrecht Ritschl, "Die NS-Wirtschaftsideologie. Modernisierungsprogramm oder reaktionäre Utopie?," in *Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung*, edited by Michael Prinz and Rainer Zitelmann (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991), 62, 68; Ludolf Herbst, *Der Totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft. Die Kriegswirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Ideologie und Propaganda 1939–1945* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1982), 78–81.

12   See, for example, Benno Nietzel, "Nazi Economic Policy, Middle-Class Protection, and the Liquidation of Jewish Businesses 1933–1939," in *National Economies. Volks-Wirtschaft, Racism and Economy in Europe between the Wars (1918–1939/45)*, edited by Christoph Kreutzmüller, Michael Wildt and Moshe Zimmermann (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2015), 108–20.

13   For an overview, see Jochen Streb, "Das nationalsozialistische Wirtschaftssystem. Indirekter Sozialismus, gelenkte Marktwirtschaft oder vorgezogene Kriegswirtschaft?," in *Der Staat und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft. Vom Kaiserreich bis zur Berliner Republik*, edited by Werner Plumpe and Joachim Scholtysek (Stuttgart: Steiner 2012), 61–2.

state direction.[14] By contrast, Alan Milward has insisted that Nazis and industrialists closely collaborated in the Third Reich. According to this interpretation, big business welcomed the suppression of workers and trade unions. Moreover, industrialists took up political incentives to expand their production and seized opportunities to increase their profits. In the Secord World War, a growing convergence of interests occurred between the Nazi state and industry.[15] Yet his interpretation has been called into question by Ludolf Herbst who has identified major rifts in the relationship, particularly in the years from 1943 and 1945 when industrialists prepared for a new peacetime market economy after the war that they expected Germany to lose.[16]

Fascist political economies rested on "a rejection of both liberal and Marxist forms of materialism, faith in authoritarian state planning, corporatist organization at the purely national level, and an obsession with ending class warfare through national reconciliation, full employment and ethically constrained consumption."[17] Moreover, fascists rejected materialist concepts of political economy and a structural-economistic understanding of history. However, they did not propose and propagate a new order that might have replaced a capitalist market economy based on competition or a state-directed planned system as espoused by communists and left-wing socialists. On the contrary, Mussolini's and Hitler's views of the economy were essentially instrumental, utilitarian, and opportunistic. They selectively took over some elements of capitalism and socialism that seemed to serve their political goals. Due to this "syncretism," a fascist "third way" remained a myth, as became abundantly clear in the Second World War when fascists resorted to looting and exploitation in the occupied territories.[18]

Moreover, a consensus has emerged on the roots of fascist economic programmes and policies. They had been heavily influenced by the crises of capitalism after the First World War. The troubling or even traumatic experiences of the difficult demobilization, the hyperinflation of the early 1920s and the Depression that the breakdown of the New York Stock Exchange triggered off in October 1929 gave rise to a lasting disenchantment with capitalism, economic liberalism, and free trade. The ensuing social dislocation and concerns about "class struggle," too, fuelled demands for autarky, state direction and a corporate economy. As industrialists and businessmen turned

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14   Milward, "Politische Ökonomie," 225–6; Overy, "Business," 152; Hayes, "Industry," 30–3, 36.

15   Overy, "Business," 152; Hayes, "Industry," 30–33, 36.

16   Herbst, "Der Totale Krieg," 327–40, 387–96. Also see Rolf-Dieter Müller, "Grundzüge der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939 bis 1945," in *Deutschland 1933–1945. Neue Studien zur nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft*, edited by Karl D. Bracher, Manfred Funke and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1992), 372–3.

17   David Baker, "The Political Economy of Fascism. Myth *or* Reality, or Myth *and* Reality," in *New Political Economy* 11, no. 2 (2006), 238.

18   Gerald Feldman, "The Economic Origins and Dimensions of European Fascism," in *Enterprise in the Period of Fascism in Europe*, edited by Harold James and Jakob Tanner (London: Routledge, 2017), 4–5, 10; Baker, "Political Economy," 229–31, 235, 243–6.

against parliamentary rule and democracy, they called for state protection against the vicissitudes of economic globalization that seemed unpredictable and threatening.[19]

Following an overview of the economic policies pursued by the Fascist regime in the context of the long-term structural weaknesses of capitalism in Italy, this article will deal with the relationship between National Socialism and entrepreneurs in Germany. The investigation will concentrate on industry in the two countries. Nevertheless, agriculture had retained an important position in the national economies, especially in Italy. In the Third Reich, agricultural policies were strongly related to Nazi ideology that glorified the "Aryan" peasant against the backdrop of the myth of "blood and soil," at least until 1936. Although it remained weak in the interwar years, however, capitalism persisted in the countryside under the cover of agrarian romanticism and racialism.

Italian Fascism: The Failure of Corporativism

The impact of the First World War and the crisis of capitalism led industrial entrepreneurs such as Giovanni Agnelli of car producer Fiat (founded in 1899) and Guido Donegani of mining company Montecatini (established in 1888) to support Mussolini's blackshirts that had forged the Partito Nazionale Fascista in 1921. The industrial unrest and social conflicts of the *Biennio rosso* (two red years) of 1919 and 1920 had undermined trust in the capacity of liberal capitalism to solve the pressing problems in postwar Italy. As a result, liberal Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti had to resign in July 1921. Even though many businessmen perceived the violence of the squadristi as a nuisance, the Fascists promised to shield industrialists from nationalization and preserve private property. Moreover, entrepreneurs counted on the "blackshirts" in their efforts to control and quell social conflict in factories. In a similar vein, large estate-owners employed Fascist squads in order to suppress sharecroppers and agricultural labourers who had seized land in northern Italy. From October 1922 onwards, the Fascist regime seemed to support a political economy that was amenable to industrialists, businessmen and landowners. In their view, Fascism promised to lend beleaguered capitalism a new lease of life.[20]

The Fascists, on their part, propagated a "third way" between liberalism and socialism. State intervention was to regulate economic activities by establishing a corporate economy. Representatives of capital and labour were to seek compromises in corporations that were founded for different sectors of the economy. Starting with a decree

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19   Feldman, "Origins," 11.
20   Franco Amatori, "The Fascist Regime and Big Business: The *Fiat* and *Montecatini* Cases,"
      in *Enterprise in the Period of Fascism in Europe*, edited by Harold James and Jakob Tanner
      (London: Routledge, 2017), 65.

on fascist corporations (1926) and the "Charter of Work" (1927), Fascist economic policies were to secure the "common good," "national interests" and stability in industry, commerce, and agriculture. However, the corporate programme only partially and slowly translated into governmental policies. The National Council of Corporations was founded only in 1930, and the corporations were created as late as 1934. As it had disbanded trade unions, Mussolini's Fascist dictatorship protected entrepreneurs from social conflict. Even though the corporate system lacked an administrative apparatus on the provincial and local level, it supported capitalism, not least by preserving private property, economic freedom, and contractual autonomy. By contrast, it restricted market competition and discouraged individual initiatives to promote innovation.[21]

State control seemed more menacing to industrialists and businessmen. After the Depression had led to the collapse of many companies and a major bank reform from 1929 to 1931, public institutions such as the Istituto Mobiliare Italiano (IMI) and the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI) were founded in 1931 and 1933, respectively. Independently of the corporations, they operated in manufacturing, banking, and services though companies that were organized as businesses. As a holding company, IRI supervised industrial financing. By 1935, it had gained control of enterprises that comprised 42 percent of the joint stock capital in Italy. In industrial sectors of national importance, IRI was responsible for large shares of production, namely 80 percent in shipbuilding, 50 percent in iron and steel and 29 percent in electric industry in 1937. Even though the IMI and IRI had been founded as an emergency measure rather than according to a long-term plan, they increased state control over the economy. The Associazone Generale di Petroli, too, represented the "prototype of the mixed economy."[22]

As they competed with private enterprises, the new public institutions threatened the freedom of entrepreneurs who had succumbed to the opportunities that state support had entailed. Montecatini, for instance, had been rescued from bankruptcy at the price of losing its independence.[23] All in all, state intervention into economic development and control of big business grew in the 1930s. A bank reform that was enacted in 1936 increased state control by restricting bank loans to small and medium-sized industrial companies. While links between industry and banks weakened, the former benefited from state support. By contrast, small and medium-sized companies were

21   Philip Morgan, "Corporatism and the Economic Order," in *The Oxford Handbook of Fascism*, edited by Richard J.B. Bosworth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010),159-161; Cinquini, "Fascist Corporative Economy," 213–5; Amatori, "Fascist Regime," 68.

22   Jon S. Cohen, "Was Italian Fascism a Developmental Dictatorship? Some Evidence to the Contrary," in *Economic History Review* 41 (1998) 104; Maurizio Vaudagna, "Structural Change in Fascist Italy," in *Journal of Economic History* 38, no. 1 (1978), 197; Peter Hertner, "Autarkiepolitik im faschistischen Italien. Zu einigen neuen Forschungsergebnissen," in *Wirtschaftsordnung, Staat und Unternehmen,* 145.

23   Amatori, "Fascist Regime," 72–3.

neglected. Eventually, capitalism was not abolished in Fascist Italy, as Mussolini did not intend to generally replace private control over the allocation, accumulation, and distribution of economic resources. Proposals to nationalize industry in the Repubblica di Salò did not come to fruition in the final phase of the Second World War, as Hitler feared that plans advocated by Fascist intellectuals such as Nicola Bombacci and Carlo Silvestri would reduce Italy's industrial output needed for the German war effort. All in all, however, the new public institutions that the Fascist regime had created restricted the freedom of entrepreneurs in key sectors of industry throughout the 1930s and early 1940s.[24]

Big business also welcomed the turn to economic autarky, at least initially. Yet again, the transition to protectionism that the Fascist regime proclaimed was an improvised response to a crisis rather than the outcome of a coherent and long-term economic programme. In the early 1920s, Italy's dependence on international markets and foreign investments had caused a severe trade and balance of payments deficit. In 1925, Mussolini responded to the problem by proclaiming the "battle for wheat" that was to increase domestic agricultural production. Efforts to limit imported goods and replace raw materials by synthetic products were to save foreign currency, as well. The Fascist regime also imposed duties on imports, thereby shielding agricultural producers and industry from foreign competition. At the same time, they benefitted from high prices that disadvantaged consumers. Not least, the revaluation of the lira in 1926 (Quota '90) lowered retail prices and wages. Price control for food, too, clearly demonstrated that the rulers prioritized big industry over agricultural producers.[25]

The turn to autarky had been accompanied by preparations for a war economy as early as the mid- and late 1920s. Yet self-sufficiency and economic independence was strongly enhanced after the Fascist regime had attacked Abyssinia in October 1935. In response to the invasion, the governments of eighteen member states of the League of Nations imposed an economic boycott on Italy. Based on growing state intervention, new oligopolies in steel, chemical, electrical, and mechanical industries mirrored the rulers' determination to promote autarky and set up a war economy. Support for key

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24   Luciano Segreto, "Entrepreneurs and the Fascist Regime in Italy: From the Honeymoon to the Divorce," in *Enterprise in the Period of Fascism in Europe*, edited by Harold James and Jakob Tanner (London: Routledge, 2017), 78–9, 86, 88–9; Christian Goeschel, *Mussolini and Hitler. The Forging of the Fascist Alliance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 275; Amatori, "Fascist Regime," 72–3; Cohen, "Was Italian Fascism a Developmental Dictatorship?," 96–7, 103, 107; Vaudagna, "Change," 184–5, 188, 197; Hertner, "Autarkiepolitik," 145–6.

25   Roland Sarti, *Fascism and the Industrial Leadership in Italy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 99; Alexander Nützenadel, "Dictating Food. Autarchy, Food Provision, and Consumer Politics in Fascist Italy, 1922–1943," in *Food and Conflict in Europe in the Age of the Two World Wars*, edited by Frank Trentmann and Flemming Just (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 96; Hertner, "Autarkiepolitik," 140–2; Amatori, "Fascist Regime," 68; Vaudagna, "Change," 190.

sectors such as aviation as well as the production of artificial rubber and textiles was also based on the policy of self-sufficiency that aimed at imperial rule and the colonial expansion in Africa, as well. In these industries, profits grew considerably. At the same time, however, entrepreneurs and businessmen depended on government demand. The lack of competition on markets also created excess capacity and reduced efficiency and productivity. Not least, the predominance of military over civil needs inhibited the development of domestic markets and consumer industries. Altogether, the Fascist policy of autarky and state intervention that characterized the war economy aggravated structural imbalances in Italian capitalism.[26]

Agrarian policies, too, influenced the economic development of postwar Italy. In the countryside, the turn to autarky was closely linked to policies of rural development and rearmament. Economic objectives were harnessed to the ideology and politics of "ruralization." In the first place, the Fascist regime pursued self-sufficiency in order to save foreign currency and thereby reduce the balance of payments deficit. Production "battles" and land reclamation campaigns contributed to an increase in agricultural production. Moreover, the corporate state that integrated existing agricultural and consumer cooperatives in 1926–27 was to regulate economic relations in the countryside and thereby overcome the perennial conflicts between landowners, sharecroppers, and agricultural labourers. At the same time, the number of retailers was reduced by 22 percent in the food sector between 1927 and 1938. Yet state intervention into trade and selective price controls of agricultural products failed in the mid-1930s, giving rise to a comprehensive and highly centralized system of state intervention. As the "Permanent Committee for Price Control" that was established in October 1935 failed as much as the newly introduced compulsory deliveries, the Fascist rulers attempted to promote food supplies by streamlining planning. Although agricultural production gradually increased in the 1920s and 1930s, self-sufficiency was not attained. As late as spring 1937, the authorities identified considerable deficits in the supply of agricultural products: 20 percent for wheat, 15 to 25 percent of meat and fish and 20 to 35 percent for fats and oils. Stocks were clearly insufficient for a long war of attrition. After Italy had joined the Third Reich in its attack on France on 10 June 1940, malnutrition and deprivation led to unrest, culminating in food riots and strikes in the industrial and urban centres of northern Italy. In the last resort, the interests of agricultural producers, traders and food consumers remained subordinated to those of industrial entrepreneurs and businessmen in commerce. Furthermore, the Fascist rulers did not solve the long-standing structural weaknesses of Italy's agrarian capitalism: the north-south divide, low productivity and the unequal division of land that was finally addressed by land reform in the 1950s.[27]

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26   Amatori, "Fascist Regime," 72; Vaudagna, "Change," 184, 186–7, 198.

27   Alexander Nützenadel, *Landwirtschaft, Staat und Autarkie. Agrarpolitik im faschistischen Italien (1922–1943)*, (Tübingen: De Gruyter, 1997), esp. 415–426, "Agrarpolitik, Marktord-

German National Socialism:
Instrumentalising Capitalism

Before Germany's entrenched authoritarian elites bestowed them with power, the Nazis did not espouse and proclaim a coherent economic programme. On 24 February 1920, Hitler publicly proclaimed the first programme of the precursor to the NSDAP, the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (DAP) that he had drafted together with the leader of the party, Anton Drexler, and another founding member, civil engineer and self-taught economist Gottfried Feder. The latter inserted anti-capitalist credentials such as the abolition of "unearned income" and "debt-slavery" (Point 11). Moreover, the DAP demanded to nationalize "trusts" (Point 13) and confiscate "war profits" (Point 12). Profits of "heavy industries" were to be divided up, as well (Point 14). As regards agriculture, the programme encompassed a land reform and the prevention of "speculation" in soil (Point 17).[28]

Yet the vague demands were open to competing interpretations. As undisputed *Führer* (leader) since 1921, Hitler declared the programme as immutable at the Bamberg Conference of the Nazi Party on 14 February 1926 in order to unify the party and secure his authority. He unequivocally rejected calls to expropriate princes without compensation. This refutation was directed against Gregor Strasser and some other party leaders and members such as young Joseph Goebbels in the North of Germany who had also demanded a corporate state government control of the means of production. In the following years, Hitler avoided any clear commitment to it in his speeches and publications, for instance in his political biography *Mein Kampf* of 1925–26. The demands for expropriation, nationalization and land reform were quietly dropped. Nevertheless, the Nazi leader still claimed that his party synthesized nationalism and socialism. Entrepreneurs were to serve the *Volksgemeinschaft* (people's community) that was to overcome the frictions and fissures of capitalism.[29]

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nung und Außenhandel im faschistischen Italien 1922–1940," in *Faschismus und Gesellschaft in Italien. Staat – Wirtschaft – Kultur*, edited by Jens Petersen and Wolfgang Schieder (Cologne: SH-Verlag, 1998), 283, 296–7, 302, 305; and "Dictating Food", 97–104; Stefano Grando and Gianluca Volpi, "Backwardness, Modernization, Propaganda: Agrarian Policies and Rural Representations in the Italian Fascist Regime," in *Agriculture in the Age of Fascism: Authoritarian Technocracy and Rural Modernization, 1922–1945*, edited by Lourenzo Fernández Prieto, Juan Pan-Montojo and Miguel Cabo (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014), 75; Amatori, "Fascist Regime," 68.

28   Ian Kershaw, *Hitler: A Biography* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 2008), 87. For the full text of the programme, see the Avalon Project. Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy (https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/1708-ps.asp).

29   Karl Dietrich Bracher, *The German Dictatorship* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 116; Henry A. Turner, "Hitlers Einstellung zu Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft vor 1933," in *Ge-*

In his bid for state power, Hitler presented himself as a respectable politician to the economic elites. In order to dispel doubts in the business community, he emphasized his nationalism and anti-Marxism, most prominently in his speech to the Industry Club in Düsseldorf on 26 January 1932. Hitler called for national unity in order to solve Germany's national problems and gain "living space." Moreover, he committed himself to private property as well as the unequal distribution of wealth and income. However, responses in the business community were mixed.[30] Even though the Nazis did not mount a follow-up campaign to Hitler's speech, the Keppler Circle (named after Hitler's economic adviser Wilhelm Keppler) and the Arbeitsstelle Hjalmar Schacht attempted to improve relations between the Nazis and business leaders in the early 1930s. Nevertheless, few major industrialists such as Fritz Thyssen and Emil Kirdorf openly supported and funded Hitler and his party before the Nazi "seizure of power" on 30 January 1933. The vast majority of bankers, as well, shied away from endorsing the NSDAP because of the party's vague economic programme and its hostility to the credit sector. Yet most German entrepreneurs and businessmen indirectly contributed to the rise of National Socialism by undermining the Weimar Republic that they considered weak and ineffective. As a corollary, the crisis of capitalism in the late 1920s and early 1930s significantly contributed to the Nazi "seizure of power" on 30 January 1933.[31]

schichte und Gesellschaft 2 (1976), 89–117; Turner, "Big Business," 77. Also see Reinhard Kühnl, "Zur Programmatik der nationalsozialistischen Linken: das Strasser-Programm von 1925/26," Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 14 (1966), 317–33.

30   For the full text, see Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Nazism 1919–1945, Vol. 1, The Rise to Power 1919–1934 (Exeter: Liverpool University Press 1998), 94–5. For an overview, see Turner, "Big Business," 204–19.

31   Henry A. Turner, Faschismus und Demokratie in Deutschland. Studien zum Verhältnis zwischen Nationalsozialismus und Wirtschaft, 2nd edition (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1980), 9–32; Hans-Erich Volkmann, "Die NS-Wirtschaft in Vorbereitung des Krieges. Von der Weltwirtschaft zur Großraumwirtschaft," in Ökonomie und Expansion. Grundzüge der NS-Wirtschaftspolitik, edited by Hans-Erich Volkmann and Bernhard Chiari (Munich: Oldenbourg 2009), 45–74; Hans-Erich Volkmann, "Deutsche Agrareliten auf Revisions- und Expansionskurs," in Die deutschen Eliten und der Weg in den Zweiten Weltkrieg, edited by Martin Broszat and Klaus Schwabe (Munich: Beck, 1989), 334–88, 433–41; Adam J. Tooze and Yvonne Badal, Ökonomie der Zerstörung. Die Geschichte der Wirtschaft im Nationalsozialismus (Munich: Siedler Verlag, 2007), 129; Peter Longerich, Hitler. Biographie (Munich: Siedler Verlag, 2017), 225, 228. On Thyssen and Kirdorf, see Werner Abelshauser, "Gustav Krupp und die Gleichschaltung der deutschen Industrie, 1933–1934," in Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte 47 (2002), 6–7; Turner, "Big Business," 91, 145–8, 152–3, 264–5. On bankers, see Christopher Kopper, Zwischen Marktwirtschaft und Dirigismus. Bankenpolitik im Dritten Reich 1933–1939 (Bonn: Bouvier, 1998), 354.

The Great Depression loomed large over the economic policies of the Nazi rulers, as well. As soon as Hitler had become Chancellor of a government that comprised seemingly influential politicians of the conservative Deutschnationale Volkspartei, the new regime extended the state control that had already been imposed on the economy in the wake of the global crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s. In 1933–34, state intervention concentrated on banking and industries such as shipbuilding and shipping companies that had been strongly hit by the global crisis. The Banking Act of 5 December 1934 decreed restrictions on risky business activities and extended the duty of disclosure in order to safeguard banking operations and protect creditors from losing the capital that they had invested. Starting from this limited intervention, banks channelled deposits into state papers that were to finance the rearmament drive. As the capital market was increasingly marginalized, financial disintermediation accelerated. Major German banks, especially the Dresdner Bank, financed SS enterprises, ultimately reorganized banking in the occupied territories of Europe and thereby contributed to the Nazi "economy of crime" in the Second World War.[32] Similarly, shipping companies had become prone to state intervention in the Great Depression. Heavily funded by the state, they were effectively nationalized in the Third Reich before tobacco industrialists finally reprivatized them in 1941–42 through a buyout.[33]

In 1933–34, Conservative ministers supported state regulations that had already been tightened in the final phase of the Weimar Republic. They also welcomed wage reductions and the suppression of trade unions that were replaced by the *Deutsche Arbeitsfront* (German Labour Front, DAF) as early as May 1933. Government-appointed "trustees of labour" were to improve industrial relations and secure harmony between entrepreneurs and the workforce according to the *Gesetz zur nationalen Arbeit* (Law for the Organization of National Labour) of 20 January 1934. Corporatist approaches espoused by Thyssen according to the conception of Austrian economist and philosopher Othmar Spann were to serve the same purpose. In a similar vein, the Law for the Protection of the German Retail Trade of 12 May 1933, which banned the expansion of existing retail shops and the establishment of new ones, was based on the politics of middle-class protection in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Not least,

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32   Ludolf Herbst, "Gab es ein nationalsozialistisches Wirtschaftssystem?," in *Wirtschaftspolitik in Deutschland 1917–1990. Das Reichswirtschaftsministerium in der NS-Zeit,* Vol. 2, edited by Albrecht Ritschl (Berlin: de Gruyter Oldenbourg 2016), 629; Harold James, "Banks in the Era of Totalitarianism: Banking in Nazi Germany," in *Enterprise in the Period of Fascism in Europe*, edited by Harold James and Jakob Tanner (London: Routledge, 2017), 16–9, 23; Kopper, "Marktwirtschaft," esp. 124–5, 189, 198, 356–7, 360–1; Avraham Barkai, *Das Wirtschaftssystem des Nationalsozialismus. Ideologie. Theorie, Politik 1933–45* (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1977), 161–8.

33   Hartmut Rübner, "Rettungsanker in der Flaute. Das Verhältnis von Staat und Unternehmen beim Krisenmanagement der deutschen Großreedereien 1931–1942," in *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 95 (2008): 291–2, 306, 309–10, 317–8.

the turn to autarky seemed to follow the path to protectionism in all major industrial countries after the onset of the Global Depression. The "New Plan" that Schacht announced as the newly appointed Minister for the Economy in 1934, for instance, enhanced state control of trade and currency transfer. Multiple Überwachungsstellen (oversight agencies) were to prevent the loss of valuable resources such as raw materials and financial means. Beyond these objectives, however, the core of the specifically Nazi economic agenda increasingly came to the fore. Behind the smokescreen of a supposedly necessary adaption to world economic conditions, the New Plan was to promote rearmament, autarky, and expansion. Claiming a third way between capitalism and socialism, the new rulers of Germany sought to combine competition with guidance and control in order to forge the popular (but vague) *Volksgemeinschaft*, suppress "enemies" and conquer the "living space" that they considered indispensable for the survival of Germans in their supposedly Social Darwinian struggle, especially against the "Slavs."[34]

From 1934 to the proclamation and implementation of the Four-Year Plan (1936–37), the Nazi regime geared capitalism to their ideological goals. Channelling economic activities and capital into their overriding political projects, the German economy was insulated from international influences. Moreover, disposition over private property was reduced, whereas control over the means of production grew. The *Gesetz zur Ordnung der nationalen Arbeit* (Law on the Order of National Labour) of 20 January 1934 and on the *Gesetz zur Vorbereitung des organischen Aufbaus der deutschen Wirtschaft* (Preparation of the Organic Structure of the German Economy) of 27 February 1934 reduced the clout of big business. The latter, in particular, increased the influence of state authorities by dividing industry into seven *Wirtschaftsgruppen* (Principal Economic Groups). As a corollary, the *Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie* (National Association of German Industry, RDI) was transformed into the *Reichsgruppe Industrie* in 1934. Appointed officials thereby replaced elected representatives of big industry, and the advocates of protectionism prevailed over the supporters of tree trade such as Carl Bosch. Altogether, German entrepreneurs lost influence. Yet private property was ultimately retained, and businessmen were pleased with the regime's policies of reducing unemployment, raising demand, and containing inflation. Moreover, the German Labour Front did not endanger managerial authority,

34   Barkai, "Das Wirtschaftssystem," 92–109, 125–34; Richard Grunberger, *A Social History of the Third Reich* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), 218; Albrecht Ritschl, "Wirtschaftspolitik im Dritten Reich. Ein Überblick," in *Deutschland 1933–1945. Neue Studien zur nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft*, edited by Karl D. Bracher, Manfred Funke and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1992), 120; Ritschl, "Wirtschaftsideologie," 54–5; Longerich, Hitler, 397–8, 425–7; Nietzel, "Nazi Economic Policy", 109–12; Tooze and Badal, Ökonomie, 135; Milward, "Politische Ökonomie," 24–5; Ritschl, "Verhältnis," 252; Hayes, "Industry," 30.

and corporatist experiments were officially abandoned by the regime as early as 1934. Fears of a new "state socialism" proved ill founded.[35]

Under these conditions, most industrialists were prepared to collaborate with the Nazi regime that redirected their interests to the political aims of the rulers. In order to promote autarky, rearmament, and war, they distributed resources, imposed sanctions, and created incentives, especially by reducing the risk of large-scale investments. The Four-Year Plan, in particular, was to raise the production in key sectors of the rearmament programme: synthetic fuel and rubber as well as coal and steel. In the 1920s, IG Farbenindustrie—a huge corporation that had been established as a merger of smaller companies in 1925—promoted the conversion of coal to liquid fuels and to rubber. Chemist and business manager, Carl Krauch, sought to maintain the IG Farben's monopoly on synthetic rubber. However, the programme did not fulfil the hopes of the corporation's high-ranking executives. The same applies to the production of synthetic fuel, which was based on the hydrogenation of coal. In 1932, synthetic gasoline was finally obtained in Leuna (where a nitrogen-fixing installation had opened in 1917) at the volume and costs that had been targeted in 1925. By that time, losses amounted to almost $ 40 million in 1932. After the Nazi "seizure of power," the chairman of IG Farben's *Aufsichtsrat* (supervisory board), Carl Bosch, requested government aid. As an opponent to autarky and planning, he stressed that synthetic fuel was not competitive due to its high price. In December 1933, the regime took up these concerns by granting producers a price and purchase guarantee. At the same time, however, the Nazi rulers imposed a profit ceiling. They also supported the production of synthetic rubber. As they sought to secure autarky and—closely related—establish a war economy, the National Socialists preserved the private property and contractual autonomy of willing collaborators. IG Farben, on its side, was eager to maintain a monopoly on the production of synthetic fuel and rubber. Market competition was replaced by state protection. Yet the Nazi leadership accepted the principle of economic calculation by entrepreneurs, and political incentives that complied with profit seeking, in particular, prevailed over coercion.[36]

35   Peter Hayes, "Carl Bosch and Karl Krauch. Chemistry and the Political Economy of Germany 1925–1945," in *Journal of Economic History* 47 (1987), 354–7, 362; Hayes, "Industry," 30–1; Abelshauser, "Gustav Krupp," 20–4; Ritschl, "Wirtschaftspolitik," 121; Streb, "Das nationalsozialistische Wirtschaftssystem," 72.

36   Jonas Scherner, "Das Verhältnis zwischen NS-Regime und Industrieunternehmen – Zwang oder Kooperation?," in *Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte* 51, no. 2 (2006), 166–74, 189–90; Streb, "Das nationalsozialistische Wirtschaftssystem," 71–2, 80; Buchheim, "Verhältnis," 237–40; Buchheim, "Unternehmen," 386, 389. For details, see Barkai, *Wirtschaftssystem*, 135–61; Hayes, "Carl Bosch," 355–9; Hayes, "Industry," 30–1; Milward, "Politische Ökonomie," 225; Tooze and Badal, Ökonomie, 144–50.

The regime also created the preconditions of profitability in fibre manufacturing by using compulsion, proscribing a twenty percent admixture of artificial thread in all clothing for German consumers. Moreover, it forced textile companies to buy stock in five regional fibre enterprises that had been set up with loans from the state treasury. Private manufactures were thereby driven to expand in order to preserve their market shares. The same combination of stimulation and coercion led to the formation of the Braunkohle-Benzin AG in October 1934 as a result of a forced merger of ten producers of brown coal. Yet the Ruhr coal industry resisted compulsion and refused to exploit the new opportunities offered by the Nazi rulers. Only two hydrogenation plants were built, supplying 12 percent of Germany's total fuel output. Fearing to create surplus capacities incurring more debt, owners of collieries clung to their cautious business strategies. In a similar vein, steel industrialists in the Ruhr refused to smelt the low-grade ores provided by the Salzgitter field of Vereinigte Stahlwerke, as this would have required a considerable expansion of blast furnace capacity, coke consumption and conveyancing. Rejecting demands for state subsidies and price increases, Hermann Göring, the Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, decided to establish a huge steel firm named after himself. In 1937–38, the German steel industry was forced to take a minority position in the new Reichswerke Hermann Göring and buy its output. Leading entrepreneurs also objected to Hitler's decision of July 1936 to produce a Volkswagen (people's car). As fears of nationalization and a "German socialism" spread in the mid-1930s, the Nazi party's newspaper, the *Völkischer Beobachter*, claimed in 1936: "Where capitalism considers itself untouched, it is, in fact, already harnessed to politics. […] National Socialism […] lets capitalism run as the motor, uses its dynamic energies, but shifts the gears."[37]

As indicated, pressure on big business increased after the passage of the Four-Year Plan that was a response to the acute lack of foreign currency in the mid-1930s when food imports had to be reduced. Price controls seemed urgent, as well. Rather than a coherent plan, it was an ensemble of various measures such as the decree on the re-allocation of foreign currency and raw materials issued by the Ministry of Economy in November 1937. In their efforts to achieve autarky and accelerate rearmament, state interventions intensified, leading to new conflicts with entrepreneurs. In the Ruhr,

37   Fritz Nonnenbruch, *Die dynamische Wirtschaft* (Munich: Zentralverl. d. NSDAP, 1936), 42–3, quoted from Hayes, "Industry," 31. Also see John Gillingham, *Industry and Politics in the Third Reich. Ruhr Coal, Hitler and Europe* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden 1985), 51–3; Herbst, "Gab es ein nationalsozialistisches Wirtschaftssystem?," 619; Streb, "Das nationalsozialistische Wirtschaftssystem," 72; Tooze and Badal, *Ökonomie*, 150–5; Longerich, *Hitler*, 472–3; Ritschl, "Wirtschaftsideologie," 57. On the *Vereinigte Stahlwerke and the Reichswerke*, see Gerhard T. Mollin, *Montankonzerne und 'Drittes Reich'. Der Gegensatz zwischen Monopolindustrie und Befehlswirtschaft in der deutschen Rüstung und Expansion 1936–1944* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 125–46, 276–9.

for instance, the vague mandate of the newly appointed *Beauftragter für die Leistung-steigerung im Bergbau* (Plenipotentiary for Productivity Increases in the Coal Mines), Paul Walter, and his licence to interfere with coal allocation met resistance. The syndi-cates also resented harsh measures to raise their production that had failed to meet the unrealistic output targets of the Four-Year Plan due to inadequate provisions, a short-age of labour and a decline in productivity. Overall, however, German industrialists benefitted from state orders. At the same time, they increasingly became dependent on them. Autarky, too, distracted them from developing new and competitive prod-ucts. In the context of the Nazi "carrot-and-stick economy," market competition was replaced by attempts to get access to influential party functionaries and state officials. As war approached, entrepreneurs felt compelled to win their favour.[38]

During the Second World War, German industrialists continued to pursue their business interests by collaborating with the Nazis who granted them "self-administra-tion" in the framework of a state-directed war economy. They seized the opportunities of "Aryanisation" and participated in the exploitation of the countries and regions that had been conquered by the Third Reich. In occupied territories as well as in satellite states, businessmen had to conform to the needs of the German-centred "New Order" and the *Grossraumwirtschaft*. Colonization was accompanied by ethnic cleansing and a racial reordering of the entire economy. As the Nazi occupiers extended their "Ary-anization" programmes, Jews were excluded from business enterprises. Moreover, the Nazis succeeded in gaining control of most companies by Germanization, especially in Eastern Europe. In those territories that were integrated into Greater Germany, state and private ownership co-existed. When Upper Silesia was captured from Poland in 1939, for instance, coal mines, steel works and the zinc industry were either taken by state holding companies such as the Reichswerke Hermann Göring or sold to private businesses. By contrast, political control was considerably stronger in the occupied re-gions of the USSR. Operating profits were set by state authorities who imposed a tight system of regulations. They were to remain in force after a German victory. Whereas German military inspectors and engineers retained the private property of small firms, larger enterprises were placed under state ownership or at least state management. All in all, holding companies such as the Reichswerke and the armed forces became the principal beneficiaries of Germany's economic empire. Nevertheless, private corpora-

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38   Hayes, "Industry," 32; Longerich, *Hitler*, 460–71, 485–6; Ritschl, "Wirtschaftspolitik," 125. Also see Gillingham, *Industry*, 54–65; Nietzel, "Nazi Economic Policy," 116. For comprehensive accounts of the Four-Year Plan and its economic repercussions, see Dietmar Petzina, *Autarkiepolitik im Dritten Reich. Der nationalsozialistische Vierjahrplan* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1968), esp. 196–8; Barkai, *Wirtschaftssystem*, 168–73.

tions such as Krupp and IG Farben took advantage of the *Grossraumwirtschaft* as well, entangling them into the Nazi policies of racial conquest.[39]

Industrialists also resorted to forced labour when their German workforce was depleted after 1941–42. Unconcerned about the conditions of those labourers, they "leased" prisoner of war and inmates of concentration camps. In the name of national duty, they sought to increase the output of armaments at any price, forcibly recruiting workers and confiscating raw materials. Entrepreneurs thereby became accomplices of the Nazis in their plunder economy. Companies such as IG Farben continued their programs of producing synthetic fuel and rubber. As a result, the corporation became locked to the dictatorship until its collapse in 1945. The factory that IG Farben established in Auschwitz in 1941 and SS Leader Heinrich Himmler's visit to the concentration camp (accompanied by Krauch) in the summer of 1942 became hallmarks of a collusion of interests that paved the way to the cooperation between the Nazis and industrialists in mass murder. The latter group was acutely aware of their dependence on state orders and the short-term economic objectives of the rulers. In particular, civilian production was sacrificed for the requirements of the war economy. Yet businessmen by no means abandoned their vested interests, and they were allowed "self-administration," even though under the tutelage of the Nazi state. As utter defeat loomed large after 1942, they attempted to extricate themselves from the tentacles of the war economy. However, they still added to the barbarity by securing resources for the postwar economy, for instance by inflating their needs for labour and raw materials in order to avoid cutbacks in production. Confronted by growing shortages, Albert Speer, who became responsible for munitions production in 1942 and for all armaments the following year, attempted to balance the competing demands for economic resources as German forces had to retreat from occupied countries and allies such as Hungary cancelled their support for the Third Reich. As conflicts between industrialists as well as between them, the German armed forces and organizations such as the DAF mounted, the dictatorship was close to collapse. Yet the diverse institutions and groups shared some basic interests such as meeting the regimes targets in order to secure the benefits that the rulers still offered. In this system of specific rewards, industrialists ultimately clung to their reactive role until the end in 1945 when state debts amounted to about 390 billion *Reichsmarks* and unspent savings had led to latent inflation.[40]

39   Hans-Erich Volkmann, "Zum Verhältnis von Großraumwirtschaft und NS-Regime im Zweiten Weltkrieg," Ökonomie und Expansion. *Grundzüge der NS-Wirtschaftspolitik*, edited by Hans-Erich Volkmann and Bernhard Chiari (Munich: Oldenbourg 2009), 76, 78, 81–6, 94, 99–101; Müller, "Grundzüge," 362–3, 367; Overy, "Business," 152, 154, 161, 169–70.

40   Willi Boelcke, "Die Finanzpolitik des Dritten Reiches. Eine Darstellung in Grundzügen," *Deutschland 1933–1945. Neue Studien zur nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft*, edited by Karl D. Bracher, Manfred Funke and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische

All in all, the Nazi regime continued to favour capitalist enterprises. As late as June 1944, Hitler promised industrialists to preserve private property and entrepreneurial control of decision-making in the postwar economy. Businessmen made concessions to anti-Semitism and administrative directives, especially during the war, but they resisted any major state interference into their competencies.[41]

The same applies to agrarian capitalists who were initially not championed by the Nazis. On the contrary, the latter supported independent peasants and farmers who they considered the most important proponents of their ideology of "blood and soil." In particular, Nazi agrarian policies were tied to their vision of a new racial order. The Reichserbhofgesetz (State Heritage Farm Law) of 29 September 1933, for instance, was to support "Aryan" peasants and farmers whose possessions were not to be divided up among their offspring. Moreover, it was prohibited to sell or mortgage those holdings that comprised between 7.5 and 125 hectares. Altogether, the law considerably curbed agrarian capitalism. The rulers also supported producers by alleviating their debts and raising the prices of agricultural products, especially in the years from 1933 to 1936 and during the Second World War. Yet these measures benefitted large landowners rather than the small peasants that the Nazis glorified as the new racial elite in their propaganda. Moreover, the Reichsnährstand, which was founded by a decree of 13 September 1933, imposed a tight net of regulations (orders, price controls and prohibitions) in agricultural production and distribution. Not least, the rulers proved unable to stem the tide of agricultural workers abandoning their jobs and leaving the countryside. When rearmament took precedence in economic policy from 1936 onwards, the agricultural policies almost exclusively aimed to stimulate and increase production in order to promote self-sufficiency. The rise of Herbert Backe, who eventually replaced Richard Walther Darré as Minister for Agriculture in 1942, sealed this change of tack. Agricultural output was increasingly regulated by the state that did not infringe on private property.[42]

Bildung, 1992), 110. Also see Ralf Banken, "'Es war überhaupt kein Finanzproblem'. Die Kriegsfinanzierung des Dritten Reiches 1939–1945," in *Finanzpolitik und Schuldenkrisen, 16.–20. Jahrhundert*, edited by Andreas Hedwig (Marburg: Hessisches Staatsarchiv, 2014), 209–10; Herbst, *Der Totale Krieg*, 281–91, 327–39, 387–96, 453–60; Hayes, "Industry," 33–5.

41   Longerich, *Hitler*, 958; Buchheim, "Unternehmen," 356, 374, 386, 389; Ritschl, "Wirtschaftsideologie," 63.

42   Gustavo Corni and Horst Gies, *"Blut und Boden". Rassenideologie und Agrarpolitik im Staat Hitlers* (Idstein: Schulz-Kirchner, 1994), 17–166, 469–7; Daniela Münkel, *Nationalsozialistische Agrarpolitik und Bauernalltag* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1996), esp. 321–423, 466–81; John E. Farquharson, "The Agrarian Policy of National Socialist Germany," in *Peasants and Lords in Modern Germany. Recent Studies in Agricultural History*, edited by Robert Moeller (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 233–59. For overviews, see Gunter Mahlerwein, *Grundzüge der Agrargeschichte, Vol 3: Die Moderne (1880–2010)* (Cologne: Böhlau

In their attempts to prevent shortages and hunger, the Nazi regime imposed tight control on agricultural producers in the Third Reich (for instance by fixing prices) and resorted to outright rape in the occupied countries where depletion led to starvation. Apart from the Soviet Union where the occupiers did not disband collectives, however, private property was preserved. In Vichy France, a law of 2 December 1940 on the Peasant Corporation foundered on the resistance of Republican elites. By contrast, comités d'organisation were set up along the lines of the German Wirtschaftsgruppen. Economic dependence on Germany grew as much as state intervention and planning. At the same time, industrialists and agricultural producers benefitted from German orders that allowed them to increase their profits and to keep machines as well as employees, not least with a view to the postwar economy.[43] The same applies to the Netherlands that was considered a "Germanic county" by the occupiers and therefore to be interwoven with the Third Reich. As primary industrial capacity grew by 24 percent from 1938 to 1946, rural poverty and unemployment were reduced. Altogether, production in occupied western Europe was more important for the German war economy that extractions from eastern and southeastern Europe.[44]

Verlag 2016), 40–1, 117–8, 137–8, 161–4; Barkai, *Wirtschaftssystem*, 109–124; Ritschl, "Wirtschaftspolitik," 122–3. On the impact on the rural economy, see Ernst Langthaler, *Schlachtfelder. Alltägliches Wirtschaften in der nationalsozialistischen Agrargesellschaft 1938–1945* (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2016), esp. 570–698. For a comprehensive biography of Darré, see Horst Gies, *Richard Walther Darré. Der „Reichsbauernführer", die nationalsozialistische „Blut und Boden"-Ideologie und die Machteroberung Hitlers* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2019).

43 Patrick Fridenson, "French Enterprises under German Occupation, 1940–1944," in *Enterprise in the Period of Fascism in Europe*, edited by Harold James and Jakob Tanner (London: Routledge, 2017), 261–2, 267; Marcel Boldorf, "Racist Parameters in the French Economy 1919–1939/44," in *National Economies. Volks-Wirtschaft, Racism and Economy in Europe between the Wars (1918–1939/45)*, edited by Christoph Kreutzmüller, Michael Wildt and Moshe Zimmermann (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2015), 179; Édouard Lynch, "Agricultural Policy in Vichy France: Modernity or an 'Allergy' to Fascism?," in *Agriculture in the Age of Fascism*, 246, 250.

44 Ritschl, "Wirtschaftspolitik," 132. On the Netherlands, see Hein A. M. Klemann, "The Dutch Economy during the German Occupation, 1940–1945," in *Enterprise in the Period of Fascism in Europe*, edited by Harold James and Jakob Tanner (London: Routledge, 2017), 223, 229–31, 236, 242–3, 246, 249.

Comparative Perspectives: State-directed Capitalism in Authoritarian Dictatorships

In the interwar years, authoritarian dictatorships were established in many states that did not have strong capitalist economies. In Hungary, Romania, Portugal, and Spain, in particular, the state had shaped industrialization that had remained partial. Strong state intervention persisted in these countries, as administrative controls in Portugal demonstrated. In 1922, the state had directly intervened in order to stabilize the currency, the escudo. The Estado Novo that António de Oliveira Salazar established in 1933 rested on Catholicism, ruralism, a strong belief in the merits of technical management and not least tight state control. Aiming at self-sufficiency, Salazar created corporate institutional structures modelled on Fascist Italy. The main beneficiaries of the protectionist policies were the large estate-owners (*latifundistas*) who retained strong political influence and prevented land reforms. In early 1945, they succeeded in diluting a law on industrial development and reorganization. At the same time, they resented official efforts to keep prices for agricultural products low and thereby protect urban consumers during the Second World War. All in all, Salazar maintained strong state supervision and regulation of the economy until 1945. It was only in the 1960s that market operations expanded.[45]

In Spain, small and medium-sized family enterprises dominated business, whereas few big companies concentrated in mining, transport and banking. Still largely an agrarian society with regional imbalances and considerable social inequality, the economy was not competitive and depended on state protection. In the early 1920s, moreover, the entrepreneurial and business class was frightened by rising tensions and the spectre of revolution. By contrast, General Miguel Primo de Rivera's military coup of September 1923 seemed to secure stability and was therefore supported by entrepreneurs and agrarian estate-owners. However, the new corporatist labour organization and growing state intervention into the economy, for instance the creation of the monopoly for the distribution of petroleum, raised criticism of a regulatory state. After Primo de Rivera's fall in 1930 and the proclamation of the Republic, conflicts between trade unions, industrial strife, nationalist revolts, unrest in the countryside and resistance to the Popular Front led disaffected entrepreneurs to welcome General Francisco Franco's attempt to seize power in July 1936.[46]

45   Daniel L. Táboas, "The Portuguese *Estado Novo*: Programmes and Obstacles to the Modernization of Agriculture, 1933–1950," in *Agriculture in the Age of Fascism*, 87, 90–4, 97–103; N. Valério, "The Portuguese Economy in the Interwar Period," *Estudos de Economia* 2 (1985), 143–148.

46   Mercedes Cabrera and Fernando del Rey, "Spanish Entrepreneurs in the Era of Fascism. From the Primo de Rivera Dictatorship, 1923–1945," in *Enterprise in the Period of Fascism*

During the ensuing Spanish Civil War up to April 1939, Franco's Nationalists intervened into the economy by imposing price controls, rationing and the allocation of raw materials. Nevertheless, the threat to private property, the social revolution propelled by anarchists and radical socialists as well as the growing influence of the Communist Party after 1937 led most industrialists and large estate-owners to flock to the Nationalists. After his victory, Franco established an authoritarian regime that allowed the business community to regain power, especially vis-à-vis labour. As early as 1938, the Fuero Del Trabajo set up vertical unions. The Instituto Nacional de Industria (National Industry Institute) that was founded as a holding company in 1941 was modelled on Italy's Fascist dictatorship, as well. Although it became an important backbone of state intervention into the economy and business organizations lost their autonomy, economic policies benefitted the entrepreneurs and landowners. For instance, the fascist Falange that had been integrated into the authoritarian regime was forced to abandon its national-syndicalist and social-revolutionary programme after 1939. Most importantly, the Nationalist rulers maintained private property and collaborated with bankers, industrialists and the proprietors of large estates. Autarky enabled businessmen to increase their profits from 1939 to 1959, as protectionism favoured big entrepreneurs in uncompetitive sectors such as mining and well as the textile and steel industries. Moreover, bankers were protected from competition by the Status quo Bancario, and they strongly influenced the economic policies of the regime. By contrast, industrialists and agricultural producers who were connected to international markets were disadvantaged. Following the rise of a Catholic technocratic elite (members of the Opus Dei) in the late 1950s, Franco's regime turned to a "dynamic, Western-style consumer economy under tight political control." Autarky was abandoned and state controls lessened, but regulations persisted, especially in banking and industrial relations. Yet the Stabilization Plan of 1959 led to a steep increase in prices. As inflation ran out of control, too, strikes proliferated throughout the 1960s. However, a return to the state-controlled economy of the 1940s and 1950s was not possible in the last phase of Franco's regime when authoritarian rule gradually crumbled until the dictator's death on 20 November 1975.[47]

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in Europe, edited by Harold James and Jakob Tanner (London: Routledge, 2017), 43–61, at 44–50.

47   Pablo M. Aceña and Elena Martínez Ruiz, "The Golden Age of Spanish Capitalism. Economic Growth without Political Freedom," in *Spain Transformed. The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959–75*, edited by Nigel Townson (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), 31, 36–8; Antonio Cazorla Sánchez, "Order, Progress, and Syndicalism? How the Francoist Authorities Saw Socio-Economic Change," in *Spain Transformed*, 105. Also see Ana Cabana and Alba Díaz-Geada, "Exploring Modernization: Agrarian Fascism in Rural Spain, 1936–1951," in *Agriculture in the Age of Fascism*, 189–191, 194, 197, 199, 203, 206; Cabrera and del Rey, "Entrepreneurs," 52–56; Walther L. Bernecker, "Das spanische Wirtschaftswunder. Ökonomisches Wachstum und sozialer Wandel in der Franco-Ära," in *Der Boom 1949–1973.*

Conclusion

Italian Fascism and German National Socialism did not abolish capitalism but triggered off a structural transformation. The two regimes harnessed companies and banks to their political needs. In key industrial sectors that the rulers considered crucial for "national independence," political intervention grew. In Italy more than in Germany, a large portion of the economy was under state control by the late 1930s. Industrialists and their companies had to adapt to multiple constraints and the new public enterprises. Although the Fascists had no coherent economic programme, they influenced the long-term economic development of Italy. As the governments of many states considered corporative models or even adopted them in the wake of the Great Depression, the influence of Fascist economic policy transcended the confines of Italy. Populist and authorianan politicians openly espoused a corporate economy as a panacea for the crisis, for instance in banking. Even in the United States of America, experts closely watched state intervention into the economy according to the rulers' priorities and the needs of producers, traders, and consumers.[48]

Despite the important differences between the economies of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, commonalities are indisputable. In both countries, the state established a closed economy and supported key sectors of "national importance." As economic liberalism and market mechanisms were displaced, party and public authorities redirected private initiative and profit incentives to the political objectives of the rulers. At the same time, they replaced foreign trade by protectionism and autarky, eventually aiming at self-sufficiency. All in all, these changes did not infringe on key pillars of capitalism, especially private property, contractual autonomy, and profit seeking. Yet they restricted the economic freedom of entrepreneurs and thereby created a new economic system. However, the fascists did not end up with a "mixed economy" as a result of a "third way" between capitalism and socialism. They rather sought to induce big business to redirect their activities to the rulers' specific political objectives, both by incentives and compulsion. In the end, the two fascist dictatorships imposed new criteria of "rational" behaviour that benefited both the regimes and those industrialists

Gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Folgen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in Europa, edited by Hartmut Kaelble (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1992), 190–6, 202–5.

48   Alexander Nützenadel, "Fascism and Finance: Economic Populism in Inter-War Europe," *German Historical Institute London Bulletin* 44 (2022), 1, 5-6, 14-17, 26; Cinquini, "Fascist Corporative Economy," 215, 225; Segreto, "Entrepreneurs," 88–9; Cohen, "Was Italian Fascism a Developmental Dictatorship?," 96–7, 103, 112.

who were prepared to seize the new opportunities. Capitalism and fascism were united in an unholy alliance without fusing and losing their distinctive features.[49]

All in all, Fascism and National Socialism changed capitalism by defining new parameters of rational action. The rulers of Italy and Germany, respectively, geared industrialists and agricultural producers to their overriding political aims. Regulating prices, interest rates and exchange quotations, they curtailed the market mechanism. Yet they did by no means destroy or even seriously restrict capitalism. On the contrary, private property and entrepreneurial freedom was maintained. Fears of socialization or nationalization by businessmen proved ill founded. Altogether, path-dependency prevailed in the Third Reich and Nazi Germany. The same applies to Spain and Portugal where authoritarian dictatorships reinforced state intervention, which had shaped economic development since the late nineteenth century. The two countries on the Iberian Peninsula remained halfway between a market economy and a centrally administered (planned) economy.[50]

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49 Stuart E. Woolf, "Did a Fascist Economic System Exist?," in *The Nature of Fascism*, edited by Stuart E. Woolf (London: Random House, 1968), 152–3; Vaudagna, "Change," 190–1; Milward, "Politische Ökonomie," 225–6; Buchheim and Scherner, "Anmerkungen," 97; Buchheim, "Unternehmen," 356–8, 386–90; Streb, "Das nationalsozialistische Wirtschaftssystem," 63, 68, 73–83.

50 For Spain, see Bernecker, "Wirtschaftswunder," 196–7. For Germany, see Buchheim and Scherner, "Anmerkungen," 97; James, "Banks," 15; Streb, "Das nationalsozialistische Wirtschaftssystem," 66.

Jesper Jørgensen & Thomas Olesen

A New Organizational Paradigm? Comparing the Organization and Resources of Historical and Contemporary Social Movements in Denmark, 1960–2020

Abstract

This article discusses the connective paradigm proposed by Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg: Connective action is less dependent on organizations, mobilizing instead through interpersonal networks facilitated by social media. The power of new connective media is so strong that it eclipses the importance of more traditional resources, such as money and organizational capacity. We find the notion of connective action to be fruitful, but also warn against the fallacy of exaggerated newness. To pursue this argument, this article offers a historically grounded comparison of "old" and "new" activists that allows us to assess how the role played by organizing and the implementation of resources has changed over the last 60 years, and in particular, how Bennett and Segerberg's notion of connective action stands up to historical evidence. It builds on a unique set of 30 in-depth interviews with activists on the left in Denmark from the 1960s to today. We discuss our findings via four themes: flat organizational structures; the importance of (new) media; individual vs. collective activism; and the power of physical spaces. Our analysis suggests that while there are indeed notable differences across activist generations, one must be careful not to over-interpret them.

Keywords: *social movements, activism, connective action, left-wing activists, anti-Vietnam war movement, anti-apartheid movement, environmental movement, new media, organization, resources.*

In Denmark, the period from the 1870s onwards has been labelled "the age of voluntary associations."[1] During this period, peasants, workers, women, and many other groups organized in order to advocate for political influence. To some extent, these

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1   Margaretha Balle-Petersen, "Foreningstiden," *Arv og eje* (1976): 43–78.

energies "from below" were gradually channelled into the parliamentary and corporatist system that developed in Denmark from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, just as many of their demands were at least partly accommodated by the expanding welfare state.[2] Through their principled handling of political conflicts and the representation of special interests, social movements became engines for the expansion of democracy and societal change.[3] In the last 60 years, this relative political stability has been challenged by momentous changes in how people engage politically. Around 1960, the number of political party members in Denmark peaked at approximately 13 percent of the population, or close to 600,000 members;[4] today, there are only approximately 125,000 members of political parties elected to the national parliament, corresponding to just over 2 percent of the population. With obvious national variations, this pattern is recognizable across most of the Western world. Nonetheless, this sharp decline in party membership should not be taken as an expression of declining political engagement, but rather as a diversification in forms of participation in advanced democracies. Over the past 60 years, both in Denmark[5] and internationally,[6] citizens have become increasingly engaged in political activism. These trends do not necessarily reflect a decline of the established political system; rather, the expansion of political activism is indicative of a *broadening* of democratic participation. As such, it denotes an understanding of democracy that not only foregrounds constitutions, parliaments, and voting, but also the constant and active participation of the citizenry in politics.[7]

Despite a significant body of work on political activism by sociologists and political scientists, a certain deficit remains when it comes to historically grounded comparisons of how the forms and goals of political activism have changed over the last 60 years. In recent decades much has been said about the novelty of social media, net-

2   Jørn Henrik Petersen, Klaus Petersen and Niels Finn Christiansen, eds., *Dansk Velfærdshistorie* (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2010–2014).

3   Peter Gundelach, *Sociale bevægelser og samfundsændringer: Nye sociale grupperinger og deres organisationsformer ved overgangen til ændrede samfundstyper* (Aarhus: Politica, 1988), 183.

4   Lars Bille, "Den Danske Partimodels Forfald?," in *Partiernes Medlemmer, Magtudredningen*, edited by Lars Bille and Jørgen Elklit (Aarhus: Universitetsforlag, 2003), 9.

5   Gundelach, *Sociale bevægelser og samfundsændringer*; Flemming Mikkelsen, ed., *Protest og Oprør: Kollektive Aktioner i Danmark 1700–1985* (Aarhus: Modtryk, 1986); Flemming Mikkelsen, Knut Kjeldstadli and Stefan Nyzell, eds., *Popular Struggle and Democracy in Scandinavia, 1700-Present* (London: Palgrave, 2018); Henrik Kaare Nielsen, *Demokrati i Bevægelse* (Aarhus: Universitetsforlag, 1991); Søren Hein Rasmussen, *Søre Alliancer. Politiske Bevægelser i Efterkrigstidens Danmark* (Odense: Universitetsforlag, 1997).

6   Ulrich Beck, "Subpolitics," *Organization & Environment* 10, no. 1 (1997): 52–65; David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, *The Social Movement Society* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).

7   Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).

worked mobilization, leaderless structures among others. In particular, Bennett and Segerberg[8] have proposed a paradigmatic shift from "collective action" (driven mainly by formal organizations) towards what they call "connective action." Connective action, they argue, is less dependent on organizations, but mobilizes through interpersonal networks facilitated by social media and personalized action frames. With the ability of new communication technologies to connect people with speed and ease, the need for formal organization and organizational resources is no longer as prominent as in the past and is, in fact, viewed with increasing suspicion by contemporary activists. The power of new connective media is so strong that it eclipses the importance of more traditional resources such as money and organizational capacity.

Within this framework, Bennett and Segerberg point to a new theoretical direction for the modern study of political activism, initially established as a field during the 1970s and 1980s. Path-breaking studies by McCarthy and Zald, Tilly, and McAdam gave prominence to "organization" and "resources,"[9] wherein the aggregation of resources and building of efficient organizations was key to the growth, success, and survival of political activism. Activism and protest did not simply occur where grievances were strongest, but where existing resources and organizational capacity could be mobilized to give voice to those grievances. In these analyses, the main mobilizing unit was the formal, professionalized social movement organization, with a relatively clear structure and defined roles and goals. Condensing this line of thought, Edwards and McCarthy[10] point out how organizations mobilize, aggregate, and depend on at least five types of resources: one, material resources (financial and physical capital, including money, buildings, communication tools, means of transportation, office supplies); two, human resources (volunteers and access to expertise and experience); three, social-organizational resources (existing social networks like family, friends, colleagues, neighbours); four, moral resources (legitimacy and solidary/sympathetic popular support); and five, cultural resources (knowledge about different protest repertoires, cultural codes, symbols and frames; production of special literature, films, music, home pages and the like). The relationship between resources and organizations is dialectical: social movement organizations emerge where resources are conducive and facilita-

8   W. Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg, "The Logic of Connective Action: Digital Media and the Personalization of Contentious Politics," *Information, Communication & Society* 15, no. 5 (2012), 739–68.

9   John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (1977), 1212–41; Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Charles Tilly: *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1982).

10   Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 116–52.

tive, but their survival and growth strongly depend on the ability to attract and utilize new flows of resources.

Bennett and Segerberg couch their reformulation of the connective action paradigm in a broader sociological reading. The affordances of new media are amplified, as it were, by a sociological trend towards increasing individualization.[11] From a political activism perspective, the individualization thesis suggests that participation is more fluid and informal, with individuals connecting with "projects" and "campaigns" rather than formal organizations. It is the combined effect of technological change and wider transformations of political identity and participation patterns that nurtures the connective action paradigm. This is essentially a historical argument that depicts a process from one condition to a new and paradigmatically different one. While Bennett and Segerberg's analyses provide rich accounts of new protest phenomena such as Occupy Wall Street in the United States and Los Indignados in Spain, their contrasting of these mobilizations with those of the past is less clear and systematic. Without such an emphasis there is a very real risk of committing the fallacy of exaggerated newness.

Within social movement studies, this concern is not new. During the 1970s and 1980s, scholars such as Alain Touraine, Alberto Melucci and Jürgen Habermas pointed to the emergence of so-called *new* social movements, which in their view deviated from "old" social movements (most notably labour and workers' movements) in their emphasis on non-material issues such as identity, lifestyle, and values. This claim to newness was problematized in a number of works, perhaps most notably through Craig Calhoun's[12] insistence that many of the traits highlighted as "new" could in fact also be identified in the social movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Expanding Calhoun's critique to the present situation, this paper offers a historically grounded comparison of "old" and "new" activists that allows us to assess how the roles of organizing and resources have changed over the last 60 years, and in particular, how Bennett and Segerberg's notion of connective action stands up against historical evidence. It builds on a unique set of 30 in-depth interviews with activists on the left in Denmark. Our findings suggest that while there are indeed notable differences across activist generations, one must be careful not to over-interpret them.

11   Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).

12   Craig Calhoun, "'New Social Movements' of the Early Nineteenth Century,' *Social Science History* 17, no. 3 (1993): 385–427. See also: Stefan Berger, "The Internationalism of Social Movements: An Introduction," *Moving the Social* 55 (2016), 7.

Background and Motivation

The research reported in this paper is anchored in the *Protest!* project. *Protest!* is a three-year (2018–2020) funded collaboration between the Workers Museum in Copenhagen and the Department of Political Science at Aarhus University. The goal of the funding (provided by the Velux Foundation) is to stimulate a research-based exchange between the otherwise often separated knowledge domains of museums and universities. Through research, exhibition and teaching programmes, the project examines change, continuity, and variation in political activism on the political left in Denmark in the period from 1960–2020. The present paper is the first research outcome of the project, which concluded with a large-scale exhibition at the Workers Museum in 2021–2022. Parts of the interview material presented in the paper were also included in the exhibition.[13]

We understand political activism as forms of participation that uses channels and methods other than the more formal and conventional forms of political engagement, such as voting, lobbying or interest group participation. Activism is a highly varied phenomenon that ranges from low-cost and low-risk actions such as "liking" a political Facebook page, over voluntary grassroots work, happenings and demonstrations, to high-cost and high-risk actions such as blockades, vandalism and sabotage. Political activism is typically motivated by an analysis that the established political system, or even the democratic form of government, is unwilling or unable to address the most pressing political and social issues.[14] The interviewees of this project are highly diverse in terms of motivations, ideologies and methods, but all share the notion that established political elites and institutions are insufficient to foster necessary social, cultural and political change.

The project focuses on political activism on the left. We have a broad conception of this category, but generally understand left-wing political activists as individuals who possess one or more of the following traits: advocate a high degree of economic redistribution in society; have a predominantly positive attitude towards immigration and the multicultural community; advocate for environmental protection, peace and demilitarization; and believe in rehabilitation rather than punishment in law enforcement.[15] This choice of focus was partly motivated by the great dynamism and variation in the forms of political activism on the left and by the fact that, historically speaking,

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13   The second output is Jesper Jørgensen, "Solidaritet med andre 'andre'. Livshistoriske veje ind i politisk aktivisme på den danske venstrefløj, 1960–1990," *temp* 12, no. 23 (2021): 128–148.

14   Lasse Lindekilde and Thomas Olesen, *Politisk Protest, aktivisme og sociale bevægelser* (Copenhagen: Hans Reitzel Forlag, 2015).

15   Ole Borre, "Old and New Politics in Denmark," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 18, no. 3 (1995): 187–205.

political activism as a form of political engagement has been favoured primarily by the left. It also reflects that the Workers Museum, where the project is anchored, has the history of the socialist labour movement as its purview.

Method and Material

The empirical material consists of 30 interviews in total. Fifteen of these were conducted with activists who were active during the period from the 1960s to the 1990s. The remaining 15 interviews were conducted with activists who are currently engaged in a variety of activities on the political left. This unique combination of historical and contemporary interview material puts us in a position to address the questions about newness and continuity that we raised in the introduction.

The historical part of the analysis focuses on activists from the anti-Vietnam War movement and the anti-apartheid movement as well as from the environmental movement. The Vietnam movement is generally perceived as the key movement that formed the "new left" in opposition to the "old left" and its more traditional forms of democratic participation through political parties and trade unions. The anti-apartheid movement is interesting in this context because it extends from the early 1960s to the end of the Cold War. It is also a perspective case because it is comparable to the Vietnam movement on several parameters, although, in a Danish context, it has hitherto only been dealt with indirectly through the histories of other actors and not as a primary object of historical research.

Both movements encompassed several different kinds of actors and considerable internal political variation. They were characterized by being Danish versions of international protest movements, and by succeeding in getting the "single case" on the political agenda and ultimately seeing it taken on by the established political system, in this case social democratic governments. Along the way, both movements experimented with new frames, media usage and modes of action that successfully mobilized people and attracted public attention, just as parts of them evolved in a radical direction which included use of political violence. Finally, the activities of both movements left traces in the form of archives and journals in the Workers Museum's archive and library collections, e.g. from the anti-imperialistic and anti-racist organization Demos, which have not previously been available for research.

The environmental movement was included in the study from both a historical and a present perspective. Whereas during the Cold War it was the peace and solidarity movements that attracted many young people, climate activism is perhaps the most popular scene for today's young activists. This is reflected in the fact that in the contemporary sample, five of the interviewees are related to the climate and environmental movements. For the historic sample we included activists from NOAH (Friends of

the Earth Denmark) and *Organisationen til Oplysning om Atomkraft* (the Organization for Information on Nuclear Power, OOA).

Apart from climate and environmental activists, the contemporary sample has considerable variation, with interviewees engaged in issues such as solidarity, social justice, feminism, LGBT rights, immigration, unionism, and welfare. The sample does pretend to be representative of the very diverse contemporary activism landscape in Denmark. Because a major ambition of the paper to assess the scope and utility of the connective action paradigm, we opted to achieve a relatively high degree of diversity in terms of activist methods and issues. This allows us to consider whether potential patterns in organization and resources are not simply patterns among certain types of activists and activist methods and ideologies. Appendices 1 and 2 present an overview of the historical and contemporary samples, respectively.

The interviews were conducted from a semi-structured interview guide, which allowed the flexibility to capture more comprehensive remembrances, while at the same time ensuring a strong theoretical foundation.[16] The interview guide's questions were divided into a number of sections: the activists' personal motivations and histories; the working practices of their organizations; their conceptions of democracy and potential for change; their view on legitimate and illegitimate action forms; the resources they consider important; their communication strategies; and their conceptions of success and impact. These themes reflect the three main pillars of social movement theory: resources and organization; political opportunities; and framing.[17] Given our emphasis on resources and organization in this paper, we primarily report on interviewees' reflections on these issues—both as informants to their own personal motives, beliefs and attitudes, but also as informed representatives of a relevant protest organization.[18] While we accept that interview data on political opportunities and framing would also be fruitful in an examination of differences and similarities in activism across time, our ambition to assess the theoretical and analytical precision of the connective action paradigm dictates a focus on the issues that speak most directly to this framework, i.e. resources and organization. Emphasis was placed on conducting interviews in settings that were familiar to the activists. In the contemporary sample we strove to conduct interviews in the activist's milieu, i.e. at places where they organize their activism. All interviewees were asked whether they would allow their interviews to be used in the Workers Museum exhibition (see above) and to be available in the museum's archives. All except one agreed. Interviews lasted between one and two hours. The interview material was subsequently transcribed.

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16   Steinar Kvale and Svend Brinkmann, *Interview: Introduktion til et håndværk* (Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels Forlag, 2009).

17   Lindekilde and Olesen, *Politisk Protest*.

18   Donatella della Porta, "In-Depth Interviews," in *Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research*, edited by Donatella della Porta (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 228–9.

Activist Organization and Resources
from the 1960s to the 1980s

The logic of collective action corresponds well with the stories told by the "historical" activists. In general, they were concerned about the history of *their* organizations and what these organizations did or did not do; how *they* were different from members of other organizations and why; how they sometimes made organizational changes to reach their political goals. Notably, the interviewees very easily forgot their own "I" in their narratives and told instead about the *collective* actions and their often resource-intensive efforts to mobilize.

Organization

De Danske Vietnamkomiteer (the Danish Vietnam Committees, DDV) is regarded as one of the most significant representatives of the protest activity in the Danish Vietnam movement. The Danish historian Søren Hein Rasmussen has emphasized that it was DDV that "created the dynamic of the movement; first of all, it was from here that the spectacular activities were carried out which, for better or worse, put the Vietnamese movement in the public spotlight."[19] In number, the organized members of DDV were no more than a few hundred, yet they managed to gather thousands of participants for demonstrations.

Organizationally, DDV is an exemplary case of an organization that was dynamic and constantly evolving. As the name indicates, DDV was originally a coalition of Vietnam committees. The first committees emerged in 1966 as primarily local committees in Copenhagen. Historian Karen Steller Bjerregaard has assumed that the committees were formed "from below" and that, unlike the party organizations, the committees created new local spaces for "practical solidarity work" and "activation," often from private homes.[20] The first assumption is debatable, and an opposite explanation has also been given; namely, that the Vietnamese committees were the result of a top-down decision from the Communist Party of Denmark (DKP) and rooted in the international rivalry between the Soviet Union and China.[21]

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19   Rasmussen, *Søre Alliancer*, 61.
20   Karen Steller Bjerregaard, ""Et Undertrykt Folk Har Altid Ret": Solidaritet med den 3. Verden i 1960'ernes og 1970'ernes Danmark" (PhD Thesis, Roskilde University, 2010), 314.
21   Chris Holmsted Larsen, *Tiden Arbejder for Os: DKP og Vietnamkrigen 1963–1973* (Copenhagen: Multivers 2007), 90–1.

Troels Toftkær, who was also a founding member of *Militærnægterforeningen* (the Conscientious Objector Association) and a member of *Socialistisk Folkeparti* (the Socialist People's Party, SF, established by an ousted DKP chairman in 1959), recalls the formation of the Vanløse Vietnam Committee with slightly mixed feelings, because on the one hand it consisted of a varied group of socialists, communists and pacifist social liberals, but on the other hand, it didn't felt like a "real" grassroots initiative that had spontaneously grown up from below: "afterwards, of course, I've been thinking about […] I thought of that at the time, too; somebody is pulling the strings, right? It's no coincidence that these people come and go, and they fit the roles they do. And there was clearly a communist network that was activated in this situation. And they stood up faithfully every time. And because they had that network and they had that way of approaching things, they came to play a much bigger role than the SFs, for example, because they didn't just come when you were playing the trumpet." Toftkær, however, confirms that the meetings in the first years took place in private homes, partly at his home, and partly at a high-ranking communist's home.[22]

Another activist who was also involved in the early Vietnam movement in another part of the city was communist party member Tove Jensen. She and her husband formed the Amager Vietnam Committee. She acknowledges that: "in this activism, the political parties thus […] the communist party, play a role, they would like the committees to grow at a certain time." Concerning the first few years, she says that the couple's apartment was the committee's domicile, and that they were eight to ten core activists and fifty to sixty sympathizers. There were many communists, but also SFs and a few social democrats, both young people and old veterans from the World War II resistance movement. The activists were members of the committee but did not pay membership fees.[23]

In 1967, seven Copenhagen local committees merged into the Greater Copenhagen Vietnam Committees, and in 1968 they joined forces with other committees from other parts of the country on an anti-imperialist basis and formed DDV. The gathering manifested at the same time as a split of the Vietnam movement into a moderate and a radical wing. In DDV, there was subsequently a rapid movement towards a more centrally controlled organization. According to the November 1970 statutes, the organization now called itself a cadre organization and introduced a membership fee. The leadership's motivation for these changes was to prevent the organization from being "a playground for periodically active individualists." DDV thereby formally gained some common features with a communist party based on the Marxist-Le-

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22   Interview with Troels Toftkær, 4 June 2019.
23   Interview with Tove Jensen, 23 April 2019.

ninist principle of democratic centralism.[24] In reality the organization was racked by factional battles.[25]

At the other end of the organizational spectrum were organizations such as *De Studerendes Vietnam Aktion* (the Students' Vietnam Action, DSVA), which cooperated with DDV. DSVA released a series of informative booklets about the war and had its heyday in May 1970 following the shooting of four students at Kent State University in Ohio, when it initiated a demonstration with approximately 10,000 participants who marched from the University of Copenhagen to the US embassy.[26]

Morten Thing, co-founder of DSVA, remembers the organization as very loosely organized: "The Students' Vietnam Action was something we had copied from the US, where the idea was to hold a demonstration once a month, and then the demonstrations should spread and grow larger. In English they called them Moratorium, that is, they had given the state a moratorium and eventually we would suffocate them in these giant demonstrations, but that did not happen […] but it led to the creation of a group at the university which very much resembled the groups [committees] in the Vietnam movement, but there was not really any leadership. There was a group of activists and several of them I lived in commune with, in the commune Bellevue, and that was like the people who met up, they did what needed to be done, and they decided what it was going to be like." To be an activist outside of an organization did not seem to be an alternative. Activism was something you practiced together with other people in an organization. Over time, your organization may have changed in a direction you did not like, and you opted out, or the organization vanished because people were more attracted to other causes handled by other organizations.

A cause that had originally been overshadowed by the Vietnam War in the latter half of the 1960s was the fight against the apartheid regime in South Africa. Yet after the Soweto uprising in 1976, the campaign gained momentum and in 1978 *Landskomiteen Sydafrika-Aktion* (the National Committee South Africa Action, LSA) was founded. Here, however, according to one of our interviewees, Morten Nielsen, the organizational form ended up inhibiting the cause. In 1985 he was as a Communist Youth member instrumental in establishing *Sydafrikakomiteen i København* (the South Africa Committee of Copenhagen, SAKK), which for the next four to five years, as a local branch of LSA, organized a large number of high-profile activities that put the fight against the apartheid system on the media agenda and made it a popular cause.

24   "Organisatorisk grundlag for DDV" (November 1970) and "Koordinerings-udvalgets beretning til landsmødet d. 3–4/4–71," Box 4–5, Demos' archive, Workers Museum & Labour Movement's Library and Archive (ABA).

25   Johs. Nordentoft and Søren Hein Rasmussen: *Kampagnen mod Atomvåben og Vietnambevægelsen 1960–1972* (Odense: Universitetsforlag, 1991), 138.

26   Ibid.: 108, 111–2.

But in the years up to 1985, according to Morten Nielsen, LSA did not manage to mobilize the activist youth: "So my quick analysis on that was that the South African Action Committee was a dead herring […] they had very little drive. There was a board that exercised its power through board meetings, not through activities outside […] One [reason] was that young people in the '80s had changed radically compared to the young people they [the board] knew, who were more faithful to authorities."

Morten Nielsen also recounts how two-thirds of the participants in the founding meeting of SAKK were young people, and he emphasizes the fact that they immediately changed the articles of association so that the executive committee "did not have decisive power over the organization. It had a weekly Thursday meeting. So, we simply changed the structure on the spot, to have an executive committee that was responsible for the finances, but not responsible for the execution of the activities. It was the people who showed up who were responsible for the action."[27] Whether the youth of the 1980s was radically less faithful to the authorities than for instance the young Vietnam activists of the late 1960s is debatable. What is perhaps more notable are the striking similarities in the stories of Morten Thing and Morten Nielsen about how well activism thrived in their flat organizations, where the activists made things happen because they desired to, and not because it was a decision of the organization's leadership.

Resources

But desire (and organization) do not do the whole of the work. Political activism on the left has historically been funded from many kinds of sources. Apart from foreign state contributions to some of the organizations during the Cold War,[28] Søren Hein Rasmussen estimates that the financial support for the protest movements in the 1970–80s was distributed as follows: 30 percent from the trade union movement, 30 percent from individual contributions, 20 percent from public institutions, 10 percent from private foundations and 10 percent from sale of propaganda materials.[29] The resources of the trade unions were not evenly distributed among the various political activist groups. The revolutionary left was clearly disadvantaged in this regard, but they found other ways to finance their activities.

27   Interview with Morten Nielsen, 1 August 2019.
28   Søren Hein Rasmussen, *Danmark under den Kolde Krig: Den Sikkerhedspolitiske Situation 1945–1991, vol. 2: 1963–1978* (Copenhagen: Omslag, 2005), 344–52. See also: Rasmus Mariager and Regin Schmidt, *PET's Overvågning af Protestbevægelser 1945–1989, PET-kommissionens Beretning*, vol. 10 (Copenhagen: Rasmus Mariager, 2009), 129.
29   Rasmussen, *Søre Alliancer*, 277–8.

An interesting case is the private Lise and Niels Munk Plum Foundation. The assets of the foundation were based on Lise Munk Plum's inheritance from her father's companies in the stone wool and gas concrete industry. The foundation was established in 1967 and has supported a myriad of "extra-parliamentary" initiatives on the Danish left through to the present day. Several of our interviewees support the assessment that the Plum Foundation played a significant role. Litten Hansen, who was secretary of the foundation from its first years until 1971, states: "The Plum Foundation played a huge role. I don't remember how many millions have gone through the Plum Foundation. It was a lot […] That was all that was going on in this country [on the new left] We did not support political parties, we never did. It was movements."[30] Ingrid Hind, who succeeded Litten Hansen as secretary, has the same perception: "applications for funding came in from all sorts of groups, activist groups. So there I really got the sense of everything that existed for people who wanted to make society better […] I really think that it meant a lot, like, to many."[31]

The accounts of the foundation show that during its first decade it distributed over one million Danish kroner. It provided steady support to the Vietnam movement and many other smaller anti-imperialist projects. Each of the grants was in general minor (between one and ten thousand kroner),[32] but for smaller activist initiatives that could make a significant difference. The main activity of the foundation during the 1960–70s was financing the three-story building 14 Dronningensgade in Copenhagen, which hosted the political journal *Politisk Revy*, *Det venstreorienterede Tidsskriftscenter* (The Left-Wing Journal Centre), and campaign organizations: *Kampagnen mod Atomkraft* (The Campaign against Nuclear Power), The Danish Bertrand Russell Council, The Black Panther Solidarity Committee and *Rødstrømperne* (the Redstockings), just to name a few.

Politisk Revy in the 1960–70s was the main new left journal. It was independent of any specific political group or party, but like its financiers the editorial group shared political agendas with SF and from 1968 the splinter group *Venstresocialisterne* (the Left Socialists, VS) and the radical part of the Vietnam movement. Unlike most other left-wing journals, its funding (and larger sales) made it possible to hire professional technicians and editors and pay journalists and photographers. And as Morten Thing, coeditor from 1969, reminds us, printed media was the only accessible mass media for protesters. It was a traditional and expensive but still potent tool to challenge the rules and norms of society and to create an alternative public.[33]

30   Interview with Litten Hansen, 28 May 2019.
31   Interview with Ingrid Hind, 15 August 2019.
32   Lise og Niels Munk Plums Fond's archive, Rigsarkivet, Box 6.
33   Interview with Morten Thing, 9 April 2019; Steen Bille Larsen, *I Venstrefløjens Øje: Mit Liv som Fuldtidsaktivist i 60'erne* (Copenhagen: Politisk Revy, 2018), 147, 238.

In general, however, most activists remember insufficient funds. Even in cases where it was possible for substantial revenues from book and record sales, organizations usually ended up with deficits. The publishing and record company of the DDV, Demos, managed to deliver music to the Danish youth rebellion with several popular record releases by well-known Danish artists. A leading member of Demos, the aforementioned Tove Jensen, recalls: "There are a number of artists who are inspired to express themselves, either in song or music or in words and theatre, which in itself is one of the very large resources that Demos then—but also in the Vietnam movement […] rested on. So, we have an alternative publishing business […] no profits are ever earned. On the contrary, we ended up with a big deficit in '79."[34] Actually, Demos' revenue from the sale of records, books, posters etc. exceeded the support of the Plum Foundation by far. In 1975 the company had a turnover of three million kroner (of which one million was from record sales), but notably only a total surplus of 12,000 kroner.[35]

One of the few organizations that managed to sustain itself well from its own revenue was OOA. Its financial backing did not come from the unions because both the social democrats and the communists were sceptical of the anti-nuclear power cause.[36] Instead great parts of its income came from the sale of the world-renowned badge "Nuclear Power? No thanks!" with its smiling sun logo. The organization successfully set up its own guarantee fund, to which about 10,000 people paid continuous deposits.[37] The woman behind the badge, Anne Lund, an economist, recalls that they earned so much from the solar badge that, through the World Information Service on Energy in Amsterdam, they were able to support the anti-nuclear power movement in other West European countries: "Yes, we did. Lots. There was a lot of money, and the movement made a lot of money on the solar badge sales, and it also helped boost more sales, because people knew the money they paid went to the movements."[38] The local branch of the OOA in Aarhus also made money from a yearly music festival. Jesper Carlsen, musician and employed organizational secretary in the early 1980s, recalls: "we did a rock festival in Aarhus, and it was simply, it was really something that turned [the tide]. We became very good at it. I think there were three or four of them where we made so much money, and that was great; it was something that gave attention, but it was there we made the money to make a countrywide, household-distributed campaign newspaper where we really could get to grips with the viewpoints."[39] In his own words, Jesper Carlsen hereby articulates the logic of collective action that

34   Interview with Tove Jensen, 23 April 2019.
35   "Regnskab 1975," Demos' archive, ABA, Box 48.
36   Rasmussen, *Sære Alliancer*, 137, 142.
37   Interview with Jesper Carlsen, 22 October 2019.
38   Interview with Anne Lund, 22 October 2019.
39   Interview with Jesper Carlsen, 22 October 2019.

organization and resources were essential elements in successful protest activities. No one put on a rock festival by themselves, and nobody distributed a free newspaper nationwide without substantial financial backing—at least not before the Internet became the new mass media platform.

Organization and Resources in Contemporary Activism

There are obviously many relevant ways to identify key themes in the organization and resources of contemporary activism. The main selection criterion here is a focus on themes that allow us to assess the scope and limitations of the "connective action" thesis set out in the paper's introduction. The following three themes attempt to facilitate such a discussion: (a) individual activism; (b) the organizing capacity of new media; and (c) the continued importance of physical meetings.

Individual Activism

Several of the interviewees may be described as individual activists, either in the sense that they do not formally belong to established organizations or display only fleeting and ad hoc associations with existing organizations. Emma Holten, a feminist activist motivated by personal experiences with revenge porn, primarily uses talks and lectures, especially for younger audiences, as her activist tool. Since her focus is on changing norms of sexism in society and empowering young women, she sees an important activist role in facilitating debate and self-reflection. What makes this strategy activist, in her view, is that she sees her interventions as not simply informational, but as a means to "make people change their minds."[40] Miss Privileze also works in the area of gender roles, but from an LGBT, queer and drag perspective. Through performances and talks, she tries to move existing norms towards a broader acceptance of diversity in sexual and gender roles. Reflecting their individual forms of activism, both Holten and Miss Privileze have professional websites or Facebook pages that advertise their goals through a clearly activist vocabulary.

While these are examples of individual and independent activism, the interviews also demonstrate how this individualism is organizationally embedded in various ways. Holten, for example, describes how her way into activism took place through the magazine *Friktion*, which she helped set up and is still involved in. *Friktion* focuses on feminist and queer issues from a clearly activist and critical perspective. Miss Privileze works part-time for the NGO *Sex & Samfund* (Sex & Society). While not fi-

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40   Interview with Emma Holten, 21 August 2019.

nancially dependent on these organizational settings, they nonetheless provide various forms of support, such as material resources (e. g. facilities and rooms provided by *Sex & Samfund*, which is a staffed, professional NGO) and cultural and social resources (personal networks and knowledge produced in the context of *Friktion*).

The potential to work as an individual activist is facilitated by new media in several ways. Websites and presence on social media and blogs generate a high degree of visibility that makes it relatively easier to conduct activism without the backing of an organization. This is so because visibility can be converted into different types of resources. In the cases of Holten and Miss Privileze, they offer talks and performances for a fee. This access to material resources decreases the need to tap into the resources of an organization. This logic, although in a very different way, is also prominent in the interview with Aymeric Daval-Rasmussen, an activist in the Aarhus branch of Extinction Rebellion. Daval-Rasmussen has temporarily abandoned a promising academic career to focus full-time on climate activism. While he is a member of Extinction Rebellion, this organization has limited resources. In order to be able to pay for basic expenses, Daval-Rasmussen started a blog with the telling title *Akademisk selvmord* (Academic suicide), from where he crowdfunds. On the blog, he recounts how he now lives "without a safety net, because I think it is the right thing to do. My goal is to collect a modest amount of money […] so that I can spend all my time on the rebellion in the coming months […] if you can spare a fiver or a tenner […] you are welcome to click the 'donate' button."[41]

The ability to acquire visibility through the multiple channels of the contemporary public sphere enables a new range of activist identities and roles compared to what was possible in the pre-social media era. Networked visibility can also be used to attract human resources. Miss Privileze, for example, recounts how she draws on Instagram friends to set up happenings and acquire know-how about media communication: "Sometimes I send them an idea about how I want to do an interview or a happening. They are helping me set up a media stunt this Wednesday at a home for the retired where we want to do drag and talk about gender, then and now."[42]

These collaborations are clearly of an ad hoc nature, emerging and dissolving around specific events. It is interesting to note, however, that the social media visibility of Holten and Miss Privileze is shaped in interaction with old media. Holten has become a prominent activist voice in feminism through a string of appearances on talk shows and news broadcasts in traditional media. Miss Privileze took part in the Denmark's Got Talent television show with a highly activist performance that provided her with new degrees of visibility that are likely to amplify the flow of resources into her activism in the coming years. Since independent activism without

41   http://www.akademisk-selvmord.dk, viewed 26 March 2020.
42   Interview with Miss Privileze, 2 October 2019.

strong organizational backing requires some level of resources to persist, these activist forms, as exemplified by both Holten and Miss Privileze, often seem to tap into the entertainment and experience economies of contemporary societies. We speculate that such individual-based, performative activism will become increasingly prevalent in the coming years, perhaps creating more fluid boundaries between political activism and other social, cultural, and political roles.

The Organizing Capacity of New Media

In 2018 and 2019, a heated debate raged in Denmark about limited time and resources in kindergartens and day care institutions. Following documentaries on Danish television that uncovered serious problems in the day care system, the left-wing party SF proposed new legislation to address the problems. When the proposal met resistance from both liberal parties as well as from social democrats, it caused widespread indignation and criticism from citizens and, in particular, parents. These debates unfolded primarily on the Facebook page of Jacob Mark, a prominent SF politician. According to interviewee Marie Blønd, the indignation led to several calls for protest. Blønd recounts how she responded to one of these calls, writing: "'I have a month and a half left of my maternity leave. Let's do it!' And then it exploded. The group was set up on 12 March [2019] and twenty-five days later 31,000 had joined."[43] The Facebook mobilization was very quickly converted into major physical mobilizations: "And there we were, behind Christiansborg [the Danish parliament], but also in fifty-five cities all over Denmark. So, it became a historic demonstration."[44] An estimated 50,000 people participated in the protests all over the country, which is an unusually high number of protesters in a Danish context.

Blønd's account is a powerful testament to the ability of social media to connect individual grievances and generate mobilizing potential within a very short span of time and largely without organizational backing. It is telling that Blønd portrays herself as a more or less accidental activist. Her move from being a concerned parent to becoming a key organizer of the initiative #*Hvor er der en voksen*? (#*Where is there an adult?*) not only happened abruptly but also without prior experience in activist work. The path from concerned individual to engaged activist is potentially very short, not least thanks to the way new media enable the connection with other aggrieved individuals outside an organizational context.

Despite the clearly social media-driven character of the protests, the network of concerned parents quickly started to interact with established organizations in the

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43   Interview with Marie Blønd and Karen Lumholt, 2 October 2019.
44   Ibid.

field of family politics, most notably *Familiepolitisk Netværk* (Family Political Network). The interview with Blønd was conducted together with Karen Lumholt from *Familiepolitisk Netværk* in order to assess these connections. According to Blønd, the group of concerned parents quickly realized that this organization was an important "resource […] because there was an upcoming parliamentary election [in June 2019] and we simply did not have the resources to know the position of all the political parties […] and this was also why we said to Karen, the second time we demonstrated […] 'Should we not add your logo to ours?'"[45] While the group of concerned and demonstrating parents retained their independence, they thus actively tapped into resources and know-how embedded in existing organizations in Danish civil society. Interestingly, what started out as a loosely connected group with the sole intention of mobilizing a demonstration has now itself crystallized into an organizational platform, *#Hvor er der en voksen?* The platform has a professional website that provides various knowledge and practical resources for citizens who want to become active in the area of family politics and, in particular, conditions in the Danish day care system.

New media do not only help organize large-scale protests around highly salient political issues such as the ones discussed above. Annbritt Jørgensen describes herself as an "everyday activist." Jørgensen is a co-founder of *Skraldecafeen* (the Dumpster Diving Café), which focuses on food waste and actively engages in dumpster diving (collecting thrown-out food from supermarkets) in order to make it accessible to people in need and with limited resources. The initiative grew out of a few individuals who wanted to connect dumpster divers and people in need of food: "There are lots of help groups on Facebook, and when we saw a request for help in one of these groups, we posted it in our own coordination group, tagging the dumpster diver that was closest by, thus creating a connection between the dumpster diver and the needy person."[46] Since it is associated with considerable stigma to both collect and receive thrown-out food and because individuals engaged in such activities are limited in number and often geographically scattered, Facebook provides a connection tool that is able to turn the otherwise individual nature of dumpster diving into a collective, grassroots-driven effort. For Annbritt Jørgensen, this work has a decidedly political character as it addresses food waste and overconsumption, as well as issues of social inequality.

In the cases of *Skraldecafeen* and *#Hvor er der en voksen?* social media, and most notably Facebook, were used as mobilization tools. Social media, however, also serves to organize much of the internal decision-making efforts in the newer, youth-driven movements. Describing how organization in Fridays for Future Copenhagen takes place, 14-year-old activist Selma de Montgomery Nørgaard demonstrates how she and her fellow activists use the application Discord. Discord was originally developed

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45   Ibid.
46   Interview with Annbritt Jørgensen, 27 November 2019.

for the gaming community but is now widely used by young activists as a platform for internal debates and organization among activists.[47] Discord enables conversation and text and image sharing without a hierarchic structure. Its affordances in this way correspond well with the general suspicion of centralized and hierarchic organization that characterizes the new youth-driven climate movements. Selma de Montgomery Nørgaard thus declares that the way she and other activists organize internally is not only a practical choice, but one that is value-driven and intended to practice the kind of inclusive decision-making they would like to see in society and politics in general (in the social movements literature this philosophy is typically termed "prefigurative politics" or "free spaces").[48]

The Continued Importance of the Physical Meeting

Diving more deeply into the interview with Selma de Montgomery Nørgaard, it quickly becomes evident that the prominence of social media in the process of internal organization is not a substitute for the physical meeting. To the contrary, she repeatedly emphasizes how a core goal of the Fridays for Future activists is the creation of an activist "community" and that such a community can only be established through physical meetings. Sarah Hellebek from *Den Grønne Studenterbevægelse* (The Green Students Movement) similarly underlines the need for physical meetings to connect and shape all the activities that take place in online forums. Physically meeting requires material resources in the form of spaces. Fridays for Future make use of spaces provided by the Geological Museum in Copenhagen and *Den Grønne Studenterbevægelse* have access to meeting facilities in The Students' House in Copenhagen (this space was also used by Harald Brønd and his fellow activists in the organization of the People's Climate Marches in Copenhagen in 2018 and 2019).

While a significant part of the organizing in many of the new activist efforts around climate happens online, it thus also draws strongly on an existing network of activist or activist-friendly physical spaces scattered around the Copenhagen area. This activist infrastructure also consists of various educational facilities. Both Sarah Hellebek and Nanna Clifforth (see below) are or have been involved in a course called *Verden brænder* (The World is Burning) offered at the Danish folk high school Krogerup. The course has a clearly activist dimension and focuses on contemporary political issues. Having existed for several years, it has been a starting point for many Danish activists

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47   See also: Interview with Sarah Hellebek, 30 April 2019.

48   Francesca Polletta, "'Free Spaces' in Collective Action," *Theory and Society* 28, no. 1 (1999), 1–38. See also the interview with Daval-Rasmussen from Extinction Rebellion above for an account of a more or less complete lifestyle transformation in order to live out one's values in practice.

on the left. In Copenhagen, *Det frie gymnasim* (The Free High School) is known for its politicized educational environment. In recent years, the issue of climate has been addressed through several student strikes and in a collective decision to ban air travel as part of school activities.

The importance of the physical meeting is not only prominent in relation to internal decision-making processes, but also in the interaction with potential supporters and constituencies. Nanna Clifforth from the Danish environmental organization NOAH describes how she and her organization devote significant time and energy to building relationships with local citizens engaged in environmentally related protests and organizing: "To me, it is much more important to organize ten people than to mobilize a thousand, because in the long run that changes a lot more."[49] Clifforth is involved in local protests against shale gas and large-scale industrial pig farms, trying to organize locals with little protest experience: "and then I spend a year and a half meeting with them on a continuous basis, three hours at a time […] so that you can build trust, and then suddenly after a year they say 'I think this is political,' and then you go 'Yes,' but it takes maybe a year to get there."[50]

In general, Clifforth advocates a return to the local organizing and basis groups that characterized earlier environmental movements in the 1970s and 1980s. The emphasis on the physical meeting is also strongly reflected in the way the environmental and climate movement organizes today. The most notable example is probably the so-called Klima Camp in Rheinland, which has been held every year since 2010 in one of the world's largest coal mining areas. While the camps have been the basis of a number of significant protests, Clifforth emphasizes the importance of the camp itself: "there is often a lot of focus on actions, but to have a climate camp leading up to that where there are workshops, where you cook together, where you can return to, that is very educational." The philosophy behind the camp reflects the notion of prefigurative politics mentioned above. The Klima Camp website thus explains how the camp is a place to "live alternatives together: anti-authoritarian self-organization, our own energy supply, compost toilets, music and much more!"[51]

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49   Interview with Nanna Clifforth, 30 April 2019.
50   Ibid.
51   https://www.klimacamp-im-rheinland.de/en/about, viewed 26 March 2020.

Discussion

The following discussion is organized around four themes that allow us to analytically interpret the interviews reported above and assess the newness claims of Bennett and Segerberg's theory of connective action: (1) flat organizational structures; (2) the importance of (new) media; (3) individual vs. collective activism; and (4) the power of physical spaces.

Flat organizational structures

Bennet and Segerberg's claim that the new digital media and the personalization of contentious politics is altering protest organization from a formal and centralized form to more flat and leaderless structures seems to neglect the continuity of ideals regarding flat structures that we have observed. When the young activist Selma de Montgomery Nørgaard highlights the flat and inclusive organization of Fridays for Future Copenhagen, where centralized and hierarchic organization principles are considered to be a main problem of society and politics in general, she echoes the past. These exact ideals of participatory or grassroots democracy where freedom, equality and fraternity could flourish in a non-hierarchical forum were important characteristics of the new left protest movements of the 1960s.[52]

In our historical cases we have seen a wide spectrum of practiced "flatness," from an organization like DSVA with no formal organizational structures to a dynamic example like DDV that transformed itself from a cluster of communist party-dominated local Vietnam committees to an anti-imperialistic cadre organization with a collective leadership dominated by a handful of ex-DKPs. Another example was OOA, which explicitly defined itself as a "flat" organization. In an OOA 10th anniversary publication it says: "In OOA, leadership is not elected at all—it's the people who show up, the activists, who make the decisions."[53] But above the basic activist layer there was *Ledelsessekretariatet* (the Leadership Secretariat) in Copenhagen and later also a regional secretariat in Aarhus where important decisions of the non-membership organization were made. Historically the "flatness" of left-wing activist organizations has been blurred and some significant organizations have had similarities to traditional, hierarchically constructed political organizations such as parties and unions. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that even though non-hierarchical forms of organiza-

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52   Gerd-Rainer Horn, *The Spirit of '68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956–1976* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 195.

53   OOA – Ti År i Bevægelse, Copenhagen 1984, 60.

tion may be characteristic of today's new technology-driven connective action, we see this tendency from the 1960s onwards.

The Importance of (New) Media

There is little doubt that new media have significantly transformed the way activists organize. In the contemporary sample, several respondents point out how new media make communication and mobilization faster, easier and cheaper. In the interview with Marie Blønd, for example, it was evident that the very fast and powerful mobilizations around children and day care were made possible through Twitter and Facebook. Other respondents pointed out how new media are not simply efficient mobilization tools, but that they also shape internal organizational structures and decision-making processes. This was perhaps most notable in the interviews with contemporary climate activists such as Sarah Hellebek and Selma de Montgomery, who use the application Discord to organize and communicate internally among activists. These observations in many ways seem to confirm Bennet and Segerberg's observations about a historical move from collective to connective action.

As discussed in the historical section, communication and mobilization on the left during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s centred on printed publications. This entailed various limitations: first, printed media were naturally subject to a certain publication cycle for physical editions that appeared with varying frequency; second, they required a significant amount of resources to be run and maintained. The first limitation made them less efficient as mobilization tools, at least in relation to more spontaneous mobilization forms. Under such conditions, established organizations naturally become prime mobilizers because they possessed the most direct relationship with activists. As recounted by Marie Blønd, new media made it possible for their initiative to mobilize tens of thousands of activists in a very short time and largely without organizational intermediaries. The second limitation meant that communication and publication required some backing from organizations with resources. *Politisk Revy,* for example, received its resources from the Plum Foundation, which in turn tied it ideologically to the foundation and the parties associated with the foundation, SF and VS. Today's new media and communication platforms, in contrast, can be used at no or very little cost and, as a result, without needing to tap into the resource pools commanded by established organizations.

Collective vs. Individual Activism

The importance of individual activism in the contemporary sample also seems to denote a real and significant historical difference. There are two aspects of individualism worth noting: first, an increasing number of contemporary activists seem to work individually or with only loose organizational affiliations (such as Emma Holten and Miss Privileze), and, second, those who are part of organizations appear to often have rather flexible and shifting affiliations. The latter observation also points to the fact that today's organizational structures are sometimes of an ad hoc character and emerge in response to concrete initiatives and crises: the rapidly mobilized network of dissatisfied parents, *#Hvor er der en voksen*? (#Where is there an adult?), is a case in point here.

In the historical sample there are suggestions that individual activism was not really considered a legitimate option. The focus on strong cadre-like organizations, which partly reflected the central role of communism on the Danish left during the 1960s and 1970s, clearly prioritized the collective over the individual. This probably started changing in the 1980s with the waning of communism and the emergence of a new generation that, as Morten Nielsen noted in the analysis, was perhaps less faithful to authority.

The new place for individual activism today reflects a wider sociological drive towards individualization, but also, as we discussed in the analysis, the opportunities offered by new media with regard to both financing and communicating individual activism. Financial and resource dependence on organizations has decreased, while at the same time contemporary activist identities are less tied up with organizational affiliation and loyalty. The point we want to make is obviously not that activists today are *predominantly* individual: in fact, as the contemporary sample demonstrates, the majority of the interviewees still locate their activism within organizational contexts, and even the ones who do not are not entirely free-standing actors. These qualifications notwithstanding, there is little doubt that the relationship between the individual activist and organizations has fundamentally changed over the last four decades.

The Power of Physical Spaces

Ever since the rise of the socialist labour movement, the left has been fighting for dominance over physical spaces in society, especially in the big cities. The premises of the Workers Museum in Copenhagen were originally built by the labour movement in 1879 in order to have a place of its own. The New Left continued and further developed these traditions of conquering space, and the latest hallmark of political activism has been the occupations of public squares and streets. For our historical activists it was essential to have spaces for organizing collective action. As mentioned, 14 Dron-

ningensgade in Copenhagen, owned by the Plum Foundation, was one such place. Another was 37 Grønnegade, where DDV and their publishing and record company Demos was housed. These gathering places were epicentres of left-wing activism. Tove Jensen remembers: "We were a centre for many different [groups], and I think the experiences from the Vietnam movement concerning being active on many fronts and using many different means [of action] became a knowledge that trickled into many other groups."[54] Likewise, we have seen that physical meeting places like museums, student houses, folk high schools and camps are important for today's activists. Ultimately, it seems that the rise of social media and the continuation of physical space as a central element of political activism highlight the complexity of the connective turn in protest movements. It even seems reasonable to argue, as does social scientist Alice Mattoni, that new technology has made protest space a hybrid of both a physical and a virtual world—forging new organizational challenges to be studied.[55]

Conclusion

We began with the ambition to discuss the connective paradigm proposed by Bennett and Segerberg. We have done so by comparing insights from two sets of interviews (30 in total) with Danish activists: the first of these were conducted with those who had been active mainly before the 1990s, and the other with contemporary activists. Our comparison focused on the role of resources and organization across these periods. In particular we looked at four themes: flat organizational structures; the importance of (new) media; individual vs. collective activism; and the power of physical spaces. Overall, it seems reasonable to conclude that activism has indeed entered a new phase of connective action. This is perhaps most visible in the way new media technologies are changing the dynamics of organizing and making established organizations and their resources less vital and decisive for mobilization.

We also found reasons not to exaggerate the claim of newness, however. First, the proliferation of flat and leaderless structures is not a historically new phenomenon but was also considered important and valuable by many organizations and mobilizations during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Second, while individual activism seems more common and feasible in today's media environment, individual activists are still connected (if perhaps more loosely) with existing organizations and embedded in activist networks. Third, even though new media provide new opportunities for mobilization

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54   Interview with Tove Jensen, 23 April 2019.

55   Alice Mattoni, "I Post, You Rally, She Tweets… And We All Occupy: The Challenges of Hybrid Spatiality in the Occupy Wall Street Mobilizations," in *Social Media Materialities and Protest: Critical Reflections*, edited by Mette Mortensen, Christina Neumayer and Thomas Poeel (London: Routledge, 2018), 26.

that decrease the need for physical co-presence, the physical meeting is by no means passé in the way contemporary activists think and engage: in fact, many specifically value the physical meeting, both for practical and identity reasons.

Future research, in other words, must seek to set the sometimes-exaggerated claims of newness that emerge from observations of new media technologies against historical experiences. We believe, like Craig Calhoun,[56] that further historically informed research along these lines will provide a much firmer and needed grasp of the balance between change and continuity in political activism, especially in modern times when the landscape of activism seems to be constantly shifting. At the same time, we are aware that depending on relative few selective examples from a rather small sample sets its limitations on the conclusions and the degree of generalizability we can propose. Rather, our interviews offer examples of more widely observed trends and, very importantly, qualitative windows to a complex reality. To exceed the limitations and improve the generalization potential of this kind of study further and larger studies need to be done, in Denmark and beyond. This could be achieved by expanding the sample size or more tightly controlling the selection of interviewees along a set of pre-determined characteristics (such as methods of activism, ideology, issues) in order to achieve greater degrees of comparability across individual cases. As such, the findings of the paper have an explorative nature seeking to motivate and provide directions for future research.

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56   Calhoun, "New Social Movements."

Appendices

Appendix 1: Historical sample

Name (year of birth)	Date of interview	Location	Main organizational affiliation
Morten Thing (1945)	9 April 2019	Private home, Copenhagen	De Studerendes Vietnam Aktion
Wilfred Gluud (1947)	16 April 2019	Café, Copenhagen	Frederiksberg Vietnamkomité
Tove Jensen (1944)	23 April 2019	Demos, Copenhagen	Demos/De Danske Vietnamkomiteer
Irene Nørlund (1951)	7 May 2019	Private home, Copenhagen	Indokinakomiteerne
Villo Sigurdsson (1944)	14 May 2019	Private home, Frederiksberg	Venstresocialisterne
Litten Hansen (1944)	28 May 2019	Private home, Vanløse	Den danske Anti-apartheid Komite
Troels Toftkær (1941)	4 June 2019	Private home, Copenhagen	Socialistisk Folkeparti
Steen Christensen (1946)	30 July 2019	Private home, Hvidovre	Socialdemokratiet
Morten Nielsen (1961)	1 August 2019	Global Aktion's office, Copenhagen	Sydafrikakomiteen i København
René Karpantschof (1965)	15 August 2019	Workers Museum, Copenhagen	BZ (squatting movement)
Gorm Gunnarsen (1962)	26 August 2019	Workers Museum, Copenhagen	Landskomiteen Sydafrika-Aktion
Lisa Lauesen (1952)	29 August 2019	Workers Museum, Copenhagen	Tøj til Afrika/Kommunistisk Arbejdskreds
Ingrid Hind (1928)	15 September 2019	Private home, Bagsværd	NOAH (environmental organization)
Anne Lund (1953)	21–22 October 2019	Private home, Brabrand/Workers Museum, Copenhagen (via telephone)	Organisationen til Oplysning om Atomkraft Aarhus
Jesper Carlsen (1954)	22 October 2019	Holiday home, Jerup/Workers Museum, Copenhagen (via telephone)	Organisationen til Oplysning om Atomkraft Aarhus

Appendix 2: Contemporary sample

Name	Date of interview	Location	Main organization affiliation
Morten Bisgaard	9 April 2019	Ibis main office, Copenhagen	Ibis (solidarity and development organization)
Harald Brønd	9 April 2019	Studenterhuset (The students' house), Copenhagen	Folkets klimamarch (The People's Climate March)
Nanna Clifforth	30 April 2019	NOAH's main office, Copenhagen	NOAH (environmental organization)
Sara Hellebek	30 April 2019	Studenterhuset (The students' house), Copenhagen	Den Grønne Studenterbevægelse (The Green Students' Movement)
Jan Hoby	13 June 2019	The Workers Museum, Copenhagen	LFS (National association of social pedagogues – union)
Close the Camps (anonymous)	7 August 2019	Café, Copenhagen	Close the Camps (refugee solidarity)
Andreas Grarup	7 August 2019	Café, Copenhagen	Mellemfolkeligt samvirke (solidarity and development organization)
Emma Holten	21 August 2019	Café, Copenhagen	Independent
Pelle Dragsted	27 August 2019	Private home, Copenhagen	Public debater and writer, former MP for Enhedslisten (The Red-Green Alliance)
Elsebeth Fredriksen	3 September 2019	Gellerup Museum, Aarhus	Almen modstand (protest against demolition of so-called ghetto areas in Denmark)
Miss Privileze	2 October 2019	Studenterhuset (The students' house), Copenhagen	Independent
Marie Blønd and Karen Lumholt	2 October 2019	Karen Lumholt's office, Copenhagen	#Hvor er der en voksen? (Where is there an adult?) and Familiepolitisk Netværk (Family political network)
Aymeric Daval-Markussen	1 November 2019	Author's (Olesen) office at Aarhus University, Aarhus	Extinction Rebellion
Ann Britt Jørgensen	27 November 2019	Skraldecafeen's office, Aarhus	Skraldecafeen (The Dumpster Diving Café)
Selma de Montgomery	31 January 2020	Studenterhuset (The students' house), Copenhagen	Fridays for Future

Max Manuel Brunner

The European Far Right:
A Review of the Recent Literature

Patrick Moreau and Uwe Backes, *Europas moderner Rechtsextremismus: Ideologien, Akteure, Erfolgsbedingungen und Gefährdungspotentiale* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2021).

Ralf Havertz, *Radical Right Populism in Germany. AfD, Pegida and the Identitarian Movement* (London: Routledge, 2021).

Luca Manucci, *Populism and Collective Memory. Comparing Fascist Legacies in Western Europe* (London: Routledge, 2021).

Leonie De Jonge, *The Success and Failure of Right-Ring Populism in the Benelux Countries* (London: Routledge, 2021).

Natasha Strobl, *Radikalisierter Konservatismus. Eine Analyse* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2021).

In the 2019 European elections, the far-right faction *Identity and Democracy* secured 10,8 percent of the votes, with members such as the French *Rassemblement National* gaining up to 23 percent in their respective national votes. The electoral success of far-right parties in many Western democracies, alongside the emergence of right-wing extremist protest movements like PEGIDA or events like the publication of the infamous "Ibiza tape," which revealed the willingness of former Austrian vice-chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache (of the far-right FPÖ) to engage in corruption and an attempt to take control over a non-partisan media outlet, make clear that far-right contenders have become a serious threat to democratic institutions in many European countries. Accordingly, academic interest in the far right has increased dramatically, resulting in a spate of new publications. The bibliography[1] of the Centre for the Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR) lists more than 80 books published in 2021 alone. The works discussed in this review thus cover only a fraction of current publications available on the far-right. In *Europas moderner Rechtsextremismus: Ideologien,*

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1   See CARR's annual (2013–2022) Bibliography and Non-Anglophone Bibliographies, at www.radicalrightanalysis.com/bibliography.

Akteure, Erfolgsbedingungen und Gefährdungspotentiale (Europe's Modern Right-Wing Extremism: Ideologies, Actors, Conditions for Success and Potential Threats), Uwe Backes and Patrick Moreau offer a comprehensive overview of recent trends within the European far right, discussing its ideological and strategical modernization as a key factor for its recent success. Ralf Havertz's *Radical Right Populism in Germany. AfD, Pegida, and the Identitarian Movement* examines three actors within the contemporary German far right, focusing on their historic roots as well as recent trends and developments. In *Populism and Collective Memory Comparing Fascist Legacies in Western Europe,* Luca Manucci argues that the success of a right-wing populist contender in a given country depends on how that country remembers its relationship to fascism in the past. Like Manucchi, Leonie De Jonge is interested in the conditions that allow right-wing populist contenders to succeed or to fail. In the *Success and Failure of Right-Wing Populist Parties in the Benelux Countries,* she argues that in addition to supply and demand-oriented explanations, it is important to focus more broadly on the specific context within which opportunity structures for right-wing populist contenders are formed, especially the behaviour of established political parties and the media. In her extended essay, Natasha Strobl *Radikalisierter Konservatismus: Eine Analyse* (Radicalized Conservatism: An Analysis) focuses less on contenders traditionally associated with the far-right, but instead discusses the presidency of Donald Trump in the United States and Sebastian Kurz's two terms as chancellor of Austria to examine the phenomenon of a "radicalized conservatism" that systematically undermines democratic institutions, drawing parallels to the Weimar period where radicalized conservatism weakened democratic institutions and left them vulnerable to fascist takeover.

In their book, *Europas moderner Rechtsextremismus,* Uwe Backes and Patrick Moreau analyze the impact of modernized right-wing extremism on European politics. Six chapters focus on ideological and programmatic aspects as well as the key mobilizing factors and strategies of the far-right. In the introduction, the authors identify their subject as "soft extremism," located "between democracy and neofascism (17)." This "soft extremism" is signified by its negative attitude towards key values and principles of democratic institutions. They argue however that it does not follow a strictly traditional ideological programme that could be considered an "all-encompassing ideology" (Großideologie). Soft extremism thus distances itself from interwar fascism. Its followers present themselves as true representatives of the people's will who challenge the political elite. The book's main thesis is that the extreme right has undergone a process of modernization by transitioning to a form of "soft extremism": It thus opposes biological racism, is open towards women and sexual minorities, and propagates a form of anti-antisemitism that goes along with a "crusade" against Islam, playing on anti-Muslim attitudes within the majority society.

The second chapter gives a short overview of key figures and actors of this "soft extremism" present within European politics. The third and most extensive chapter discusses different ideological and programmatic aspects of right-wing "soft extrem-

ism." Different sections deal with ethnopluralism and the myth of the great replacement, antisemitism and anti-Muslim attitudes, the status of women and minorities, nationalism, anti-imperialism and anti-globalism, the relationship to Russia, religion, conspiracy theories, and ecology. The analysis is underpinned through a broad variety of empirical material. Unfortunately, the discussion of specific ideological features sometimes remains one-dimensional. Key concepts like antisemitism or "ethnopluralism" are only discussed superficially and self-descriptions are sometimes taken at face value. For example, the authors discuss the concept of "ethnopluralism" as a concept that breaks with biological racism and the hierarchy between lesser and higher races by highlighting the value of a "diversity of peoples" and cultural homogeneity. While the authors discuss how the ethnopluralist worldview differs from traditional biological racism, more in-depth analysis would uncover that "ethnopluralism" is a category of self-description within far-right circles that is often used to obscure an ideology that is in fact closely related to biological or cultural racism, antifeminism, and an antisemitic worldview.

The authors sometimes lean towards a generalizing view of a post-ideological and unspecific "soft extremist" ideology that replaces racism, antisemitism, and antifeminism with an ethnopluralist worldview, resentments towards Islam and a propensity for conspiracy theories. This generalizing view tends to overshadow the fact that "traditional" elements of right-wing ideology (for example biological racism, antisemitism, antifeminism) remain relevant within the contemporary far right. When, for example, Björn Höcke of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) rants about "international elites" or a "degenerate financial capitalism," it is evident that he is engaging in a form of dog-whistle politics that invokes antisemitic tropes. The fourth chapter briefly presents data highlighting the electoral success of "soft extremist" right-wing parties during the 2019 European elections. Key factors for the success of right-wing extremism are discussed in Chapter five. The success of the far right is contextualized within the broader framework of political events like the 2015 European migration crisis that made way for a growing acceptance of far-right positions. Subsequently, the authors discuss the impact of strategic factors like the spread of disinformation through social media, how "soft extremism" tries to appeal to voters by shifting between radicalization and moderation, and the spread of conspiratorial attitudes in different electorates. The final chapter analyzes how the "soft extremism" of the far right endangers European democracies. The authors conclude that "soft extremism" appears as an ambivalent political current that combines elements of liberal democracy (for example denouncing a claimed abuse of power) and totalitarian democracy (the idea of a homogenous will of the people and a dichotomy between friend and enemy) with a modernized worldview that promotes anti-antisemitism and is more open to the inclusion of women and sexual minorities while simultaneously appealing to anti-Muslim attitudes and conspiratorial attitudes.

Overall, the book provides a comprehensive overview of trends in the European far right and factors affecting their electoral success. However, by focusing only on "soft extremism," the authors may have overemphasized the newness of certain aspects and overlooked continuities between "soft extremism" and traditional aspects of far-right ideologies like antisemitism, racism, antifeminism, as well as homophobia and transphobia. This seems particularly striking since the material reveals that "soft extremism" is closely linked to ideological successors of interwar fascism of the so-called "New Right."

In *Radical Right Populism in Germany*, Ralf Havertz offers an insightful introduction to the contemporary German far right. The study contextualizes the AfD, PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident), and the German branch of the identarian movement within the conceptual framework of "radical right populism." This conceptual framework is based of the approaches of Cas Mudde and others: According to Mudde's "minimal definition of populism," populism is a "thin ideology" that rests on an assumed opposition between "the people" and "the elites." It can thus be understood as an anti-pluralist worldview that imagines itself as an exclusive representative of the volonté générale. Further, Havertz argues that radical right populism can be understood as a triadic variant of populism: beyond the dyadic distinction between "the people" and "the elites," it adds a distinction to the "other." Havertz refers to the work of Rogers Brubaker,[2] who claims that populism adds a "horizontal" dimension to a "vertical" opposition between the "the people" and "the elite." According to a vertical understanding of society, groups like "the people" and "the elites" are defined by class and social status. According to populism though "the people," "the elites" or "outsiders" are defined by "horizontal" criteria such as virtue or, in the case of radical right populism, ethnicity or identity. On this basis, Havertz discusses Mudde's "maximal definition," which defines the "populist radical right" as a combination of populism with both nativist and authoritarian tendencies. While Haverz agrees with Mudde that nativism and authoritarianism are both essential features, he disagrees with Mudde on the term "populist radical right." Moving away from Mudde's "populist version of the radical right,"[3] Havertz's term "radical right populism" emphasizes the structural features of populism discussed above. Havertz claims that "specific utterances of nativism may overlap and move along with" features such as the triadic relationship and a horizontal view of the social order. However, "nativism appears more like a description of the content for the antagonisms inherent

2   Rogers Brubaker, "Why Populism?," in *Populism and the Crisis of Democracy*, vol. 1, eds. Gregor Fitzi, Jürgen Mackert and Bryan S. Turner (London: Routledge 2019), 27–46.

3   Cas Mudde, *Populist radical right parties in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 24.

in populism (19)." In other words, for Havertz, radical right populism is primarily defined by its populist structure and only secondarily by its nativist content.

The concept of radical right populism developed in the inital chapters provides the foundation for the consecutive analysis. The discussion of the history of the German far right and the AfD in chapters three and four will be particularly useful to readers who are not yet familiar with the political discourse in Germany. The fifth chapter analyzes the AfD's programme, official documents, and individual statements to show that the party can indeed be understood as a radical right populist party. Chapters six to eleven discuss different aspects of radical right populist ideology in Germany such as volkish nationalism, euroscepticism, Islamophobia, antisemitism, antifeminism, and the AfD's ambivalent relationship to neoliberalism and social populism.

The author provides helpful examples and thoroughly reconstructs the discursive landscape of different actors within the populist radical right landscape and its close relationship to right-wing extremist groups like the so-called "New Right." Unfortunately, the discussion sometimes falls short on an analytical level. In the discussion of antisemitism, for example, Havertz exclusively addresses the populist radical right's antisemitism in Germany as a form of "secondary antisemitism" that is primarily interested in historic revisionism and eliminating the Shoah from German memory politics. Here Havertz misses out on an opportunity to address the intersections between antisemitism and other aspects of radical right populist ideology, such as anti-globalism and anti-Muslim racism. Havertz thus mentions the myth of a "great replacement" in his discussion on Islamophobia and states its importance for the justification of anti-Muslim positions. However, the myth of the "great replacement" serves as a conspiracist framework that conceptualizes European integration, liberal migration politics, and feminism as elements of a "globalist" agenda—a dog-whistle commonly used in antisemitic rhetoric—that undermines the ethnic and cultural integrity of European peoples.[4] Despite minor shortcomings, the book delivers a valuable discussion of a conceptual framework for analyzing the populist far right, as well as a comprehensive overview of contemporary currents within the German far right that is rich in material and will be particularly insightful for an international audience not yet familiar with the German context.

In *Populism and Collective Memory,* Luca Manucci tries to answer the question of "why is populism so successful in Italy, Austria, and France, while in Germany it is marginal and socially unacceptable?" Mannucci argues that in addition to differences in socioeconomic factors (including corruption), democratic institutions, and economic performance, each of these countries developed a particular culture of collective memory, providing different opportunity structures for populism in gener-

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4   See for example, Samuel Salzborn, *Globaler Antisemitismus. Eine Spurensuche in den Abgründen der Moderne* (Weinheim: Beltz Juventa, 2020), 77–81.

al and right-wing populism in particular. As with other publications discussed here, Manucci's argument is based on the minimal definition of populism put forth by Mudde. Manucci points out that while populism and fascism are not the same, both embody illiberal and authoritarian tendencies: "it is possible to say that all fascists may be populists, but not all populists are fascists (15)." In other words: Fascism and populism are related but not identical. How a country memorializes the fascist past thus has an effect on whether populism and especially right-wing populism is socially acceptable or stigmatized. Manucci identifies four different "ideal-types (51)" of a collective memory of the fascist past: culpabilization, heroization, cancellation, and victimization. Each "ideal-type" thus entails specific ideas about a country's role during the Second World War and its relationship to fascism and determines the degree of stigmatization of illiberal elements shared by both fascism and populism. In the case of culpabilization, a country condemns its fascist past and goes through a process of critical self-examination, ultimately considering itself guilty. This goes along with a high level of stigmatization. On the other end of the spectrum, Manucci locates collective memory based on (self-)victimization.[5] In that case, a country confronts the past only to overturn and deny its own responsibility. This goes is paralleled by a low level of stigmatization.

The study's conceptual framework and the argument are developed in chapters one to three, before applying them to a comparison of eight European countries in the later chapters: Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In Chapter five, Manucci analyzes the social acceptability of populism in each country based on a somewhat fuzzy qualitative comparative analysis. The following chapter analyses how each country memorializes the fascist past. Chapter seven asks how different levels of acceptability may be explained by socioeconomic and political-institutional factors. Chapter eight analyzes how this acceptability relates to types of collective memory. In the case of Germany, Manucci argues that the country can serve as a textbook case for a memory culture of culpabilization that, "once established at the end of the 1950s […] was never seriously challenged in Western Germany (123)." According to Manucci, the integration of the German Democratic Republic, where a narrative of heroization was the predominant way of remembering the fascist past, presented the first real challenge to the culpabilization narrative, resulting in a process of normalization. Manucci argues that this memory political landscape presented a particularly challenging opportunity structure for right-wing populism, which explains why, until recently, no right-wing populist party has been able to establish itself in German politics.

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5   Manucci clarifies that this type of collective memory can only be applied to countries that are at least partially ascribable to the group of perpetrators and not to countries that were actual victims of fascist regimes.

To support his claim that "culpabilization" remained mostly unchallenged in West Germany, Manucci refers to the so-called "Historikerstreit," pointing out that the main conflict in one of the most important debates on the politics of memory in recent German history was the question whether the Holocaust can be compared to other events. However, the author fails to address the fact that at the heart of that debate lay the question whether the Holocaust could be "historicized"—whether it was just a "normal" historical event and a reaction to historic circumstances or a unique event that shattered any concept of national-historical continuity. The question is of course linked to the question of German guilt and responsibility. In Chapter five, Manucci associates the demand to "historicize" Germany's Nazi legacy with the right-wing populist party "Die Republikaner" and claims that the high level of stigmatization associated with this demand led to the party's political failure (86). However, a closer inspection of the source material would have revealed that demands for a historicization of Germany's fascist past or a "normalization" of Germany's relationship to its history were not exclusively the purview of the margins of political discourse and were far from taboo.[6] Events like the German publication of Daniel Goldhagen's *Hitler's Willing Executioners* or the so-called Wehrmachtsausstellung triggered far-reaching public debates on the role of ordinary Germans during the Holocaust. Though crucial for a comprehensive picture of German memory culture, neither are discussed in the book. The discussion that would have revealed that the discourse on Germany's fascist legacy and the Holocaust is more nuanced than Manucci suggests and that challenges to the culpabilization narrative have always been part of this discourse.

The example of German memory politics reveals the study's main weakness which likely a by-product of its design. Comparing populist and memory political debates in eight different European countries is an ambitious task, which can lead to a schematic and at times one-dimensional account that leaves little room for nuance or the portrayal of contradictory positions. A more thorough analysis of each country would perhaps have revealed that while memory politics may indeed play an important role, so do other, country-specific factors such as the integrative forces at play in postwar Germany or the concept of "peoples parties." Overall, Manucci presents an interesting argument for the relationship between memory politics and the success or failure of right-wing populism in Europe. While the general argument is plausible and the study does indeed show that "memory matters (171)," the book would have profited from a more focused analysis.

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6   See for example Nicolas Berg's study on the West German academic discourse surrounding the Holocaust *Der Holocaust und die westdeutschen Historiker. Erforschung und Erinnerung* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003), or Martin Broszat and Saul Friedländer's discussion of the historicization of the Holocaust in the Historikerstreit: Martin Broszat and Saul Friedländer, "Um die 'Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus': Ein Briefwechsel," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 36, no. 2 (1988): 339–72.

In line with Manucci, Leonie De Jonge's aims to contribute to a theoretical under-standing of the conditions for the success or failure of right-wing populist parties in *The Success and Failure of Right-Ring Populism in the Benelux Countries*. While Manuc-ci focuses on the impact of specific types of memory culture, De Jonge aims for a more holistic understanding, presenting an in-depth analysis of the opportunity structures for right-ring populist parties in the Benelux countries. De Jonge analyses variations in the electoral performance of right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands, Bel-gium, and Luxembourg. She notes that while in recent decades, the Netherlands and the Flemish parts of Belgium witnessed the rise of right-wing populist parties, com-parable contenders have failed to gain electoral success in Wallonia and Luxembourg. To fully understand why a right-wing populist contender could be successful, she argues that in addition to supply and demand explanations, contextual factors are also crucial: "notably the strategic choices of mainstream parties and the role of the me-dia." Mainstream parties and the media, she argues can choose to "stigmatise, isolate, mimic or challenge the populist radical right (8)" and thus affect the degree to which an electorate is receptive to a right-wing populist contender.

In the first chapter, De Jonge introduces the reader to her argument and the po-litical context of the Benelux countries. Chapter two elaborates the argument and presents a conceptual framework. De Jonge defines populism as a style of politics that tends to defy taboos—perceived as "political correctness"—and divides society into the virtuous "people" and an antagonistic "other." Right-wing populism is understood as a radical form of populism that combines the populist style with a rightist ideology consisting of nativist and authoritarian elements. Following this definition, De Jonge reviews three different approaches to explaining the success of right-wing populism. Success is understood here as the moment of a party's electoral breakthrough, since, as De Jonge argues, conditions drastically change once a party crosses a certain "thresh-old of relevance (32)." Different explanatory strategies thus focus on demand, supply, or contextual factors. A demand-side explanation may understand the electoral suc-cess of a right-wing populist party as the result of broad historical changes leading to a demand for a new type of politics. A supply-side explanation may argue that the success of a given party is a product of *internal* factors such as the party's leadership or *external* factors like political opportunity structures. Contextual explanations con-sider the broader situation in which factors like political opportunity structures arise. Following Antonis Ellinas,[7] De Jonge argues that "the electoral fortunes of right-wing populist parties are largely dependent on the behaviour of mainstream parties and the media (43)," who are considered "gatekeepers." Mainstream parties and the media can thus choose to ignore the populist far right or try to exclude them from the political

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7   Antonis Ellinas, *The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

arena. Conversely, they can act on, recognize, or adopt issues that the populist far right stands for. Each of these decisions thus shapes opportunity structures and may determine the populist far right's success or failure.

The following chapters recapitulate the history of the populist radical right in the three Benelux countries, showing that for the better part of the twentieth century far-right parties have not managed to achieve or maintain a level of success that could be considered crossing the "threshold of relevance." While in Luxemburg and Wallonia the populist far right remains on the margins of political relevance to this day, parties like Geert Wilders's *Partij voor De Vrijheid* (Party for Freedom) in the Netherlands or the Flemish *Vlaams Belang* have managed to become relevant political actors. De Jonge argues that supply and demand approaches vary in their explanatory value for the success and failure of ring-wing populist politics. In the case of the Netherlands, she shows that there is little reason to believe that demand-side factors, like a growing scepticism towards immigration, can account for the electoral breakthroughs of the parties of Pim Fortuyn's party in 2002 and the subsequent success of Geert Wilders's Party. Conversely, for De Jonge, supply-side approaches seem more promising but tend to be reductionist: Due to their charisma, figures like Fortuyn or Wilders may have been able to mobilize voters in ways their precursors were unable to do. However, as De Jonge points out, they did not act in a vacuum. Thus, we need to address factors that allowed far-right figures to arise in the Netherlands but hindered them in Wallonia—particularly the behaviour of mainstream parties and the media. Chapters four and five focus on these contextual factors. De Jonge argues that for example in the Netherlands, long before the rise of Pim Fortuyn, centre-right parties contributed to a politicization of issues pertaining to immigration. The politicization of immigration, De Jonge argues, opened up a line of conflict that actors like Pim Fortuyn could engage on. In addition, De Jonge observes that while in Wallonia and Luxemburg the media engages in a strategy of isolating far-right actors, Dutch media has become increasingly more open and accepting towards them. Thus, mainstream parties and the media in the Netherlands contributed to an opportunity structure that has been far more beneficial for right-wing populist politics than in Wallonia or Luxemburg. Finally, De Jonge concludes that actors like the media or established parties and their behaviour towards the populist far right and its issues are a crucial factor for the success of far-right parties in the Benelux countries. She suggests that the approach presented may also be applied to the case of France and may also shed light on the rise of "trojan horses" such as the AfD, which once appeared as a single-issue party with a Eurosceptic agenda and over time transformed into a more obvious right-wing populist contender. Overall, De Jonge presents an insightful account that stands out through its attention to detail. The book will be a rewarding read to those interested in right wing populism in the Benelux countries as well as to those who are interested in a more general understanding of the success and failure of right-wing populism.

Another contribution that may be helpful to understanding the connection between the rise of the far right and the behaviour of actors who are more likely to be considered mainstream is Natasha Strobl's *Radikalisierter Konservatismus*. Strobl begins her essay with an overview of the present state of conservatism in Western democracies. In a world still shaped by the aftereffects of the 2008 economic crisis, global warming, and the COVID-19 pandemic, Strobl notes that, while some conservatives participate in democratic processes, others have increasingly adopted positions that were previously exclusive to the extreme right. The first chapter introduces the concept of "radicalized conservatism," analyzing the relationship between conservatism and fascism or the extreme right; a relationship she describes as precarious. According to Strobl, conservatism can be understood as an "anti-egalitarian, anti-revolutionary, class-harmonizing standpoint that, above all, values order and property (12)." Like fascism, it is oriented towards order and social hierarchies, it is anti-egalitarian, and anti-socialist. While conservatism is anti-revolutionary and interested in maintaining a status quo, fascism by contrast is understood as a revolutionary ideology interested in rewriting the social order at least to some degree. Some readers, especially conservative ones, may reject Strobl's notion of conservatism as a generalizing view that does not reflect the diverse nature of democratic conservative politics. However, Strobl later points out that to analyze radicalized conservatism, we need to be aware of the intersections between conservatism and the extreme right, rather than coming up with clear definitions separating the two.

For Strobl, the radicalization of conservatism is the realization of a potential present within a conservative DNA. In this process, the line between conservatism and fascism is obscured. Movements like the New Right need to be considered since they strategically appeal to more conservative audiences. However, she argues that the process must mainly be understood as a radicalization from within. As an essential factor, Strobl points towards authoritarian leanings within the conservative milieu, which she describes as *rohe Bürgerlichkeit*. The term was first introduced by the sociologist Wilhelm Heitmeier[8] and can roughly be translated to "raw bourgeois culture." It expresses a bourgeoise tendency to turn away from solidarity and instead deploy an ideology of hardship; instead of social justice, solidarity, and fairness, *rohe Bürgerlichkeit* values efficiency, utility, and economic usability. Strobl argues that radicalized conservatism appears when, driven by the dynamic of *rohe B*ürgerlichkeit, conservatism moves towards the extreme right. It then breaks up the consensus established with the more centrist or social-democratic left, turns away from social participation, and disavows any mediation between the property-owning and working classes.

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8   Wilhelm Heitmeier, "'Rohe Bürgerlichkeit'. Bedrohungen des inneren Friedens," in *Wissenschaft & Frieden* 2 (2012): 39–41.

Using the examples of Donald Trump's presidency in the United States and Sebastian Kurz's two terms as Austrian chancellor, the second chapter reveals six aspects of how radicalized conservatism strategically shapes the public discourse and threatens democratic institutions. First, it deliberately transgresses the formal or informal rules of political discourse and behaviour, by, for example, disregarding electoral results or deliberately abusing language to discredit political opponents. Second, it engages in a language of cultural warfare to polarize society into different irreconcilable groups which are flagged as "us" or "the other." Third, it focuses on authoritarian leaders, along with an erosion of democratic party-structures. Fourth, it disassembles democratic institutions such as the welfare state, the judicial system, parliamentary processes, and the freedom of the press. Fifth, it instrumentalizes the media and fabricates scandals to stage a permanent state of campaigning. Sixth, to delegitimize criticism and appeal to those holding conspiratorial worldviews, it deconstructs established standards of truth.

While Strobl comprehensively depicts how radicalized conservatism undermines democratic institutions, it would be interesting to read a more detailed analysis of specific social and political dynamics that present the basis for the radicalization of conservatism. The third chapter, "Weimar Calling" only rudimentarily approaches that question by arguing that, in the 1920s, social movements and the organized working class confronted conservative interpretations of the world with intensifying scrutiny and questioned the dominance of the bourgeois ruling class. In order not to collapse into political insignificance, conservatism radicalized itself (in the form of currents like the so-called "conservative revolution" in Germany or the "Black Vienna" in Austria), undermined the foundations of a democratic society, and paved the way for a fascist rise to power. For Strobl, radicalized conservatism can thus be viewed as a backlash to a process of social emancipation. Strobl's analysis can thus be read along with works of authors like Matthias Quent,[9] who argue that the current rise of far-right movements in liberal democracies can be understood as a by-product of a general process of democratization in which traditional social hierarchies are increasingly questioned. Strobl's work ends with a word of warning: "Fascist dynamics cannot be controlled. Once normalized, fascist thinking spreads throughout society. Thus, one quickly approaches a point of no return (149)." In only 150 pages, readers cannot expect an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon of radicalized conservatism. Rather, Natascha Strobl presents an interesting contribution to a more general debate trying to make sense of the populist politics of figures like Trump or Kurz. Her anal-

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9   Matthias Quent, "Ruck nach rechts oder Rückschläge gegen Demokratisierungserfolge? Was ist neu in der 'Mitte'?," in *Die neue Mitte? Ideologien, Strategien und Bewegungen der Populistischen und Extremen Rechten*, eds. Raj Kollmorgen, Steven Schäller and Johannes Schütz (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2021).

ysis locates the origins of this specific type of populism in authoritarian tendencies within the conservative milieu and shows how this specific variant of an authoritarian mindset translates into political practice and undermines democratic institutions. A more in-depth analysis would perhaps address questions like: How does radicalized conservatism relate to what some commentators call a "social democratization" of conservative politics.

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Sean Scalmer

Stuart Macintyre (1947–2021): New Left Historian of Australia and Britain

Stuart Macintyre was one of the most gifted and productive historians of the New Left generation. He made the bulk of his career at the University of Melbourne, Australia, and wrote mostly on Australian history. But his first two works were distinguished and influential contributions to the history of British communism and his significant international reputation was registered in his appointment as an editor of *The Oxford History of Historical Writing, Volume 4*.[1] Readers of *Moving the Social* will therefore note his passing, with regret, and will benefit from considering his remarkable achievements.

Macintyre was a child of Melbourne's upper middle-class. His father returned from war service to found a successful business (and lectured in Management at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology). His maternal grandfather had been a Congregationalist Minister, and his parents had met at a Church social. Macintyre was raised in comfortable circumstances in the pleasant suburb of Hawthorn. He attended one of Melbourne's most prestigious private Schools, Scotch College, where his love of history was nurtured by a fine teacher, David Webster.[2] He then passed to Ormond College at the University of Melbourne, where he quickly won attention for his tremendous talents and his irregular attendance of university classes. From this point, Macintyre's education then followed the time-worn path of talented scholars from the antipodes: an Honours and a Masters degree in Melbourne; a doctoral degree in Oxbridge, at the University of Cambridge.

The passage from one academic laurel to another obscures a growing political consciousness. Macintyre took from his mother's religious traditions a concern with social justice, deepened by the influence of R.H. Tawney's *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*.[3] His mother voted for the Labor Party, just as his father supported the conservatives; family discussions provoked his interest. Macintyre's middle-class suburb also abutted the industrial suburb of Richmond, and his local federal member of parlia-

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1   Stuart Macintyre, Juan Maiguascha and Attila Pok, eds., *The Oxford History of Historical Writing. Volume 4, 1800–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
2   As Macintyre emphasized in "Q&A with Stuart Macintyre," with the Australian Historical Association, https://ahaecr.wordpress.com/2018/06/13/qa-with-stuart-macintyre/
3   Macintyre notes the influence of Tawney's work in "Q&A with Stuart Macintyre."

ment was Australia's leading left-wing politician, Dr Jim Cairns. Macintyre entered the University of Melbourne in 1965, just as a conservative government committed Australian troops to war in Vietnam, including military conscripts. Inspired partly by the American Civil Rights movement, Australian University students also began to protest in support of Aboriginal rights at this time; the mood on university campuses shifted leftward.

Reflecting these diverse influences, Macintyre joined the Labor Club at the University of Melbourne. But his activities in student politics were always tempered by a great interest in working-class politics. He read widely in Marxism, and in 1971 he joined the Communist Party of Australia. His first major undertaking was to collaborate on a new journal, *Intervention*, that sought to deepen theoretical discussion on the Australian Left, and especially to stimulate engagement with the work of Lukács, Gramsci and Althusser. The influence of Perry Anderson's reshaped *New Left Review* was palpable.

New Left Review had published Gareth Stedman Jones' evisceration of his elders, "The Pathology of English History," in 1967. This was an obvious inspiration, as was Perry Anderson's "The Origins of the Present Crisis" (1964).[4] Following these leads, Macintyre offered in *Intervention* an equivalent critique of earlier forms of left-wing historiography in Australia in his first published article, "Radical History and Bourgeois Hegemony" (1972).

Like Anderson and Stedman Jones, Macintyre came not to praise, but to bury. History in Australia, as in Britain, was apparently a compound of "scientistic empiricism" and "moralism."[5] The first generation of history teachers at Australian universities had not sought to understand "the lived past" and had limited their labours to "moral instruction based on established texts."[6] Their successors had reinforced "bourgeois hegemony" by such devices as an "inculcation of reverence for the founding fathers" and a preoccupation with "freedom of the will."[7] The radicals who protested the orthodoxy were politically courageous but intellectually stunted. They had narrowed their attention to labour and popular history rather than grappling with the more complicated field of "class relations."[8] Their "undialectical" and "mechanistic" approach to class offered "moral outrage" in place of serious social analysis."[9] They had failed to adequately consider the "racialist element in the Australian radical tra-

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4   Macintyre has noted this influence in his contribution to "What is History? Historiography Roundtable," *Rethinking History*, vol. 22, no. 4, 2018, 515.

5   Stuart Macintyre, "Radical History and Bourgeois Hegemony," *Intervention*, no. 2, (1972): 50.

6   Macintyre, "Radical History," 48.

7   Macintyre, "Radical History," 50, 52.

8   Macintyre, "Radical History," 65–6.

9   Macintyre, "Radical History," 67–9.

dition."[10] A new kind of history was needed: based on a new "problematic";[11] guided by a concern with the "Marxist concept of totality";[12] devoted to the study of "class interrelationships and their determining factors."[13]

The tone was especially sharp, and is a notable contrast with Macintyre's mature posture in later scholarly exchanges; he would become much more pluralistic and concerned to observe civilities. But the continuities are as striking as the differences. Macintyre's first published work is animated by three characteristics that would typify his later career: a concern to use history as a means to understand and change the present; a commitment to enlarge the scope of traditional labour history; and a concern with the context of intellectual work. He would explore these themes through nineteen monographs; more than twenty-five edited books; and scores of minor publications, book chapters and journal articles. They ranged from *A Proletarian Science: Marxism in Britain 1917–1933* (1980) a reworked version of his prize-winning thesis at Cambridge, to *The Party* (2022), a study of the Communist Party of Australia, from its heyday in World War II to its decline in the 1970s. They spanned studies of radical history, labour history, the history of liberalism, biography, historiography, and the history of universities and the social sciences.

The first abiding characteristic of Macintyre's scholarship was a confidence in the capacity of historical study to connect past, present and future. In his first published work, Macintyre expressed a desire to win "an understanding of the present situation."[14] He turned to "history" in the belief that it enabled such understanding. He traced the changing contexts of historical writing in Australia. And he drew upon this historical account so as to ground an analysis of contemporary constraints and opportunities.

Macintyre would deploy this method across his career. Interviewed by early career researchers as a retired eminence, he reflected: "I retain that earlier aspiration to understand cause and effect, what happened and why it happened. I see history as an essential component of understanding public affairs."[15] Macintyre's first synoptic examination of Australian society, *Winners and Losers: the pursuit of social justice in Australian history* (1985), was quite self-consciously composed as a combination of historical analysis and political intervention. In this book he did not simply trace the history of the concept of "social justice," but declared "I want to argue that it

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10   Macintyre, "Radical History," 62.
11   Macintyre, "Radical History," 72.
12   Macintyre, "Radical History," 67.
13   Macintyre, "Radical History," 69.
14   Macintyre, "Radical History," 48.
15   See "Q&A with Stuart Macintyre."

still possesses current relevance."[16] He did not just narrate a story of contest, advance and constraint, but aspired to "suggest how the weight of the past still presses on us today."[17] His study of attempts to construct education as a "ladder of opportunity" quite pointedly terminated with a critique of the then ruling Labor Government and a forthright statement that "A government even as nervous as this one about electoral consequences could abate the inequality of education by sticking to just a few minimal principles."[18]

A similar confidence in the analytical capacity of "history" illuminated Macintyre's entire career. His two books on history of communism in Australia— *The Reds* (1998) and *The Party* (2022)—might be considered as critical meditations on what could be salvaged from that inspiring but flawed political quest. His study of post-war reconstruction—*Australia's Boldest Experiment* (2015)—has resonated very powerfully over recent years, and has been especially influential among reforming Labor politicians. This is because it wrestles with urgent contemporary concerns: how might the State take action to correct the instabilities and inequalities of a market economy; how might an atmosphere of national emergency variously enable and constrain experiments in State intervention. Likewise, his books on Australian universities—notably *Life After Dawkins* (2016) and *No End of a Lesson* (2017)—sought to use history to better understand the transformation of higher education and the possibilities of alternative paths. *The Poor Relation* (2010), for its part, was a history of the social sciences in Australia that aimed to comprehend the relative failure of Australian governments to support such research, but also an effort to challenge such habits.

A second characteristic of Macintyre's "Radical History and Bourgeois Hegemony" also became a recurrent feature of his later contributions. This was a determination to reshape the traditional field of "labour history" and to offer in its place an enlarged form of historical investigation. The Australian labour movement's founding generation of the late nineteenth century had composed works of memoir and history.[19] These had been succeeded by penetrating historical studies by freelance radical intellectuals, such as Brian Fitzpatrick, and by labour-movement intellectuals who would later win a place in the universities, such as the famed prehistorian, V.G. Childe. In the 1950s and early 1960s, a generation of wartime Communists had entered the universities and had managed to establish "labour history" as an accepted sub-discipline.

16   Stuart Macintyre, *Winners and Losers: The Pursuit of Social Justice in Australian History* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1985), xiii.
17   Macintyre, *Winners and Losers*, xiii.
18   Macintyre, *Winners and Losers*, 117.
19   For example: W.E. Murphy, *History of the Eight Hours Movement, Volume I* (Melbourne: Spectator Publishing, 1896); W.G. Spence, *Australia's Awakening: Thirty Years in the Life of an Australian Agitator* (Sydney: Worker Trustees, 1909).

Macintyre rejected three defining elements of these earlier works. First, their relatively narrow concern with institutional politics (especially the internal character of the Labor Party and the Communist Party). Second, their treatment of key institutions as carriers of relatively unbroken traditions—notably "labourism" (variously defined) for the Labor Party and the trade unions, and revolutionary communism for the Communist Party. Third, their attempt to connect these traditions to a mythical (and largely positive) account of the Australian character and Australian political culture. Macintyre substituted for this restricted approach a much more expansive treatment of "the Left." His early works on British labour history explicitly rejected a widespread tendency to conflate labour history with the "history of institutions." Far from assuming such an identity, they closely examined the shifting ties between institutions and working-class communities. This was a project pursued most fully in Macintyre's pioneering study of three British mining and industrial centres that became strongholds of interwar communism, *Little Moscows*.[20]

The historian's subsequent works ranged still more widely. They considered the period that ran from the mid-19th century until the near present. They examined not only leading figures of the Labor and Communist Parties, but also creative interpreters of "liberalism" (as evident in the work, *A Colonial Liberalism* [1991]), trade union militants (as evident in the biography *Militant: The Life and Times of Paddy Troy* [1984]), reformist bureaucrats of the 1940s (in *Australia's Boldest Experiment* [2015]) and civil libertarians (analyzed in *Liberty: A History of Civil Liberties in Australia* [2011]).

Macintyre did not present his key protagonists as embodiments of unchanging traditions, but rather as creative reinterpreters of complex political ideas. *A Colonial Liberalism* established how liberals in nineteenth-century Australia rethought a traditional opposition to State action and came to recognize the value of expanded State intervention to meet their political purposes and ambitions. *A Proletarian Science* (1980) traced the rise of what he called "two relatively systematic ideologies" in the British Left over the 1920s: "Marxism" and "Labour Socialism."[21] It is a work inspired by the "sheer energy and determination" of "self-taught worker-intellectuals."[22]

This sensitivity to the intellectual richness of working-class politics is evident in other work. Macintyre's study of the foundational years of the Australian Labor Party, *The Labour Experiment* (1989) denied that the Australian movement was "lacking principles" and "bereft of theory"[23] (then the dominant view), though he also traced the incapacity of Labor's founding ideas to meet the overwhelming force of class rela-

20   Stuart Macintyre, *Little Moscows: Communism and Working-class Militancy in Inter-war Britain* (London: Croom Helm, 1980). On institutions: p.19.

21   Stuart Macintyre, *A Proletarian Science: Marxism in Britain 1917–1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908), 49.

22   Macintyre, *A Proletarian Science*, 71.

23   Stuart Macintyre, *The Labour Experiment* (Melbourne: McPhee Gribble, 1989), 35.

tions and the State. *Winners and Losers* examined the changing ways in which advo-cates of "social justice" reimagined this influential concept from the early nineteenth century until the later 1980s: first, as an expression of the inalienable rights of a free-born Englishman; then to the right to a living wage; thence to the right to work; and eventually to an acknowledgement that "citizenship" and universal entitlements were insufficient to meet the rightful claims of women and of First Nations peoples. *The Reds* traced the shifting ways in which the Bolshevik model of the revolutionary party came to be understood and pursued in a changing Australia. *The Party* went on to con-sider the slow recognition of the limits of this model and the attempt to practice a new form of Communist politics. In these and other studies Macintyre unveiled a much more pluralist and dynamic "Left" than had been evident in most earlier work. He did not champion of a single "tradition," but on the contrary explored a variety of at-tempts to understand and combat injustice. He acknowledged the role of mainstream politics, but challenged the "institutionalised consensus" that change "proceeds from the centre," emphasizing rather the necessity of "vigorous tributaries and turbulent eddies that feed it and impel it onwards."[24]

These studies also developed a much more historical understanding of the process of political change. In Macintyre's hands, Australians embarked upon a series of dis-tinct and identifiable political projects, challenged existing inequalities, met resistance as well as partial incorporation, and were blunted and exhausted in this contentious process. Though of the Left, Macintyre recognized the "creative energy" of Australian Liberals and their formative role in establishing distinctive Australian measures, such as compulsory conciliation and arbitration of industrial disputes and the guarantee of a living wage for all white men. Nonetheless, he adjudged that political "energy" as "largely exhausted" by the later 1920s.[25] Likewise, Macintyre's respect for the impulses that animated post-war reconstruction—and his belief in their enduring import—re-verberate through the pages of *Australia's Boldest Experiment*. And yet he also argues that by 1949 "The impetus for reconstruction was clearly spent."[26]

Macintyre's historical perspective on the rhythms of political change was also an injunction to contemporary experiment and challenge. He put this view directly in his *Overland* lecture of 2001: "'Temper Democratic, Bias Australian': One Hundred Years of the Australian Labor Party." Delivered at a moment in which neoliberalism still sat high in the saddle, he argued that Australian Labor needed less "surrender to binding

24   Stuart Macintyre, *Militant: The Life and Times of Paddy Troy* (North Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), 220–1.

25   Stuart Macintyre, "Whatever Happened to Deakinite Liberalism?," in *Confusion: The Mak-ing of the Australian Two-Party System*, edited by Paul Strangio and Nick Dyrenfurth (Carl-ton: Melbourne University Press, 2009), 232.

26   Stuart Macintyre, *Australia's Boldest Experiment: War and reconstruction in the 1940s* (Sydney: NewSouth Publishing, 2015), 459.

orthodoxy" and "more improvisation": "A democratic temper is sorely in need of revival."[27] He had the courage to make a similar argument in an address to the federal conference of the Australian Labor Party, "Who Are the True Believers?": "You cannot treat the traditions of the Party as a form of political capital unless you maintain and renew those traditions; and this involves something more than a celebration of pragmatism […] True believers need beliefs."[28]

Macintyre's arguments and his significance were most obvious to students of Australian history. Nonetheless, his methodological contributions were incisive and somewhat original in their challenge to institutional labour history. They will also be of interest to many readers of *Moving the Social*, as they demonstrate a fecund attempt to draw upon traditions of Marxist history, to respond to the rich contributions of the British Marxist historians, but also to imbue their approaches with distinctive emphases.

Macintyre wrote under the clear influence of the Marxist intellectual tradition, and particularly the inspiring examples of Perry Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm (the latter examined his doctoral thesis). As a postgraduate student in Cambridge, and then as a postdoctoral fellow, he played an active role in collective efforts to develop Marxist historical research.[29] As such, he sought from the early 1970s to write a history that could comprehend "totality" (a privileged term in his first published essay) and that considered the interrelationship of multiple structures of power and resistance. His capacity to work on this large canvas underpinned his prize-winning general histories of Australia. It was particularly evident in his contribution to the Oxford History of Australia, his book *1901–1942: The Succeeding Age*, though also evident in his *Concise History of Australia* for Cambridge University Press (a work of such excellence that it ran to five editions).

But Macintyre also wrote in the aftermath of Edward Thompson's *Making of the English Working Class*. In a notable essay of 1978, "The Making of the Australian Working Class" (the mirroring of the title very obvious), he emphasized especially Thompson's "theoretical influence," arguing that "Thompson redefined class for labour historians and opened their eyes to areas of analysis that had previously been neglected."[30] This was not simply rhetorical. Macintyre's work always reflected Thompson's

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27   Stuart Macintyre, "Temper Democratic, Bias Australian": One Hundred Years of the Australian Labor Party," *Overland*, no. 162 (Autumn 2001): 11–2.

28   Stuart Macintyre, "Who Are the True Believers?," *Labour History*, no. 68 (May 1995): 166–7.

29   Themes taken up in: Geoff Eley, "What happened in the 1970s?" and Kevin Morgan, "Stuart Macintyre and British Communism," in *The Work of History: Writing for Stuart Macintyre*, edited by Peter Beilharz and Sian Supski (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2022).

30   Stuart Macintyre, "The Making of the Australian Working Class: An Historiographical Survey," *Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand*, vol. 18, no. 71 (1978): 233.

elevation of the concept of "experience" as a mediating force between "structure" and "consciousness," as well as his practical emphasis on "experience" as a central feature of compelling historical narrative.

Macintyre's work therefore connected both the structural impulse associated with Hobsbawm and others and the experiential impulse associated with Thompson.[31] It was unusual for the author's capacity to move back and forth between the registers of "individual experience" (with all of its complexity and variety) and of social, political and economic process. Macintyre's study of *The Succeeding Age*, for example, begins (unconventionally for a general history) with a chapter entitled "Some Australians" that provides a biography of five individuals. He shows how these individuals "were separated not just geographically, but by firm economic and social boundaries."[32] He then used his close analysis of their experiences to identify what he called "common social structure."[33] Likewise, Macintyre's histories of the Communist Party are punctuated by carefully observed and sometimes affecting biographical close-ups of Communist leaders and rank-and-filers. And his contribution to the history of the Australian Labor Party's federal caucus, *True Believers*, is a revealing prosopography of the first Labor men elected to federal parliament.[34]

These biographical treatments reflected Macintyre's talent for observation (obvious to anyone with whom he shared conversation) and his interest in human complexity. They also reflected the influence of Macintyre's spouse—the distinguished anthropologist, Martha Macintyre—for there was something of the ethnographer in the historian's thick descriptions of working-class activists, of their rituals and their habits. Whatever the origins of this biographical and experiential emphasis, its imprint on Macintyre's work was significant and distinctive. It helped the historian to escape the snare of over-abstraction without ever losing the insights of social and political analysis. And it gave his narratives an enviable richness that won him a wide audience.

Macintyre also published several outright biographies. These shared his capacity to move between the general and the particular, even if their framing was more overtly personal. His study of Western Australian union leader, Paddy Troy was presented not simply as a striking portrait of an individual but also as a model of a "distinctive strand of the Australian Labour movement, that of the militant." Through his rich examination of Paddy's life, Macintyre was able to articulate the key dimensions of that model of the militant: "proud of their occupational skills, intensively class-conscious, suspicious of all compromise […] Their rejection of pragmatism is grounded in a

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31   Macintyre notes the influence of both in "Q&A with Stuart Macintyre."

32   Stuart Macintyre, *The Oxford History of Australia, vol. 4: 1901–1942: The Succeeding Age* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1986), 21.

33   Macintyre, *The Oxford History of Australia,* 24.

34   Stuart Macintyre and John Faulkner, eds., *True Believers: The Story of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party* (Crow's Nest: Allen and Unwin, 2001).

developed view of society, usually strengthened by self-education and a corresponding sense of historical mission."[35]

Similarly, Macintyre's portraits of three leading public figures in 19th century Victoria—George Higinbotham, Charles Pearson and David Syme—was framed not merely as a study of three connected lives, but more abstractly as an examination of *A Colonial Liberalism*.[36] Even Macintyre's biography of a distant predecessor as Professor of History at the University of Melbourne, Ernest Scott, bore the revealing title *A History for a Nation*. Here the method of biography provided a means to interrogate the rise of "Australian history" as an academic enterprise.[37]

The pursuit of biography leads its serious practitioners to an appreciation of the necessary entanglement of circumstance and agency, personal self-fashioning and contextual constraint. "We make history, not under circumstances of our own choosing, but in circumstances directly encountered and given from the past," to paraphrase Karl Marx from *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Macintyre returned periodically to Marx's historical essays (he noted that they "repay rereading");[38] his own understanding of the struggles of the Left reflected this abiding wisdom. In the first pages of his history of the Communist Party, *The Reds*, he deprecated party histories that "treat the fortunes of communism as a reflex of appropriate endeavour."[39] While he was justifiably critical of many aspects of Communist practice and much of the Party's strategy, he was too wise and too empathetic an historian to assume that there were always adequate answers to the dilemmas and the challenges thrown up by the past.

Macintyre's study of *The Labour Experiment* was a severe examination of the weaknesses of Labor's policies in the first half of the twentieth century: their unwillingness to fundamentally challenge divisions of labour and gender; their ultimate failure to abolish pronounced inequality; their inability even to provide a reliable safeguard against unemployment and poverty.[40] But even here he was conscious of the great difficulties the first Laborites faced. As Macintyre pointed out, the Australian Labor Party's precocious political success—it held minority national government from 1904 and majority national government from 1910—meant that it was forced to try to solve pressing social problems long before its Social Democratic counterparts overseas.

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35   Macintyre, *Militant*, 221.
36   Stuart Macintyre, *A Colonial Liberalism: the lot world of three Victorian visionaries* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1991).
37   Stuart Macintyre, *A History for a Nation: Ernest Scott and the Making of Australian History* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1994).
38   As noted in "Q&A with Stuart Macintyre."
39   Stuart Macintyre, *The Reds: The Communist Party of Australia from Origins to Illegality* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1998), 5.
40   Macintyre, *Winners and Losers*, 63–4.

When they began to develop more effective policies, over the 1930s, Australian labour was "committed to policies it was difficult to abandon."[41]

Australia's Boldest Experiment is the obvious successor to Macintyre's study of Labor's first five decades. Here he notes how an "unprecedented national emergency" opened up "new possibilities" for political change and how "many were grasped before the moment passed."[42] Reforming Laborites and intellectuals would not have chosen to return to office only as a great world-historical struggle between fascism and its alternatives teetered this way and that. But they were able to pursue what Macintyre called a "distinctive Australian design of reconstruction" in the teeth of this crisis, and to thereby establish the foundations of greater prosperity and greater equality in the decades that followed.[43]

A career focused simply upon enlarging the field of labour history in Britain and Australia would have constituted an appreciable life's achievement. Macintyre was unusually wide-ranging and productive, however, and he also made important contributions to historiography and to the history of ideas, broadly defined. Again, this interest was imprinted upon Macintyre's first published work, "Radical History and Bourgeois Hegemony." Again, he there developed an original approach that he would carry across his subsequent career.

Macintyre's first foray into historiography was clearly inspired by Marxist scholarship, and especially by Althusser's specific insights. The young Macintyre advocated historical studies animated by "the Marxist concept of totality," and his rejection of economism and idealism was accompanied by a desire to examine "class interrelationships and their determining factors."[44] These inclinations persisted. In his later commentary on the scholarship of fellow New Leftists, "The Making of the Australian Working Class" (1978), Macintyre identified an unhelpful tendency to treat "consciousness" as the "ultimate criterion of class."[45] He urged more careful attention to the construction of a national economy, the character of Australian capitalism, and the social basis of racism and imperialism.[46] His prize-winning general history that formed volume four of the *Oxford History of Australia, 1901–1942: The Succeeding Age* (1986), reaffirmed a desire to grasp relationships "in their totality": "material" practices, "social" practices, political mobilizations.[47] This granted his narrative ac-

41   Macintyre, *Winners and Losers*, 65.
42   Macintyre, *Australia's Boldest Experiment*, 15.
43   Macintyre, *Australia's Boldest Experiment*, 472.
44   Macintyre, "Radical History," 67, 69.
45   Stuart Macintyre, "The Making of the Australian Working Class: An Historiographical Survey," *Australian Historical Studies*, vol. 18, no. 71 (1978): 248.
46   Macintyre, "The Making," 249–51.
47   Stuart Macintyre, *The Oxford History of Australia, Volume 4. 1901–1942: The Succeeding Age* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1986).

counts an intimidating breadth. But this same sensibility meant that when he turned to the work of intellectuals—especially historians—he necessarily placed it in a fully realized context.

Macintyre's writings on historiography were moored in a deep understanding of their institutional environment. A historian of the Australian University, he was able to illuminate the possibilities and confinements of this place of work: the arduous rounds of teaching, for Australia's first Professors of History; the expectation that one might contribute to public affairs; the persistent superintendence of State authorities, including the security services. In his attention to the resources available for research—archives, jobs, scholarships, journals—he was able to trace its growth, its increasingly national perspective, and its less gratifying tendency to specialization.[48] Macintyre went further. In rich analyses of particular historians, he was also able to demonstrate how creative individuals sought to negotiate their changing circumstances, sometimes successfully, though sometimes less so. These included illuminating studies of leading academic historians such as Keith Hancock and Max Crawford.[49]

But Macintyre's capacity to place the historian in their context perhaps yielded the most startling results in his treatment of those writers less fully integrated into the world of the University. He showed how the first scholarly research in Australian history by Ernest Scott reflected a quest for authority (buttressed by a turn to von Ranke) and a desire to hold an audience outside of academia (reflected in a belief that "history" was a form of romance).[50] Likewise, his analysis of the work of freelance radical historian, Brian Fitzpatrick (the father of noted Soviet historian, Sheila Fitzpatrick), demonstrated how his intellectual momentum was stalled from the 1940s by the hostility of the cultural and political environment.[51] A similar capacity to locate careers

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48   On how increasing resources underpinned "a much stronger national perspective": Stuart Macintyre, "Historical Writing in Australia and New Zealand," in *The Oxford History of Historical Writing. Volume 4, 1800–1945*, edited by Stuart Macintyre, Juan Maiguascha and Attila Pok (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 425. For critical references to specialisation see: Tyson Retz and Stuart Macintyre, "The Honours Conception of History," *History Australia*, vol. 15, no. 4 (2018): 808.

49   On Hancock: Stuart Macintyre, "'Full of Hits and Misses': A Reappraisal of Hancock's *Australia*," in *Keith Hancock: The Legacies of an Historian* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2001). On Crawford: Stuart Macintyre, "The Making of a School," in *Making History* (Fitzroy: McPhee/Gribble, 1985), 3–33.

50   Stuart Macintyre, "Ernest Scott: My History is a Romance," in *The Discovery of Australian History, 1890–1939*, edited by Stuart Macintyre and Julian Thomas (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press), 71–90 and Stuart Macintyre, *A History for a Nation: Ernest Scott and the Making of Australian History* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1994). On his absence of expertise, p.34.

51   Stuart Macintyre, "The Radical and the Mystic: Brian Fitzpatrick, Manning Clark and Australian History," in *Against the Grain: Brian Fitzpatrick and Manning Clark in Australian His-*

against the background of their circumstances was also evident in Macintyre's revealing studies of the two dominant Australian historians of the period that ran from the 1960s through to the 1980s, Geoffrey Blainey and Manning Clark.[52]

Macintyre's interest in the relationships between context and historical writing perhaps made him especially sensitive to changes in that context during his own lifetime. In the early 1980s, the Australian right launched a "culture war" against the rise of left-wing interpretations of history and politics. Macintyre traced these developments in a prescient 1983 study, "Manning Clark's Critics." Here he noted the rise of critics of history from outside the profession: journalists, amateur historians, sociologists,[53] publishing in the house journals of right-wing thinktanks or in the conservative press. The new critics were "ideologues," anxious to redefine national identity for "conservative ends."[54] Their impact on Australian historians would be more fully explored in Macintyre's book-length study of 2003 (featuring a chapter by Anna Clark), *The History Wars*.

Written against the background of a right-wing polemicist's accusations of the "fabrication" of Aboriginal history (a claimed inflation of Aboriginal deaths in massacres), *The History Wars* places these conflicts in a longer historical and political perspective. Macintyre draws on thirty years of writing on Australian historians to investigate growing public conflicts over Australia's past. In his assessment, these "History Wars" should be distinguished from the necessary and perennial impulse to rewrite the past. The latter is an accepted aspect of research and debate, regulated by collegial inspection, academic honesty and intellectual fair dealing.[55] The former is animated by a Manichean vision and a vigilant resolution against a hateful enemy.[56] It is distinguished by the prevalence of ad hominem attack. It is inspired by an anxiety over the "politicization of history," though its prosecutors are themselves "advocates of a partisan political cause."[57] Its primary arenas are "extra-curricular."[58]

tory and Politics, edited by Stuart Macintyre and Sheila Fitzpatrick (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2007), 12–36.

52   On Blainey: Stuart Macintyre and Anna Clark, *The History Wars* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2003), Chapter 5. See also "The Making of a School," 27–32. On Clark: Stuart Macintyre, ""Always a pace or two apart"," in *Manning Clark: Essays on his Place in History*, edited by Carl Bridge (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1994), 17–29. See also: Stuart Macintyre, "Manning Clark's Critics," *Meanjin*, vol. 41, no. 4 (December 1982): 442–6. On Clark and Whitlamism: *The History Wars*, 58–9.

53   Stuart Macintyre, "Manning Clark's Critics," *Meanjin*, vol. 41, no. 4 (1982): 442–52.

54   Macintyre, "Manning Clark's Critics," 449–50.

55   Macintyre, *The History Wars*, 218.

56   Macintyre, *The History Wars*, 9.

57   Macintyre, *The History Wars*, 218–9.

58   Stuart Macintyre, "The History Wars," 78.

Macintyre's analysis of historiographical conflict was marked by a compelling clarity, and the book secured great media coverage and academic honours. It also made Macintyre a target of the political right. On the morning of the book's launch, Rupert Murdoch's *Australian* newspaper published a feature article that presented him as the "godfather" of Australian history; it implied that he had corruptly influenced the dispersal of Australian Research Council grants. A columnist from the *Daily Telegraph* alleged that Macintyre had improperly used the stationery of the University of Melbourne in a campaign against press bias.[59] His critical analysis of the power of a hostile media to influence historical debate was likened to a "shop steward" seeking to enforce a "closed shop."[60] His writings were rejected as "vindictive" and "abusive,"[61] reviving "the pro-Communist" invective of "the Cold War." Elaborate attention was drawn to his earlier membership of the Communist Party, long since ceded.[62] A later critique raked over internal conflicts at the University Melbourne and presented Macintyre as the victor in a vicious game of academic politics that brought him "power and perks."[63]

Macintyre bore these attacks with accustomed dignity and barely broke stride. He broadened in the following years his analysis of the context in which scholarship is undertaken, developing cogent analyses of the changing Australian University system (*No End of a Lesson* [2017]) and of his own University's negotiation of these changes (*Life After Dawkins* [2016]). Though little known outside Australia, they bear comparison with Stefan Collini's critical interventions in a British context. Macintyre also pursued a history of the social sciences in Australia, *The Poor Relation* (2010), an interest associated with his Presidency of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia.

He was distinguished by great administrative capacity and collegiality, and therefore served in senior positions on very many important cultural institutions: The State Library of Victoria, the National Library of Australia, the Australian Historical Association, the Heritage Council of Victoria. He chaired an important inquiry into Civics Education in Australia, and he drafted a new National Curriculum in History that covered the primary and secondary years. He held senior posts at the University of Melbourne, including two terms as Dean of Arts. But his eminence never compromised a concern for younger scholars and their careers: he carefully supervised as many as eighty postgraduate theses and aided these researchers and many others to take the next steps in their professional lives. He remained committed to teaching

59   As detailed in: Macintyre, "The History Wars," 78–9.
60   Greg Melleuish, Review of "The History Wars," *Policy*, vol. 19, no. 4 (2003-04), 54.
61   Kevin Donnelly, "Enraged or Engaged?," *Review* (Centre for Independent Studies) (2003), 39.
62   Melleuish, Review, 54.
63   Windschuttle, "Stuart Macintyre," p. 35.

and continued to teach at the University of Melbourne for some years after his formal retirement.

Macintyre was a man of settled habits. He ran marathons and half-marathons into his early seventies and enjoyed a Sunday morning run with a large group of friends that crossed generations. He bore the marks of Oxbridge with his fondness for pipe smoking and tweed jackets. He ardently followed the sports of Australian Rules Football (barracking for Hawthorn) and cricket and enjoyed especially taking overseas visitors to the Melbourne Cricket Ground to share in the atmosphere. He loved the city of his birth, Melbourne. He loved his library (some 11,000 volumes) and was perhaps most at home surrounded by his books and settling down to write.

Notwithstanding the slight introversion that most historians share, he was warm and very approachable to colleagues and acquaintances (though sometimes inadvertently intimidating to those with lesser achievement and intellectual range). He had a wry sense of humour and delighted in recounting stories animated by the follies and ambitions of his protagonists (whether historical figures or contemporaries). He was fundamentally modest and resisted the efforts of colleagues to celebrate his work and achievements. Reflecting both a confidence in his own gifts and a kind and generous disposition, he was always ready to welcome new scholars into his chosen fields, and to aid them in their own endeavours. Macintyre was conscious that he made his own histories under the relatively propitious circumstances of a middle-class childhood, a post-war boom, and an expanding University sector. He used his own opportunities and his talents to enlarge the possibilities available to other scholars. He also managed to enlarge our understanding of the history of Australia, and of the Left. And he thereby expanded our collective capacity to forge a better future.

Stuart Macintyre died in November 2021, after a protracted battle with cancer. He had the opportunity to hold his final book in his hands just a few weeks before his death and drew some satisfaction from his completion of these labours. Characteristically, he had already begun work on a new book. His many admirers will regret the books unwritten, but will be grateful for those many fine works that will endure. He is survived by his wife, his two daughters, and many grandchildren.

Stefan Berger

Thomas Welskopp (1961–2021): From Social History to the Cultural History of Society

The voice of one of Germany's leading social historians fell silent on 19 August 2021. Thomas Welskopp was a giant among his peers in more ways than one. When he was born in the heart of the industrial Ruhr region of Germany, in the mining and steel town of Bochum in 1961, no one would have predicted a brilliant career as a professor of history. He was born into the German working class and remained conscious of his roots throughout his all-too-short life. He came back regularly to Bochum to visit his elderly mother, to cheer on his beloved VfL Bochum in the stadium on Castroper Strasse and to eat a Currywurst (or two) — the popular local delicacy in this archetypal working-class town.

Today, Bochum is no longer a city of mines and steelworks, but while Thomas was growing up, he could still see the orange glow of the sky at night and hear the hammering of the steelworks and the sirens of the mines. Yet he was also born into the massive deindustrialization that affected his city and the Ruhr region as a whole and that the Germans like to call *Strukturwandel* (structural change), emphasizing the possibility of steering the process of deindustrialization in a way that would open up new possibilities for future development. In Bochum it was, above all, the Ruhr University that was founded as the very first university in the region in 1965 which came to represent one of the biggest success stories of this structural change. Yet, when Thomas came to choose a university to study history in 1982, his choice was not Bochum, but the equally young University of Bielefeld that was, at the time, the home of the so-called Bielefeld School of History, represented by Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Jürgen Kocka, among others. In the early 1980s, many young history students with left-of-centre political leanings veered towards Bielefeld as the type of social history practiced there seemed like a breath of fresh air in the stuffy and still largely conservative atmosphere of German history seminars, in which professors wore ties and had assistants that carried their bags. More to the point, source criticism seemed the ultimate in the theory of history in a profession still broadly stuck in the world of historicism. Thomas was influenced intellectually by the Bielefeld School and its type of political social history, but he was also deeply impressed with his experiences as an exchange student at John Hopkins University in Baltimore, where Ronald Walters and his studies on social movements, especially American abolitionism, left a lasting impression and sparked a life-long interest in American history.

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When he came to choose a dissertation topic, he turned to comparative working-class history and decided to study the history of work and power relationships surrounding work in German and American steelworks. *Arbeit und Macht im Hüttenwerk* was a history of the specific industrial relations regimes that emerged in the American and German steel industries and that he related back to an understanding of class in both countries that could not have been more different. Focusing on the Ruhr region of Germany and the areas around Pittsburgh and Chicago, he identified similar work processes. Thus, the team system, dominant between the 1860s and the 1880s, gave way to the drive system in 1890s and 1900s, and finally to the crew system around 1910. What Thomas showed so brilliantly for each case and for each system was that it was, above all, the mode of production that determined how workers related to each other and to their superiors at work. The success or failure of worker attempts to organize had much to do with those relationships. The book was exemplary in its detailed analysis of the impact of ethnic differences in the work force, and its excellent interpretation of different managerial ideologies on both sides of the Atlantic. At its very heart stood work cultures, and it was already here that Thomas widened the perspective of the social to include cultural processes and expressions in his understanding of the social. In many pathbreaking articles and edited collections over subsequent years, he outlined what was one of the key messages of the book: the revival of labour history, which had entered a crisis in the 1980s, was possible through a focus on the company and the company-level relationships that workers forged at work. The complexity of workplace identities was foregrounded time and again in Thomas's analyses. He thus had little time for simplistic sociological analyses, like those of Harry Bravermann, who had famously argued that it was the deskilling of labour which robbed workers of the means to resist management strategies. Thomas's comparative analysis of work relations in the American and German steel industry showed that other factors were at play that were far more important in determining the degree to which workers could oppose management effectively: first, the networks of solidarities forged by workers and their organizations, and secondly, the hierarchies involved in work processes that were based on specific power relationships among different groups of workers.

His dissertation, which was completed at the Free University of Berlin, where Thomas had moved together with his supervisor and mentor, Jürgen Kocka, made him an immediate household name and rising star in Germany's social history circles. In Berlin, he also wrote his Habilitation on German labour history—with another brilliant book on the history of early German Social Democracy from the 1840s to the 1860s. It was a courageous choice, as German labour history as party history seemed almost a dead field of studies at the time. During its heyday in the 1960s and 1970s, it was a subject that had been discovered by a generation of left-of-centre historians who pointed out that the history of left-wing parties and social movements had been kept before the gates of German academia for a long time because of the latter's conservative predilections. The championing of this field of historical writing went hand in

hand with the political hope that a radicalized contemporary labour movement would bring major changes to German society. When this hope began to fade towards the end of the 1970s, the field moved into crisis mode, with many of its doyens reflecting on how it might find ways out of its loss of future horizons.

The comparative method was one such proposed way, and Thomas had already championed it with his first book. A second promising path out was the turn towards cultural history that had swept everything before it in the Anglophone world during the 1980s and arrived in Germany with some delay in the 1990s. The cultural turn in historical writing was not greeted enthusiastically by the representatives of the Bielefeld School. Especially Wehler was extremely sceptical about an emphasis on culture and theoretical perspectives that were no longer inspired by Max Weber and Karl Marx but looked rather to French poststructuralism, in particular Michel Foucault. Thomas's mentor, Jürgen Kocka, was always more open and flexible in his approach to historical writing, willing to enter into dialogue with historians that did not share his theoretical and methodological penchants. It was still a sign of Thomas's self-confidence and personality that he gave his own study of early Social Democracy a decidedly cultural bent, thereby also seeking to further develop the approaches championed by his teachers at Bielefeld and Berlin.

Although Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens would always be more important to his work as a historian than Foucault, Thomas's book was another landmark publication, in which he not only comprehensively covered the history of the early German labour movement for the first time, but also established this history as being largely autonomous from the later history of the Social Democratic Party that emerged fully after the Anti-Socialist Laws in the 1890s. Skillfully combining individual and collective biography, he highlighted the importance of the interconnectedness of the leadership circle of this early form of a party organization. He brought to life the associational culture of early Social Democracy and analyzed its ideology. The close proximity between everyday life and the associational milieu of Social Democracy is described in ways which underline how this milieu became even more important than family ties and workplace relations—at least to what Thomas described as the "carrier milieu" of early Social Democracy. Thomas also identifies an "associated milieu" and a "contact milieu" with declining forms of identification with the party's associational culture. He differentiates between the strongest and most active associations usually to be found in the urban centres and weaker forms of associationalism which sometimes needed constant resourcing from the hegemonic centres in order to stay active.

He shows how journeymen became the most numerous group of workers, next to artisans and small trades people, among early Social Democrats which helps to understand the party's anti-guild stance. Early Social Democracy, Thomas shows, formed archipelagos amidst conservative, liberal, or clerical seas. Describing it as a "decentralized associational party," he emphasizes the importance of its leisure-time activities as giving the party members a social world of their own which was fundamental to

their identity. He also shows convincingly how the party especially thrived in localities where workers had failed to form trade unions, indicating that in fact the early formation of a political party in Germany was due to failed attempts at trade unionization. Many early Social Democrats perceived themselves, above all, as democrats in search for greater social justice but also in search of a unified German nation state. These commitments formed a bridge to bourgeois democratic politicians and, as Thomas could show, there was as yet a great willingness to cooperate with bourgeois political representatives. The early party associations were thus not so much representing a proletarian counterculture as a variant of liberal bourgeois cultural norms and values. Most early Social Democrats were male, and their associational culture often had an extreme male bias. Altogether, they aimed at the formation of a democratic male civil society. Even in their political language, early Social Democrats tended to exclude women from their "community." Even though Thomas's second great book focused overwhelmingly on Germany, he could not quite let go of comparative history. In a wonderfully illuminating epilogue to his book, he compared early German Social Democracy with labour movements in a range of other countries in Europe and North America pleading to establish more subtle differences between them (which he saw rooted mainly in the different political systems in which early labour movements operated) but treating them as one and the same type of movement.

Although he had lost his heart to Munich after a stay at the Historisches Kolleg in 2008/9, he was to stay after 2004 as professor for the history of the industrial world at the University of Bielefeld—thus returning to the place where he spent his first formative university years. By 1997, he co-edited, together with Thomas Mergel, a collection of essays entitled *Geschichte zwischen Kultur und Gesellschaft* (history between culture and society) attempting to historicize the Bielefeld School and to move a modern cultural history of society forward. The first generation of the Bielefeld School were guided by the theories of Max Weber and Karl Marx. The next generation to which Thomas belonged, were deeply familiar with those two giants, but they looked also elsewhere for inspiration. Looking at the different contributions to this edited collection we thus encounter Foucault, Bourdieu, Giddens, Niklas Luhmann, Benedict Anderson, Antonio Gramsci, and a whole range of gender theorists, modernization theorists and theorists of social anthropology as well as communitarianism that have all been influential among this second generation of social historians in Germany. Thomas, in his own contribution to this influential collection, sought to develop the social history of his academic "fathers" further. He was never an iconoclast. His collection of classic texts of the Bielefeld School published together with Bettina Hitzer under the title *Die Bielefelder Sozialgeschichte* (Bielefeld social history), was a tribute to the generation of his teachers that was full of admiration for their achievements but also contained critical perspectives—in line with Max Weber's famous statement that it was the fate of all scientific endeavour to be overtaken by the next generation of scientists.

For seventeen years Thomas pushed the boundaries of social history at Bielefeld University, always alert to new theoretical developments, always convinced of the "veto rights of the empirical sources" (Reinhart Koselleck). The Bielefeld graduate school in history and sociology, producing another generation of social historians in Germany, became his particular baby. Founded in 2008, its hallmark became the interdisciplinary cooperation especially with sociologists, but also representatives from a range of other disciplines who all became involved in the structured training of PhD students. This hugely productive and influential graduate school benefited enormously from Thomas's engagement with students among whom he was incredibly popular because he always remained approachable and avoided any form of condescension. His good humour, his wit and his brilliance as a teacher accompanied the Bielefeld graduate school to the end.

At Bielefeld he developed a third important research field, the history of the prohibition in the United States of America. Published under the title *Amerikas große Ernüchterung. Eine Kulturgeschichte der Prohibition* (America's great disenchantment—a cultural history of the Prohibition), Thomas here practiced a cultural history of society and followed his own theoretical predilections, guided—like in his other two research monographs—by a stupendous knowledge of the sources. He discusses very different facets of the era: legal, economic, political, social, cultural, and gender perspectives were all employed and merge into a rounded kaleidoscope on the years between 1920 and 1932. His book contains many memorable anecdotes and stories that make the book not only insightful, but a pleasure to read. Thus, we learn much about how the illegal drinking dens of the prohibition era overcame the rigid gender division that characterized the male-dominated saloon culture before the 1920s. The "flappergirls," devoted to illegal drinking, became an iconic image of these years just as much as the gangster cultures that are also given considerable space in this volume. The powerful Anti-Saloon League was in a key alliance, especially in the southern states, with the Ku-Klux-Clan and together they portrayed saloons as dangerous places, where unwanted immigrants and those they deemed as not belonging to America, such as Jews, Blacks and Communists, were planning the downfall of the "city on the hill." Racist ideologies were closely aligned to the successful banning of alcoholic beverages. The book is acutely alert to a range of idiosyncrasies such as the support of both the Anti-Saloon League and the Clan for the enfranchisement of women, as both were convinced that they would gain new supporters by such a move. The book describes also in detail the massive police violence with which the prohibition was pushed through in different parts of the US. Thomas showed that the banning of alcoholic beverages was overwhelmingly a campaign that drew support from rural and small-town America that dominated the political landscape as the massive urbanization of America and the formation of the big metropolises had not yet led to the redrawing of political constituencies.

Thomas not only produced three pathbreaking monographs but was also the master of the academic article. He had an essayistic talent—something he had undoubtedly learnt from the United States—a country which he loved to visit. In particular the University of Notre Dame in Indiana became a place to which he returned time and again and where he felt at home. In the 2010s, he turned to practice theory with an ever-greater vengeance and sought to shed light on the history of capitalism, on class relationships and on factory life, themes that he had pursued since his PhD days. Some of this work was collected in the book *Unternehmen Praxisgeschichte* (Operation practice history) published in 2014. The factory, in particular, became the locus classicus for some of his most pertinent historical analyses that included attention to the many criminal activities of employers in their attempts to out-manoeuvre the competition under capitalism. In a volume co-edited by Hartmut Berghoff and Cornelia Rauh, Thomas pleaded to differentiate between crimes committed for economic profit and corruption and he also clearly saw that economic crimes rarely questioned the economic order as such. Thomas was also an outstanding business historian that can be seen, among other studies, in his work on the Swiss Migros company or in his attention to the micropolitics of businesses at the shop floor. It was no coincidence that Thomas was an active member of the Association of Critical Business and Industrial History (Arbeitskreis für kritische Unternehmens- und Industriegeschichte), founded in his hometown in 1989. In his final years, he became particularly interested in the boundaries between free and unfree labour, questioning the significance of free wage labour for a history of capitalism.

Politically, Thomas was a man of the left. For a time, he served as a member of the SPD's Historical Commission, but he became disillusioned with the latter's lack of political influence and its inability to make itself heard in public debates in Germany. His heart belonged to scholarship (Wissenschaft), and he loved to research, teach, and build institutions that would further the cultural history of society. In this spirit, he also became a founding member of the German Labour History Association (GLHA) that emerged in 2017. As a member of the association's executive he was instrumental in shaping the first conference of the GLHA around the issue of free wage labour. As founding president of the GLHA, I could always rely on his wise advice and loyal support. His contribution to the revival of German labour history over recent years has been immense.

Thomas's writings in social and labour history betrayed a keen interest in and deep knowledge of the theory of history and the history of historiography which eventually was also to bring us together as co-chairs of the theory and historiography network at the European Social Science History Conference (ESSHC), where he was my colleague for many years. Whilst he was widely read in poststructuralist and narrativist theories, he rejected the relativism that sometimes goes hand in hand with the adoption of such theoretical viewpoints among historians. He was adamant that the historian's task remained one of saying something about historical realities that had

to be pieced together by a profound knowledge of the historical sources, both textual and non-textual. His insistence that there was something he was not afraid to call historical reality made him turn to Anthony Giddens's theory of structuration. Both agency and structure had to be depicted in their concrete social contexts, he would not tire to argue. Conceptually he was particularly interested in theories of capitalism and theories of consumption around which many of his articles and contributions to labour and social history circled.

Thomas was an exceptional scholar, but, above all, he was a real *Mensch*. Our friendship dates back to the days when I was still Professor of Contemporary History in South Wales in the early 2000s. He stayed with my family for a couple of days after attending a conference I had organized. We visited the industrial heritage of South Wales together and sampled the local ales. My older daughter, extremely shy as a child, immediately and instinctively trusted Thomas, who found a way into her heart as he found his way into so many of others. He listened and he was able to relate to others—both qualities not very common in high-flying scholars. Many of his PhD and Master's students can testify to his outstanding abilities as supervisor which sometimes went far beyond scholarly advice. He certainly always was a good friend to me. I shall miss him.